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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the existing empirical financial literature on the 
determinants of capital structure and adjustment process, cost of debt determinants and the 
affect of capital structure on profitability in the context of non-financial Small and Medium 
size Enterprises (SME) in the UK. In order to formulate the testable hypothesis different 
capital structure theories are reviewed.  
 
A firm can choose equity, debt or both to finance its operations. The selection of optimal debt 
equity mix is a crucial issue in finance. The Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) is 
considered to control for simultaneous equation bias employing both firm specific and 
macroeconomic variables. For entire population of non-financial SMEs in the UK using Two 
Stage Least Square (TSLS) methodology, we focused on determinants of the cost of debt 
capital and the impact of capital structure on profitability. 
 
Results indicate that findings are consistent with the pecking order theory, trade-off theory 
and agency theory. Our results show that short term debt plays an important role in capital 
structure, cost of debt and profitability of SMEs in the UK. Moreover, the short term debt is 
appeared to be more expensive for the manufacturing sector and more profitable for service 
sector whilst size and macroeconomic variables have a significant impact on leverage.  
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CHAPTER 1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation of the study 
Capital structure is the one of the controversial issue in the theory of finance since the 
unrealistic assumptions of Modigliani and Miller (1958, henceforth MM, 1958). Since then 
much of the capital structure theories have advanced explaining different capital structure 
patterns and to provide empirical evidence relating to the explanatory power of these theories 
in the real world. However these empirical studies mainly based on the large firms and 
majority of these studies have largely been confined to United States. Though these studies 
have produced results of leverage related costs and tax advantage of debt the question is 
whether or not the various gearing related costs and benefits are economically important to 
have a significant impact on the optimal capital structure. 
 
The most commonly accepted view is that firms are heterogeneous and each firm has a unique 
optimal capital structure which is determined by the characteristics of the particular firm. 
Previous studies (Marsh, 1982; Jalilvand and Harris, 1984) on capital structure have studied 
how firms choose the equity and debt mix and they have concluded that the important source 
of finance is the internal source. This is because internal finance is the cheapest source of 
finance which allows firm to undertake investment without any transaction costs, cost of 
bankruptcy, agency problems and asymmetric information compared to external finance.   
  
Many small businesses seek financial help from family or friend because it starts out as an 
idea from one individual or more. If they are successful as they start as small establishment, 
there comes a time for the developing and expansion of the business. However, they often run 
8 
 
into problem of acquiring capital as they find it difficult to obtain capital compare to larger 
businesses. These difficulties that SMEs encounter can be related to some policy issues, 
incomplete range of financial products which are appropriate for their needs, transaction cost 
and the information asymmetry between firm and the finance provider.  However, one of the 
most contentious issues in financing business is determining the debt, equity mix. To 
generalize and come up with theories and models explaining and predicting the most suitable 
capital structure, the academic world has spent much effort. In particular, Modigliani & Miller 
(1958) have proved that mix of debt and equity have no effect on firm value or the cost of 
capital assuming perfect capital market.,  Myers (1984) suggest that firms should balance the 
tax benefit of borrowing against the risk of financial distress, Myers & Majluf (1984) suggest 
that managers  have superior  information and it is generally better to issue safety security 
than risky ones, and Burger and Udell (1998) examine the financial growth cycle and capital 
structure and show that different capital structures are optimal at different point in the 
financial growth cycle. 
 
A noticeable feature of most theories that discuss capital structure is the fact that they are 
usually developed to explain the capital structure of large firms. The question of whether 
these capital structure theories can be applied to small and medium-sized firms (SMEs) is still 
a puzzle. This is therefore investigated in the 3
rd
 chapter of this study. We also study what 
factors determine the cost of debt and profitability of SMEs in the UK. 
 
The theories generally suggest that the firms choose their debt equity mix based on the 
attributes that determine the various costs and benefits associated with debt equity mix. Better 
understanding of the cost of debt determinants should result in more precise debt equity mix 
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and create a better alignment between manager’s compensation and shareholder value 
creation.  The available empirical research in this area has lagged behind the theoretical 
research, especially in the context of SMEs. Therefore Chapter 4 of this study focuses on the 
determinants of debt capital which will contribute to the existing empirical literature. 
 
The final empirical chapter (Chapter five) of this study examine the influence of capital 
structure on profitability of non-financial SMEs in the UK. Identifying the appropriate mix of 
capital structure would also change the ownership structure and control considerations and 
thereby encourage the managers to act more in the interest of the shareholders in order to 
ensure the firms’ profitability is increased. As noted in the literature many of the previous 
studies are US based. Further, prior research does not consider the reverse causation from 
profitability to capital structure. Therefore we find it is important to study how this debt 
equity mix affects the firms’ profitability.  
 
1.2 Background  
The purpose of our study is to empirically examine the determinants of borrowing decisions, 
and determinants of cost of debt and the influence of capital structure on profitability of non- 
financial SMEs in the UK. The methodology of this study consist of the review of literature, 
construction of hypothesis, collection of data, estimating and testing and interpretation of 
findings and finally generate conclusions relating them to the theory and the literature.  
 
The main focus of our study will be based on previous empirical studies and on three major 
theories of capital structure namely the Trade-off Theory (TOT), the Pecking Order Theory 
(POT) and Agency Theory (AT). TOT assumes that an optimal capital structure is achieved 
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by trading off cost and the benefit of debt (Fama and French, 2002, Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers, 1999). Thus, companies equate the costs and benefits of debt and select the optimal 
mix of debt and capital which maximizes the value of the firm. PT suggests that firms have 
strong preference over internal finance (Myers, 1984) as that is the most profitable source of 
finance. In a need of external finance firms issue debt and when all other options are worn out 
they go for equity as a last resort. The AT’s view, in the other hand, argues that agency 
problems occur due to incomplete alignment of the agent’s and the owner’s interests. That 
means separation of ownership and control generates agency cost. This is mainly due to the 
asymmetry of information between two parties, Jensen and Meckling (1976).  
 
The issue of capital structure has been constantly debated in the lietrature (Harris & Raviv, 
1991; Myers, 1984; Sogrob-Mira, 2005) and it is proved to be complex issue to investigate 
(Van der Wijst & Thurik, 1993). There are two different ways to finance the assets of the 
firm, through equity and debt. Moreover, there are several different kinds of equity and debts, 
such as common stock, preferred stock and retained earnings as well as bank loans, bonds, 
accounts payable and line of credit. The relation between debt and equity, often measured 
with the debt proportion ratio, represents the capital structure of a firm (McMenamin, 1999).  
 
There are theories explaining the advantages for certain mixtures of debt (Modigliani & 
Miller, 1958), theories clarifying why some companies tend to avoid debts (Myers, 1984), 
existence of taxes and bankruptcy cost make debt relevant (DeAnegelo and Masulis, 1980), 
and some theories pinpointing that some companies put more focus on their strategic goals, 
whilst little attention is paid to rational profit maximizing (Barton & Matthews, 1989). The 
real world however, confirms that there is no single theory or model applicable to all 
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companies and their choice of capital structure (Barton & Mathews, 1989, Mathews, 
Vasudevan, Barton & Apana, 1994).  
 
One of the main aspects of the choice of the SME sector is the role of SMEs in the generation 
of economic and social welfare. Given the fact that small businesses, and particularly 
innovative SMEs, become increasingly vital to economic development and job creation as the 
knowledge-based economy develops. SMEs boost competition and entrepreneurship 
consequently providing economy-wide efficiency and aggregate product growth. According 
to the Bank of England statistics (2004) show that firms with less than 100 employees 
accounted for 99.8% of the total business population, 44.7% of turnover and over 55% of 
employment in the UK. The great majority of all businesses in the UK (82%) had not sought 
external finance for their business at all in 2003. This proves that they are the engine of 
economic development. It is not surprising that there has been ongoing governmental concern 
against this background with regard to the source and availability of finance to SMEs 
(Cruickshank ;2000). However SMEs still face the difficult issue of access to capital for 
future development. This raises a question as to what factors influence the capital structure of 
UK SMEs.  
 
However, most empirical studies focused on capital structure used data pertaining to large 
companies. Since most large firms can easily access finance nationally and internationally, it 
is not reasonable to accept and generalize the results of these studies especially for SMEs as 
they might not have the same facilities. In complying with the above view Ang (1992) argued 
that small privately held firms encounter different types of financing problems in comparison 
to large firms. Storey (1994) suggests that small firms find it difficult to obtain outside capital 
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and when they are able to obtain debt, it is at a higher interest rate. Berger and Udell (1998) 
confirm that raising external finance are even more pronounced for smaller firms. 
Theoretically these problems caused due to the information asymmetry and agency cost. The 
interest rates are actually the main instrument of the economy which cease or attract the 
external investments. This affects the companies in different ways, first it will elevate cost of 
finance and on the other hand hindering the profitability. Therefore it is timely important to 
study what financing sources do this companies prefer, what factors determine the capital 
structure, cost of debt and profitability of SMEs in the UK. 
 
1.3 The contribution of the study 
Our main contribution to the literature is mainly empirical. We study the capital structure, 
cost of debt and profitability of SMEs in the UK which has not been received much attention. 
While most researchers focus on large firms and financing as well as on financial constraints 
of US, We focus here on small and medium size enterprises in the UK, as we think that they 
can be one of the most influential players in the UK economy.  
 
Our study shed some light on a specific area of finance namely capital structure, cost of debt 
and profitability. Previous literature has mainly concentrated on the cost of debt and 
determinants of profitability of large companies. This study, however contribute to the 
existing studies as we have incorporated macroeconomic variables and used a dynamic model 
to estimate the capital structure of SMEs in the UK. This is expected to highlight and gain the 
practical insight in to the financial practices of the non-financial SMEs in the UK.  
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Further this study extend the literature that short term debt is an important source of finance 
for SMEs in the UK. In particular short term debt has been the most popular source that funds 
the small firms. Thus in this study we have focused on the three different sectors micro small 
and medium firms in order to provide more comprehensive view on the finance behavior and 
impact of capital structure on the profitability and cost of debt of those firms.  
 
1.4 The structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 provides introduction, definition and importance of SME where we explain various 
definitions of SMEs, and we clarify the definition use in this study.  The difference between 
the finance of SME and that of large business is investigated. We also shed the light on the 
importance of SME to the UK economy, manipulate data on SME finance, and finally outline 
overall capital structure of SMEs in UK where we focus on the tradeoff theory, pecking order 
theory, agency theory and asymmetric information.  
 
Chapter 3 is the first empirical chapter, the subject is capital structure determinates of SMEs 
in the UK. We mainly concentrate on the factors which determine the capital structure of 
SMEs and the role of the adjustment process. We review the previous research on capital 
structure of SMEs and provide the details on firm specific, macroeconomic variables and 
adjustment to financial targets and explain firm specific and macroeconomic variables that 
influence capital structure. An innovative aspect of our study is that we use the dynamic 
adjustment model which enables us to test the dynamic adjustment preposition as other 
studies relating to SMEs in the UK use static model. Another important aspect of our study is 
that we use both firm specific factors and macroeconomic variables. The empirical approach 
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include panel Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) analysis. Results confirm that the 
pecking order theory, agency theory and trade off theory have an important role in explaining 
the capital structure of SMEs in the UK and macroeconomic changes are also significantly 
affecting the capital structure. Total debt ratio exhibits a positive relationship with 
macroeconomic variables. It could be interpreted as the country grows, leverage also 
increases as growth provide better financing opportunities for SMEs. It also suggests that 
firms have long term target debt ratio where they adjust to the target ratio relatively fast. 
 
Chapter 4 turns attention to the cost of debt of non-financial SMEs in the UK as 
understanding the determinants of debt should results in precise capital budgeting decision 
and thereby understand why SME is difficult to attract external finance requirements.  For this 
purpose we have to carry out empirical testing using panel date methodology covering all the 
SMEs in the population. The empirical approach includes Two Stage Least Square (TSLS) 
technique. To test how the size of the firm affects the cost of debt capital, we have divided the 
total sample into three sub sample; micro, small and medium. The results seem to support the 
notion that size matters for the cost of debt of SMEs in the UK. Results further shows that 
SMEs are highly depend on short term debt and strongly oppose to share the ownership. 
 
The main issue address in the chapter 5 is to test how capital structure affects the profitability 
of non-financial SMEs in the UK as prior research does not take in to account the reverse 
causation from profitability to capital structure.  Additionally, to capture impact of capital 
structure on various sectors, we have divided the sample initially as manufacturing and 
service and based on the extended sector classification.  This enables us to understand how 
debt equity mix affects on the profitability of different sectors. We use again the Two Stage 
15 
 
Least Square technique for the estimations. Furthermore this directly addresses the spirit of 
the previous chapter and the role of short term debt on profitability. Results indicate that 
capital structure matters, the profitability and size is also one of the most important factor that 
determine the profitability of SMEs in the UK. Furthermore, consistent with the agency 
theory the argument of higher leverage is associated with lower profitability which is 
economically significant as well.  
 
Final chapter, Chapter 6 concludes. We summarize the key findings of each empirical chapter 
and also discuss some policy implications and main future research ideas.  
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CHAPTER 2 
SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZE ENTERPRISE SECTOR IN THE UK AND 
PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the overall capital structure of the SME sector in the UK and 
theoretical framework of the study in order to get a general understanding. The financing of 
SME is different from that of large businesses. It is not therefore surprising that empirical 
literature has shown different behavior of capital structure over firms and countries.  Based on 
the general concept of SMEs in this chapter we attempt to evaluate the growth and role of 
SME in economy in terms of contribution to the GDP, employment etc.  We also focus on the 
feature of our dataset. 
 
This chapter consists of 4 sections. Firstly outline the theoretical framework, definition of 
SME and importance of the SME sector in the UK economy and the focuses on the general 
capital structure in UK. 
 
2.2 Theoretical aspects of SMEs  
A firm can be defined as a legally recognized organization designed to provide goods or 
service, or both to consumers, businesses and government entities (Sheffrin, 2003). 
Businesses are the prime concern in capitalist economies and most of the businesses are 
privately owned. A business is typically formed to make profit that will increase the wealth of 
its owners and grow the business itself. Except cooperative enterprises and state-owned 
enterprises the main objective of owners and managers of other businesses is to generate a 
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financial return which matches with the work and the risk they bare. Businesses can also be 
formed as not-for-profit or be state-owned. On the other hand a business can be grouped in to 
two groups of characteristics as quantity characteristics such as size, assets output, turnover, 
number of employees etc. and quality characteristics such as organizational structure, 
management quality where these qualitative characteristics in general are difficult to measure. 
As a result the most frequently used characteristics that have been applied to differentiate the 
firm are the quantity characteristics. In particular number of workers, sales and total assets of 
the firm are the most frequently used criteria.  
 
As mentioned in the enterprise and industry publication of European Commission 2005, the 
first common definition for SME was adopted in 1996 with the intention of improving the 
consistency and effectiveness and to limit the competition. The definition has been widely 
applied thorough the European Union (EU) but in May 2003, in order to take account the new 
economic development, the commission adopted new recommendation where turnover and 
balance sheet total ceiling were introduced to the definition in addition to the number of 
employees This new definition  replace since January 2005
1
. In this study we use EU 
definition and it is discussed in detail below.  
 
2.3 Definitions of SME  
For the purpose of studying the capital structure and financial choice of SMEs in the UK one 
major issue that we have to clarify is the way we define SMEs and also how they are different 
from large firms. In this section we discuss 3 different definitions of SMEs , United Kingdom, 
                                                             
 
1
 See enterprise and industry publication of European Commission 2005. 
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European Union and US respectively and finally we explain which definition and why we use 
the selected definition for this study.  
2.3.1 United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom there is no one definition for what a SME is. Head count seems to be 
the common in most of the definitions. The Department of Trade and Industry define SMEs 
only based on the number of employees while British Bankers Association defines SMEs only 
based on the turnover.  Section 382 and 465 of the Companies Act 2006 define a SME for the 
purpose of accounting requirements. 
Table 2.1 
SME definition - UK 
Enterprise category Headcount Turnover or Balance sheet total 
medium-sized < 250 ≤ £ 25.9 million ≤ £ 12.9 million 
small < 50 ≤ £ 6.5 million ≤ £ 3.26 million 
 
It is noted that even within the UK this definition is not applied universally.  
 
2.3.2 European Commission 
The European Commission has a third category called micro enterprises. A micro enterprise 
has a headcount of less than 10, and a turnover or balance sheet total of not more than €2 
million. 
 
Table 2.2 
SME Definition –European Commission 
Enterprise category Headcount Turnover or Balance sheet total 
medium-sized < 250 ≤ € 50 million ≤ € 43 million 
small < 50 ≤ € 10 million ≤ € 10 million 
micro < 10 ≤ € 2 million ≤ € 2 million 
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Enterprises qualify as micro, small and medium-sizes enterprises (SMEs) if they fulfill the 
above criteria. In addition to the staff headcount ceiling an enterprise qualifies as an SME if it 
meets either the turnover or total assets ceiling.  
 
The EU Commission established a SME definition based on four criteria (number of 
employees, turnover, total balance sheet and independence) in order to unify the large number 
of definitions used by different institutions of the EU member countries. Number of 
employees, is the first criteria and obligatory criteria and it is considered as the important and 
widely used in the EU member countries. Independence is an important aspect of the 
definition which has been included to avoid companies being controlled by other companies. 
Turnover and total balance sheet are the other important financial criteria. Considering these 
four criteria, the EU Commission in 1996 published a recommendation on the definition of a 
SME which states; 
1. A company will be considered as a SME when: 
-the number of employees is less than 250 people, 
-either annual turnover is less than 40 million Euros per year or its total balance sheet 
is less than 27 million Euros, 
-it is independence as expressed in point 3 below. 
2. When the differentiation between a SME is necessary, a company can be ranked as 
small when; 
 -the number of employees is less than 50 people, 
-either annual turnover is less than 7 million Euros per year or its total balance sheet is 
less than 5 million Euros, 
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-it is independence as expressed in point 3 below. 
3. A company is defined as independent if a 25% or more of its capital (or voting rights) 
do not belong to any other company or group of companies not considered SMEs. 
4. When the differentiation between a macro company and the rest of SMEs is necessary, 
a micro company can defined as a company with less than 10 employees. 
 
Most of the UK companies follow the European Commission Recommendation (ECR) and 
rank their company statistics according to the number of employees. From the institutional 
point of view, it seems that the European Commission has achieved its objective of unifying 
the different definitions of SMEs. Nevertheless in the field of research this definition has not 
been finalised. On the contrary, a large variety of criteria still exist. In this fashion, some 
research papers can be found in the UK that has used the number of employees as the criteria 
to define SME.  
 
2.3.3 USA 
The definition of small business in the USA is set by a government department called Small 
Business Administration (SBA) Size Standard Office. SME definition of US considered 
individual industry size instead of applying one single definition for all industries like in UK 
and EU
2
.  This variation is intended to better reflect industry differences
3
. To sum up in this 
                                                             
 
2
 See University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, SME definition. 
3
 The most common size standards are  
 500 employees for most manufacturing and mining industries  
 100 employees for wholesale trade industries  
 $7 million of annual receipts for most retail and service industries  
 $33.5 million of annual receipts for most general & heavy construction industries  
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study we have adopted the European Commission definition. Different countries use different 
definitions for SME. In the US for specified industries the upper limit for employment can be 
1000-1500, for small firms is 250 and for medium firm 500 employees. Similarly the other 
criteria, annual turnover can vary from US$0.75mn to US$33.5mn.  Canada uses the term 
SME to refer to business with fewer than 500 employees while classifying firms with 500 or 
more as large businesses. While European Commission introduced a definition based on 
employment, turnover and asset size some countries in the EU still use their own domestic 
definition for their statistics.  
2.4 The difference between SME and Large Business Finance 
There are some distinguished qualitative differences between the financing of small firms and 
large firms. The small businesses generally only have access to private equity and debt 
markets, whereas large firms have access to the public markets. It is argued that information 
asymmetry is the main reason that small firms have no access to the publicly traded securities. 
In addition to that publicly traded securities are associated with significant amount of other 
additional cost which will be difficult to afford to a small firm. Those costs are essentially 
fixed and create economies of scale in issue size. SMEs find it is difficult to overcome the 
economies of scale in issue size as there is a positive correlation between issue size and asset 
size of the firm.  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
 
 $14 million of receipts for all special trade contractors  
 $0.75 million of receipts for most agricultural industries  
Approximately one quarter of industries have a size standard that is different to those listed above. Refer to the 
SBA website for the full table of size standards. The most recent scheme was originally produced in 2002, but 
has had amendments integrated on a rolling basis. 
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The financing of a small firm is transparently different from that of larger firms. Large firms 
have ready access to the capital markets, such as the London Stock Exchange, where there is 
no access to the vast majority of small firms. The lack of equity capital invested in small firms 
forces these firms to search for other sources of finance, which tend to be bank lending and 
other types of financial products. There have been constant concerns that the finance markets 
do not always fully meet the needs of small firms who can find it harder than large firms to 
acquire finance that is available, suitable and reasonable. But there are mechanisms which 
widen the access to finance specially targeting at SMEs such as Small Firm Loan Guarantee 
(SFLG) which help small businesses to find the funding opportunities even without the 
required collateral. But most of the young firms are not aware about these facilities and more 
of them are reluctant to use these facilities
4
. 
 
However significant evidence does exist which suggest that there are specific problem areas 
within the UK economy. A number of groups face distinguish challenges when accessing 
finance, including women setting up businesses, ethnic minority businesses, entrepreneurs 
from deprived backgrounds and high technology businesses. British Bankers Association 
(2009) shows that SMEs in the UK remain dependent on the bank finance and continued 
weakness in bank lending remains a challenge for those borrowers, though according to 
British Bankers’ Association statistics, net lending by banks to UK small businesses has been 
positive during 2009 despite weakening in recent months. 
 
                                                             
 
4
 See Small business survey, The small business service 2005. 
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The most prominent banking providers in UK are the big four
5
 which provide wide range of 
retail banking to investment banking for both business and personal customers. SME sector is 
largely banked by these banks and internet based banking providers are not much active in the 
SME market. Building societies mainly offer commercial mortgages and now they have 
expanded the range of services they offered. Irrespective of these changes still the big four are 
dominant the market. Through the government help Small Business Service offers small 
business loan guarantee scheme
6
 where the loan is applied through the retail bank and 75% is 
guaranteed by the government. In the context of SMEs a large number of research (Wilson 
2007, Deakins et. al, 2008) suggest the dissatisfaction of small firms about the availability of 
finance because of information asymmetry. Fraser (2008) suggests that past difficulties are 
gradually improving through the better communication. Further Fraser (2008) shows that 69% 
of SMEs in the UK have a single banking relationship and in the recent past the SMEs 
communicate with the bank through internet and there are less face to face contacts between 
banks and business owners which would not be expected to enhance the quality of the 
relationships with banks and help flow of finance to the firm.  
 
2.5 Importance of SME in the UK Economy 
SMEs play a vital role in the economy, providing new ideas, products, services and jobs. 
SMEs have been in the focal point for a few decades and a subject for the number of research 
articles. The SMEs which have in recent years proved themselves to be the engines of 
economic growth and the principle source of new employment. The ability to exploit new 
                                                             
 
5 Barclays, HSBC, RBoS-Natwest and Lloyds_TSB. (Certified Accountants Educational Trust, London  2006) 
6 This scheme supports the firms with insufficient security to obtain bank loan finance. 
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technologies and to respond quickly to changing market needs give SMEs a key role in the 
success of the European Economy.  
 
The figure 2.1 shows the distribution of employment, turnover and enterprise across the size 
bands small, medium and large for the year 2008. 
 
Figure 2.1 
Distribution of Enterprises across size 
 
The above figure shows the Distribution of Enterprises across size enterprises, employment and turnover. 
Source: British Chamber of Commerce 2008. 
 
 
According to the Department for Business, Enterprise & Regulatory Reform (BERR)’s 
Enterprise Directorate Analytical Unit, in 2008, the UK economy is 99% SMEs. Out of 4.9 
million UK businesses less than 1% was large corporations. SMEs are gaining a significant 
share of the total output in the private sector over the last decade. In terms of UK turnover and 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) UK SMEs account for 1.48 trillion pounds. Employing over 
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14 million people in the UK, they also account for 85% of the 2.3 million extra jobs created 
by new businesses in the private sector. The following figure shows the turnover and the 
employment in SMEs in the UK for the period of 1998-2008.  This figure shows the turnover 
as a percentage of total annual turnover of the economy and employment shows the 
employees as a percentage of total number of employees in the economy.  
 
Figure 2.2 
Employment and Turnover 
 
The above figure shows the employment and turnover from 1998-2008 of SMEs in the UK. Source: Department 
of Trade and Industry: 2008 
 
As can be seen in the figures above, there is a down turn of the employment and turnover 
throughout the period. In fact all SMEs outperform the large UK corporations in terms of 
productivity despite having minimal resources, little support and being largely ignored 
compared to the large firms. Large corporations only account for only 50% of UK turnover 
and there is substantial evidence that the UK economy is supported by SME performance and 
that improving performance will have a substantially positive effect on entire UK economy.  
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According to Organization for Economic Corporation and Development (OECD) recent
7
 
figures ranked UK as the third highest GDP growth in the G7 over the period 1996-2006. In 
2007 UK reported the strongest estimated growth among G7. However, since economic 
conditions are very likely to worsen during 2008 as uncertainties and challenges facing SMEs 
are increased due to the credit crisis. Small firms will be particularly vulnerable as lenders 
become more risk averse and even the interest rates fall especially small firms find harder and 
expensive to borrow. But, having said that the UK is still considered as one of the most 
attractive location
8
 to do business (World Bank, 2011).  
 
2.6 Data on SME Finance 
Even in the UK a very few surveys have been conducted on small businesses and the data was 
not widely circulated among researchers. The lack of data disrupts a complete analysis of the 
financial situation of the SME. This is the reason why SME has been one of the most under 
researched areas in finance. In the UK there are about 4.8 million enterprises in 2008 but only 
less than .1 million small firm data can be accessed. The Bank of England and Department of 
Trade and Industry maintain data relating to small businesses. The Department of Trade and 
Industry brought all the government information services for the UK SMEs under the 
umbrella of a single website in 2003. The site, which has been built in collaboration with 
other Government departments and agencies including The Treasury, Inland Revenue, 
Customs and Excise and Companies House, carries information on grants and support 
schemes and guidance on issues such as employment law, tax and to enable anyone who 
                                                             
 
7
 2007 
8
 UK is ranked 4 out of 183 economies. 
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wants to set up in or improve the performance of their business with easy access to the 
relevant information, advice, funding or training available from the public, private and 
voluntary sectors. 
 2.6.1 Data Sources 
This section explains how the data has been collected and to address the research questions. 
The data used in this thesis has been obtained from FAME data base and Bank of England 
covering the period 1998-2008. All the firm related details are collected from FAME data 
base and all the macroeconomic data is collected from Bank of England. FAME contains 
comprehensive information on companies in the UK and Ireland.  FAME database is collected 
by Jordans Bureau Van Dijk commercial use and is constructed from the profit and loss and 
balance sheet data. The database consists primarily of unquoted companies data and some 
quoted companies on Alternative Investment Market (AIM) and Off-Exchange Market 
(OFEX) where this database includes mainly non-listed firms in the UK. Firms that had at 
least 3 observations during the period 1998-2008 were chosen. Samples have an unbalanced 
panel structure and the number of years of observation varies between 3 and 11.  
Table 2.3. Data and Variables  
Raw Data  Transformed Data Name of variable 
Turnover Log of Turnover  
(Turnover1- Turnover 0)/ 
Turnover 0 
SIZE 
SALES GROWTH 
Total Assets  Log of Total Assets SIZE2 
Tangible Assets Tangible  Assets/Total Assets CA 
Intangible Assets Intangible Assets/Total Assets FGO 
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EBIT EBIT/Total Assets 
EBIT/Total Assets-Current 
Liabilities 
Standard deviation of 
EBIT/Total assets 
Profitability/PROFIT 
ROCE 
OR 
EAIT EAIT/Total Assets ROA 
Debtors (Debtors-Creditors)/Total 
Assets 
Net Debtors 
Creditors (Debtors-Creditors)/Total 
Assets 
Net Debtors 
Depreciation Depreciation/Total Assets NDTS 
Total Debt Total Debt/Total Assets DR 
TDA 
Long Term Debt Long Term Debt/Total Assets LDA 
Short Term Debt Short term Debt/Total Debt STDTD 
Equity Debt/Equity Gearing 
GEARINGRATIO 
Current Assets Current Assets/Current 
Liabilities 
LIQUIDITY 
LIQUIDITYRATIO 
Current Liabilities Current Assets/Current 
Liabilities 
LIQUIDITY 
LIQUIDITYRATIO 
QUI  Score 0, 1 Dummy variable CREDITSCORE 
Audit Report 0, 1 Dummy variable AUDIT DUMMY 
Incorporation Date 0, 1 Dummy variable AGE 
Interest Cost Interest cost/Total Debt COD 
GDP Growth Rate GDP Growth Rate Grate 
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Inflation Inflation rate-Annual 
percentage change in the 
consumer price index 
Inflation 
 
In this study we have considered private limited firms
9
 which satisfy the EU definition for 
SME. We focus only on the non-financial SMEs in UK. The database lists all the  private 
limited firms with available accounting data at the time of downloading. The sample used for 
the estimations are explained in each chapter in detail.  
2.7 Descriptive Statistics 
This section shows the preliminary data analysis on firms’ financial perspective for the study 
period. We have presented detailed financing pattern of the firms throughout the period of 
study focusing on the selected annual key financial ratios during the period as the annual 
ratios shows the trend of the financial impact of changes in economic conditions. We have 
also shown the financing behavior of each sector for each year to observe the specific 
financing manner across sectors.  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
 
9
  In order to keep our study focus we drop Unlimited, Public AIM, Guarantee, Limited Liability partnership, 
Public not quoted, Public Quoted OFEX, Public quoted inv. Trust and public quoted.  
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Figure 2.3: Leverage behavior of UK SMEs 
 
 
 
The figure shows the Leverage behavior of UK SMEs. Data collected from FAME database for the 
period of 1998-2008. Leverage is measured by total debt over total assets. 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Leverage behavior of UK SMEs of Manufacturing and Service sector 
 
The figure shows Leverage behavior of UK SMEs of Manufacturing and Service sector. Data collected 
from FAME database for the period of 1998-2008. Leverage is measured by total debt over total assets. 
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Figure 2.5: Leverage behavior of UK SMEs of different sectors 
 
The figure shows the Leverage of UK SMEs of different sectors, agriculture forestry and mining, 
manufacturing,, construction, wholesale and retail, hotels and restaurants transport and communication, business 
or services education health and social and other. Data collected from FAME database for the period of 1998-
2008.  Leverage is measured by total debt over total assets. 
 
Graph 2.3 shows the behavior of total debt ratio (Total debt/Total assets) from 1996-2008 of 
SMEs in the UK. The graph shows that there was a decrease of firm debt ratio at the 
beginning of the study period and in the late 1990s it has started increasing gradually until 
2003. From 2004-2008 again there is a rise in the ratio. After a slowdown in 2003 the UK 
SMEs looked to be employing more debt from the year 2004. This does not show any 
immediate effect of 2007- 08 economic crisis.  
 
As we have considered the different sectors in this study financing behavior of each year and 
the occurrence of specific financing method across the sectors is interesting to describe. 
Therefore we graph the financing patterns of different sectors. Figure 2.4 shows the TDR for   
Manufacturing and Service sectors, while the figure 2.5 shows the TDR for each different 
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sectors .The graph 2.4 shows that the Manufacturing sector have the highest debt financing 
and Hotel and Restaurants Trade use the highest debt capital while Education Health and 
Social work sector utilize the lowest among the different sectors. We observe that from 1998-
2008 except agriculture, forestry and mining sector all other sectors have increased the usage 
of debt capital. We also notice that Service sector debt ratio has increased sharply in 2007. 
 
Figure 2.6: Profitability of UK SMEs  
 
 
The figure shows the Profitability of UK SMEs. Data collected from FAME database for the period of 
1998-2008. Profitability is measured by EBIT over total assets. 
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Figure 2.7: Profitability of UK SMEs of Manufacturing and Service sector 
 
 
The figure shows the Profitability of UK SMEs of Manufacturing and Service sector. Data collected from FAME 
database for the period of 1998-2008. Profitability is measured by EBIT over total assets. 
 
Figure 2.8: Profitability of UK SMEs of different sectors 
 
 
The figure shows the Profitability of UK SMEs of different sectors, agriculture forestry and mining, 
manufacturing,, construction, wholesale and retail, hotels and restaurants transport and communication, business 
or services education health and social and other. Data collected from FAME database for the period of 1998-
2008. Profitability is measured by EBIT over total assets. 
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Next we consider the profitability (ROA) of SMEs in UK which shows that there is a 
fluctuation throughout the period as shown in the above figure 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8. The graph 2.6 
shows that there was a reduction in profitability ratio immediately after the crisis in 2007-08. 
This is justified in the other three graphs (Debt, COD and Size) where debt financing has 
increased during the period as a result of that cost of debt increase and decrease the return on 
assets during the crisis period. We also notice that profit of all the sectors drop down by the 
end of 2007as shown in figure 2.7. Construction sector shows the highest profitability while 
Agriculture, Forestry and Mining sector reports the lowest profitability across sectors. Overall 
profitability of SMEs as well as profitability of Manufacturing and Service sectors also shows 
the same pattern throughout the period and by the end of 2007 until 2008 it has dropped.  
 
Figure 2.9: COD of UK SMEs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure shows the COD of UK SMEs. Data collected from FAME database for the period of 1998-
2008. COD shows the cost of debt which is measured by interest cost over total debt. 
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Figure 2.10: COD of UK SMEs of manufacturing and Service sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure shows COD of UK SMEs of Manufacturing and Service sector. Data collected from FAME 
database for the period of 1998-2008. COD shows the cost of debt which is measured by interest cost 
over total debt. 
 
Figure 2.11: COD of UK SMEs of different sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure shows the COD of UK SMEs of different sectors, agriculture forestry and mining, 
manufacturing,, construction, wholesale and retail, hotels and restaurants transport and communication, 
business or services education health and social and other. Data collected from FAME database for the 
period of 1998-2008. COD shows the cost of debt which is measured by interest cost over 
total debt. 
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Cost of debt as shown in figure 2.9 has decreased till 2003 and after it has increased.  
Manufacturing sector report the highest cost of debt and this may be due to the tight credit 
terms for Manufacturing sector compared to the Service sector
10
. Transport and 
Communication sector shows a significant drop of the cost of debt capital in 1999 while the 
Education, Health and Social work sector shows the lowest cost of debt capital among the 
sectors. The significant drop in 1999 could be due to the change of classification of business 
activity
11
 and may be due to the government decision to increase the spending on Education 
and Health and charged lower cost of debt in order to encourage the firms in this sector. 
Average highest cost of debt reports in Wholesale and Retail Trade sector. 
 
Figure 2.12: Size of SMEs in UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure shows the Size of UK SMEs. Data collected from FAME database for the period of 1998-
2008 and size is measured by log of total assets. 
 
  
                                                             
 
10
 This is confirmed in the Bank of England 2010 statistics that annual rate of return of Service sector is higher 
than for Manufacturing sector.  
11 Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reforms (BERR) analysis shows that between 1998-2006 firms 
switching classification from service to manufacturing providers. If a firm was previously focused on 
manufacturing but had a small but significant service activity chose to focus solely on manufacturing.  
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Figure 2.13: Size of SMEs in UK of Manufacturing and Service sector 
 
The figure shows Size of UK SMEs of Manufacturing and Service sector. Data collected from FAME 
database for the period of 1998-2008 and size is measured as log of total assets. 
 
 
Figure 2.14: Size of SMEs in UK of different sectors 
 
The figure shows the Size of UK SMEs of different sectors, agriculture forestry and mining, 
manufacturing,, construction, wholesale and retail, hotels and restaurants transport and communication, 
business or services education health and social and other. Data collected from FAME database for the 
period of 1998-2008. Size is measured as log of total assets. 
 
As this study about the SMEs in UK size is very important. Size is measured as log of total 
assets. As mentioned earlier size of the SMEs in UK during the period shows continuous 
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increase
12
 till 2007 and decline afterwards following the economic crisis. Figure 2.13 shows 
that service sector has increased its total assets in 2008 started to pick up again after 
experiencing decline during the crisis while manufacturing sector total assets declining. The 
graph 2.14 also indicates that same behavior for sectors in 2008 showing that manufacturing 
sector of SMEs in the UK appeared to have been more important throughout the study period 
reporting highest total assets.  
 
In general above description suggest that firms have continuously increased the debt capital 
during the period shows that firms have accepted the risk during the crisis period. But there is 
not much increase (3.25%) in the level of leverage. As the risk is high during a recessionary 
period usually financial institutions obtain higher security and increase interest rates rather 
than allowing the firms to continue to trade. Therefore the increase of debt capital would be 
due to the private loans (Family, friend etc)
13
. However, the profitability and size has 
increased throughout the period and significantly decreased in 2008 and cost of debt has 
increased following the recession.  
 
2.8 Summary and Conclusions. 
Focus of this chapter is to discuss the different definitions of SMEs, SMEs in the UK and the 
preliminary data analysis. First we have discussed why we use the EU definition for SME in 
                                                             
 
12
 The first year of the study period which is the year 1998, shows very low value compared to the other years. 
This may be due to the drop of investment, employment and higher cost and low profitability during the period. 
Business in Britain, A survey of business and trends (2011) shows that there is a decline of overall business 
confidence in 1998.   
13
 When small firms are concerned lenders become more risk averse, even if official interest fall, small find it is 
very hard and more expensive than previous years to borrow. (British Chambers of Commerce, 2009) 
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this study. Then we have graphically presented the data for the period 1998-2008 and try to 
identify whether there is any specific financing pattern throughout the period of study and the 
financing behavior of different sectors. Preliminary analysis has suggested that leverage ratio 
has shown a relatively shaky movement in response to the economic condition during the 
period. Profitability has fluctuated during the sample period and graph clearly shows the 
immediate response to the economic crisis in 2007-2008. Except the year 2008 size has 
shown an increasing trend during the period and COD has decreased till 2003 and shows an 
increasing trend afterwards. These initial data analysis has shown that SMEs in the UK to 
follow specific financing patterns. In the following chapters we will consider these issues on a 
deeper empirical investigation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
CHAPTER 3 
FINANCIAL POLICY AND CAPITAL STRCUTURE CHOICE OF SMEs IN THE UK  
 
3.1 Introduction  
A principle issue in corporate finance is how firms adjust their capital structure to finance 
their operations. That is the decision related to the existence of an optimal total borrowing 
ratio. Such a choice like investment financing and dividend policy decisions should be 
evaluated in terms of its impact on the firms main goal which is to maximize shareholders 
wealth or in other words, maximize the value of the firm.  
 
With the pioneering work of Modigliani and Miller (1958) debt irrelevance proposition, 
financial economists have advocated a number of leverage relevance theories
14
 to explain the 
variation in debt ratios across firms. One set of theories suggested is the existence of taxes and 
bankruptcy costs makes debt relevant (DeAnegelo and Masulis, 1980). Myers (1984) and 
Ross (1977) suggested the relevance is due to information asymmetry. Myers (1984) and 
Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that it exists a hierarchy in the financing funds of companies. 
Due to informational asymmetries, firms will prefer internal to external capital sources. This 
suggests that high profitable companies will tend to finance investments with retained 
earnings rather than using debt. If we consider the existence of informational asymmetries 
between investors and managers, two additional capital structure theories appear the 
Signalling Theory and the Pecking Order Theory. 
 
                                                             
 
14
 These theories are explained in Chapter 2 in detail. 
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The pecking order theory is especially appropriate for small and medium sized firms. These 
firms do not typically aim at a target debt ratio; instead, their financing decisions follow a 
hierarchy, with a preference for internal over external finance, and for debt over equity. Thus, 
according to the pecking order theory, many SMEs would tend to borrow more and more in 
case their investment needs are typically well in excess of internally generated cash flows. 
Changes in debt ratios are therefore driven by their need to obtain external funds rather than 
an attempt to achieve an optimal capital structure. For example, Ang (1991), Holmes and 
Kent (1991), and Watson and Wilson (2002), emphasized that the pecking order theory can be 
easily applied to SMEs. Clearly SMEs have important adverse selection problems that are 
explained by credit rationing and therefore bear high information costs (Psillaki 1995). These 
costs can be considered nil for internal funds but are very high when issuing new capital, 
whereas debt lies in an intermediate position. Moreover, SMEs are often managed by very 
few managers whose main objective is to minimize the intrusion in their business and avoid 
the discipline inherent in financing options other than internal funds. That is why internal 
funds will lie in the first place of their preference of financing. In case internal funds are not 
enough, SMEs will prefer debt to new equity mainly because debt means lower levels of 
intrusion and, most importantly, lower risk of losing control and decision-making power than 
new equity.  
 
The Signalling theory is of little use for the small firm sector as SMEs are not usually listed in 
stock exchange markets and therefore their managers do not intend to signal something to the 
market and investors while adopting their financing decisions. On the contrary, the latter 
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theory could be very useful for our purposes.The other relevant theory is agency theory
15
 
advanced by Jensen and Meckling (1976) which was derived from the conflict between 
corporate managers, outside stock holders and bond holders. The general result from the 
various capital structure studies is that the combination of leverage related costs and tax 
advantage of debt, produces an optimal capital structure below 100% debt financing, as the 
tax advantage is used to trade against the likelihood of incurring bankruptcy costs. Given all 
those theoretical issues question that arises whether or not various gearing related costs and 
benefits are economically enough to have an appreciable impact on optimal capital structure. 
 
Although these theoretical approaches deal with capital structure from different perspectives, 
what they have in common is that they all study large firms
16
 as opposed to small and medium 
sized enterprises (Michaelas et.al, 1999 and Lopez and Aybar (2000). Capital structure 
decisions are dynamic by nature and should be modeled as such in empirical analysis. Many 
earlier studies on the determinants of capital structure decisions have tended to limit 
themselves to static modeling. This study extends the empirical research on the topic of 
capital structure by focusing on the dynamics of capital structure decisions. It would be ideal 
to provide more insight into the long run capital structure determinants of target capital 
structure of firms using a sample of Small and Medium sized Enterprises (SMEs). It also 
estimates the dynamic capital structure model using a much stronger estimation technique. In 
                                                             
 
15
 Agency theory investigates the conflicts of interests between the stakeholders of the firm. Basically, agency 
theory considers the conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors, and between shareholders and 
managers. SMEs are not possibly to suffer from this second issue as their property identifies almost exactly with 
their management and thereby there will only be a unique financial objective for these two groups. 
Notwithstanding, the agency conflict between shareholders and lenders may be particularly severe for SME (see 
Ang et al,1992). 
16
 For example Bradley et al. (1984), Auberbach (1985), Friend and Hasbrouck (1988), Titman and Wessels 
(1988), Barclay and Smith. (1995), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Graham (1996), Shyam – Sunder and Myers 
(1999), Wald (1999), Wiwattanakantang (1999), Hovakimian et al. (2001), Fama and French(2005) and Ariff et 
al(2008). 
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doing so, our use of dynamic adjustment model (Ozkan, 2001) enables us first to test the 
dynamic adjustment proposition and then to identify the both firm specific and 
macroeconomic factors driving the capital structure changes. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the previous research on 
capital structure of SMEs and provide the details on firm specific, macroeconomic variables 
and adjustment to financial targets. Section 3.3 explains Firm specific and macroeconomic 
variables that influence capital structure. Section 3.4 explains the model in detail, panel data, 
fixed effect regression and Generalized Method of Moment (GMM). Section 3.5 explain the 
empirical model 3.6 Data and sample 3.7 Definitions of variables, 3.8 results and discussion 
and finally conclusion and recommendations for further studies.  
 
3.2 Review of the previous studies 
Review of the previous studies consists of two subsections where section 3.2.1 reviews the previous 
studies relating to large firms of other countries and UK and small firms of other countries.  Section 
3.2.2 reviews the literature relating to SMEs in the UK.  
3.2.1 Empirical studies on Large and other country Small firms  
It is obvious from the large amount of literature on this topic that there is no consensus on 
what constitutes optimal capital structure in application, although there is strong evidence 
from many studies that firm specific factors are correlated with capital structure. Much of the 
previous studies on determinants of borrowing decisions of firms have concentrated on the 
factors predicted by the static trade off theory of capital structure which is based on a tradeoff 
between the tax advantage of debt financing and the costs of debt financing and cost of 
financial distress. Myers (1984), argued the static trade off theory implies that the actual debt 
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ratio reverts towards a target or optimum, and it predicts a cross sectional relation between 
debt ratio and assets risk, size, profitability, tax status and assets type. The results of the 
empirical studies on SMEs in the UK (Micheales et al, 1999) confirm some of these 
predictions in that firms in the same industry, facing similar leverage ratios.  
 
Moreover, the evidence of these studies supports the negative impact of business risk on 
corporate borrowing decisions. In the context of small business sector, Queen and Roll (1987) 
argue that SMEs are likely to have a higher level of operating risk relative to the large firms. 
According to the theory of financial distress, higher operation risk increases the probability of 
financial distress, so firms have to trade off between tax benefits and bankruptcy costs.  
  
However there are conflicting conclusions on the impact of other firm specific variables. For 
instance, Bowen et al (1982) Kim and Sorensen (1986) Michealas et al(1999) and Ozkan 
(2001) provide evidence on the negative relationship between non-debt tax shields and 
leverage. Conversely Bradely et al(1984), Titman and Wessels(1988) and Homaifar et 
al(1994) fail to provide such  a support. There are also conflicting results on the relationship 
between size and leverage. Ferri and Jones (1979) Kim and Sorensen (1986), and Chung 
(1993) show that there is no systematic association between firm size and capital structure. 
Homaifar et al (1994), Titman Wessels (1988) and Michealas et al (1998) report that larger 
firms have higher debt ratio.  There is also strong empirical evidence for the view that there is 
a negative relation between profitability and debt ratio. This is again consistent with the 
pecking order theory of capital structure. For instance the findings of Titman Wessels (1988), 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) Michealas et al(1998) and Ozkan (2001) give strong evidence for 
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this negative relationship. However, Long and Malitz (1986) do not find such a relation 
between leverage and profitability.  
 
In the literature there are other studies which focus on the determinants of capital structure 
and the adjustment to financial targets. There are studies (Taggart ,1977; Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers,1999; Ozkan,2001 and Ariff, 2008) in the literature that provide more direct evidence 
that firms adjust towards a target debt ratio. These studies also provide some information on 
the likely determinants of speeds of adjustment toward target debt ratio. Taggart (1977) gives 
evidence that the speed of adjustment to the long-term capital targets are relatively slow and 
liquid assets and short-term debt play an important role in the adjustment process. He obtains 
quarterly data for the period of 1957-1972 and implies that when a firms’ debt to equity ratio 
is below target, they issue more debt and less stock. Further he finds that adjustment is slow 
as the adjustment coefficients are very small and the timing considerations have an important 
influence on corporate financing decisions. He explains change in permanent capita is 
influenced by the firms target debt equity mix, interest rate timing conditions and retained 
earnings. Taggart (1977) proposes that interest rate timing conditions are important as they 
affect the financing decision of firms and if the firm expect decline of long run interest it may 
postpone raising long run funds and borrow short term until the interest rate fall.   
 
Using a sample of 748 UK quoted companies over the period 1959-1970 Marsh (1982) 
applying logit model analyses the choice of financing instrument of companies and argue that 
this choice depends on  the difference between the companies current and target debt  ratios. 
The results suggest that companies try to maintain their long-term target debt levels, even 
though they deviate from this target in the short run in response to capital market conditions. 
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He finds that the companies’ choice between debt and equity is not influenced by the finance 
structure and companies are concerned about the market history and the security prices in 
choosing debt and equity mix. For both short-term and long-term debt companies do not have 
target level in mind. In addition to that this paper also provide evidence that long-term target 
debt levels are influenced by operating risk, size  and the assets composition.   
 
Jalilvand and Harris (1984) look at the determinants of speed of adjustment to long-term 
financial target where the speed of adjustment is allowed to vary across companies and over 
time. In particular, using US corporations this study assumes perfect capital markets and 
study whether there is a relationship between financing decision and firm value. Assuming 
investment decisions are exogenous Jalilvand and Harris (1984) examined the process of 
parcial adjustment, allowing speed of adjustment to vary by firm size and capital market 
conditions. They suggest that the firm size, interest rates and stock price levels affect the 
speed of adjustment. They explain that firms financing decision is based on the cost of capital 
it has. Following Marsh (1982) and Taggart (1977) they specified the targets based on the 
book value rather than market value as the market value fluctuate a lot.  
 
Jalilvand and Harris (1984) concluded that management expectations about interest rates and 
stock prices and firm size affect the adjustment speed. Deriving a model that firm value have 
a target ratio for all financial variables Jalilvand and Harris (1984) noted that speed of 
adjustment can be different among different firms over time. They also find that long-term 
debt, short-term debt and liquid assets are the main sources of the firms financing needs and 
the firm will adjust more quickly to its target level of long term debt and more slowly the 
equity target.  
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Rajan and Zingles (1995) compared the capital structure of Canada, France, German, Italy, 
UK with US and investigate that the same factors influence the capital structure of other 
countries as US. This study finds that size, profitability, market to book ratio and tangible 
assets are the major factors that determine the capital structure of these countries and the firms 
with higher collateral are not highly levered. Further they find that profitability and market to 
book ratio are negatively related to leverage. This study does not provide any evidence 
supporting to the relationship between size and leverage but firms with high market to book 
ratio appeared to be negatively related with profitability.  
 
Berger and Udell (1998) study a sample of US small finance data from 1993 and show the 
source of small business finance and how capital structure varies with the firm size and age. 
Further they find that smaller firms tend to use more internal finance (internal funds and loans 
from stockholders) and more debt finance and external equity use rarely compared to the 
larger firms. They explain this is mainly due to the information asymmetry as small firms are 
not required by law to disclose information of their financial statements and this influence the 
source of finance of small firms. 
 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) test a benchmark target adjustment model against a pecking 
order model and report that the target adjustment model appears to be superior. Using 157 US 
firms during the period of 1971-1989 they present an equation for pecking order model. The 
intuition behind their model is that financial deficit
17
 of the firm should mainly be met by debt 
                                                             
 
17
 See page 224 of Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999 for more definition of financial deficit. 
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capital. Even though there results are statistically not significant they explain that the pecking 
order theory better explain the time series variance in actual debt ratio than a target 
adjustment model which is based on trade off theory.  
 
There is only a limited amount of empirical work done on the capital structure decisions of 
the SMEs in the UK. The exception is Michealas et al.(1998). Bennett and Donnelly (1993), 
Lasfer (1995), Walsh and Ryan (1997) and Ozkan(2001) study based on the large firms.  
 
Bennett and Donnelly (1993) study attempts to explain the cross-sectional variation in the 
capital structures of non-financial UK companies using proxy variables for characteristics 
suggested by capital structure theories. Using date on listed UK firms from 1977-1988 
Bennett and Donnelly (1993) find that long-term debt is more representative of a firms 
capital structure policy.  
 
Bennett and Donnelly (1993) find that non-debt tax shields, asset structure, size and past 
profitability exert an important impact on the capital structure choice of firms as suggested by 
the theory. In this study they attempt to explain the cross-sectional variation in the capital 
structures of non-financial UK companies using proxy variables for characteristics suggested 
by capital structure theories. Earnings volatility is found to be positively related to leverage. 
This finding, though counter intuitive, is consistent with the hypothesis of Myers (1977) that 
risky firms may borrow more than safer ones. In addition, they find evidence that capital 
structures vary across industrial classification.  
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Lasfer (1995) examines the impact of corporate tax and agency cost on firms capital structure 
decisions using a sample of 88 industrial and commercial UK (non-financial) companies over 
period 1972-1983. This study uses both the cross sectional and time series variation in the 
capital structure of firms and provides evidence consistent with agency theory, that firms with 
fewer growth opportunities have more debt in their capital structure. This study also finds that 
firms that are more likely to have free cash flow have low debt impact on the capital structure 
choice of firms in the short run. Lasfer (1995) suggest that agency cost is the major 
determinant of capital structure. Moreover they find that in the long run tax exhausted 
companies exhibit significantly lower debt ratio than tax-paying firms and taxation do not 
affect the short run capital structure decisions. 
 
Walsh and Ryan (1997) test a binomial choice model based upon observed debt and equity. 
Using a date set from of British public limited companies for the period of 1984-1991 the 
study the impact of tax and agency consideration on the capital structure decisions, mainly the 
issue of debt and equity. They find that agency and tax considerations are significant in 
determining debt and equity decisions of the UK firms. Consistent with Lasfer (1995) they 
explain that agency considerations are more influencing in determining the choice of debt and 
equity issue rather than tax considerations.  
 
Based on Australian family and private businesses Romano et al (2000) demonstrates that 
size, industry, age of the firm, age of CEO, extent of family control, business planning, 
owners business objectives, and plan to achieve growth influence family business owners 
financing decision. Moreover, their model has established that family businesses drive their 
funding from a number of even multiple sources and the decision regarding type of finance is 
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based on a complex array of social, behavioral and financial factors. Service industry family 
businesses are less likely to use family loans as they plan to achieve growth through new 
products or process development.  
 
Ozkan (2001) study the empirical determinants of the target capital structure of the firm and 
adjustment process towards this target. This study suggests that a firm adjusts its capital 
structure dynamically against its own target capital structure. It is further suggested that this 
adjustment process changes over time at different speed of adjustment.   
 
Ozkan(2001) has provided the following insight to the empirical determinants of corporate 
borrowing. The evidence suggest that firms have long-term target leverage ratio and they 
adjust to the target ratio relatively fast, implying that the cost of being away from their target 
ratios and the cost of adjustment are equally important for  firms.  The results also provide 
evidence that profitability, liquidity, growth opportunities, non-debt tax shields and borrowing 
ratio of firms exist an inverse relationship.  
 
Using a sample of Spanish firms during the 5 year period from 1994-1998 by Sogorb-Mira 
and Gracia (2004) test both trade off and pecking order theory and explain the main factors 
that determine the financial policy of SMEs. Using GMM
18
 and 2SLS
19
 test the Trade off 
theory and Pecking order theory. The results suggest that both theoretical approaches 
contribute to explain the capital structure of SMEs in Spain. They find that age plays an 
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 Anderson and Hsiao, 1982 
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important role in financing decision of Spanish SMEs and older firms use less debt and 
younger firms more often depend on debt. Consistent with the findings of Sogorb-Mira and 
Gracia (2004) using a panel data technique Degryse et. al (2009) show that predictions made 
by the pecking order theory is in line with the capital structure of Dutch SMEs. They 
investigate the capital structure of SME from 2003-2005 using LSDV estimator they 
document that SMEs use profit to reduce their debt level and growing firms increase their 
debt position since they need more funds which implies that when internal funds are depleted 
long term debt is the next in the pecking order. In addition, consistent with the maturity 
matching principle long term assets are financed by long term debt, while short term assets 
are financed by short term debt and larger firm have relatively more long term debt than short 
term debt which implies that the maturity is the way to mitigate the risk. In line with 
Michealas et al (1999) this study also found the inter-industry effect of capital structure and 
linked them closer to the importance of pecking order theory and trade-off theory and 
conclude that firm characteristics are more important than industry characteristics in 
explaining capital structure of Dutch SMEs.  
 
Using the conditional quantile regression method of distribution Fattouh, Harris and 
Scaramozzino (2008) demonstrate new insights in to the choice of leverage ratio.  They use 
the UK firm observations for the period 1988-1998. They estimate the coefficients at 7 
quantiles and find that firms that experience an increase in internal funds demand less for 
debt. This is consistent with the Pecking order theory and suggests that an increase in internal 
funds is related to a decrease in leverage and especially so for highly leveraged firms. They 
have shown that explanatory variables on leverage are different at different quantiles of the 
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distribution. Results reveal that effect of firm size on leverage is positive at lower quantiles 
and it is negative at upper quantiles.  
 
Ariff et al (2008) investigate the capital structure determinants and the speed of adjustment to 
target debt ratio by firms under distress and firms not under distress.  In modelling using 
dynamic capital structure model, both firm specific and macroeconomic variables were used 
as the inclusion of financially distressed firm sample necessitated the use of macroeconomic 
variables.  They use listed firm data of Malaysia over the period 1986-2001. The findings are 
similar to the studies in developed countries and consistent with the capital structure theories 
such as pecking order theory. Consistent with Ozkan (2001) they found that speed of 
adjustment is relatively fast and firms have target leverage ratio. 
 
In the above literature review we discussed the capital structure decisions of quoted and 
unquoted companies and it is clear that most firms are likely to suffer from information 
asymmetry. Most of the empirical work study the determinants of capital structure of large 
firms and tend to concentrate on the factors predicted by Myers (1984) the static trade off 
theory suggests that the actual debt ratio reverts towards target. Further this predicts the 
relationship between debt ratio and other determinants such as size, asset risk, profitability, 
and growth. It is evident from the vast amount of literature on this topic that firm specific 
factors are correlated with capital structure irrespective of the size (Large or small) of the 
firm. Study based on UK by Ozkan (2001) suggest that firms adjust their capital structure 
dynamically and this change over time at a different speed of adjustment. Unlike in the 
previous studies based on UK, SMEs we focus on both firm specific and macroeconomic 
variables and by applying theoretical and empirical model of capital structure determinants 
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and also  using dynamic model which made possible to provide additional insight in to the 
capital structure determinants.  
3.2.1 Empirical evidence on SMEs in the UK 
Hughes (1997) examine the balance sheet structure, gearing and profitability of non-financial 
data from UK companies for the period of 1987-1989 dividing the sample in to two as large 
and small companies. Due to the signaling problems associated with the equity issuing equity 
funding is more problematic for small firms and retained earnings and bank finance and also 
famous among small firms. He finds that small firms have low fixed to total assets ratio and 
more current liabilities. He further explains that manufacturing firms are more geared than 
non-manufacturing firms. Further this study concluded that the evidence for general equity or 
debt gaps in the UK is weak. It is considered to promote the seedcorn funding of SME co-
operative or mutual guarantee schemes to reduce the information asymmetry in UK credit 
market.  
 
The relationship between capital structure and strategy is explored by Jordan et al (1998) in 
the context of SMEs in the UK. The sample was extracted from 10 or less years old SMEs in 
the South East of England for the period of 1989-1993.  In this study they have defined the 
SMEs as firms with less than 100 employees and less than £10 million turnover. This study 
use questionnaire method for data collection.  The results of this research support the idea that 
there are certain financial variables play an important role in determining the capital structure 
of SMEs in the UK and support the aspects of a strategy-capital structure relationship which 
indicates that both strategic and financial factors are necessary to explain the chosen debt 
level. Further this study supports the notion that small firms adopt pecking order approach 
when funding their activities and variability in profits results in distress borrowing. It has 
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been argued that owners of small firms are reluctant to give up the control and willing to 
finance expansion through internal funds, debt and equity respectively. However this is not 
consistent with Frank and Goyal (2003) where their sample provides more supports for the 
pecking order theory of large firms than small firms.  
 
Using 3500 UK small firms which satisfy the SME definition for 10 years from 1986-1995 
covering all ten industries in the UK Michealas et al(1999) find that most of the determinants 
of capital structure presented by the theory of finance  appear indeed to be relevant to the UK 
small business sector. The results of this study analyse using Least Square Dummy Variable 
(LSDV) model. Size, age, profitability, growth opportunities, operating risk, asset structure, 
stock turnover and net debtors all seem to have an effect on the level of both short and long-
term debt in small firms. Furthermore this study provides evidence which suggest that the 
capital structure of small firms is time and industry dependent.   
 
Michealas et al(1999) show that most of the capital structure theories appear to be relevant for 
the SMEs in the UK and average short term debt ratios of SMEs in the UK appears to be 
increasing during the period of economic recession and decrease in the market place 
economic condition improves.  Average long term debt ratio shows a positive relationship 
with the change in economic growth.  The main conclusion of this study is that agency and 
asymmetric information cost have an effect on the level of both short and long term debt of 
small firms. They claim that since the cost of external equity may be higher for small firms 
than for large firms due to transaction cost, adverse selection and control considerations 
pecking order theory approach is particularly relevant for small firms.  
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Panno (2003) finds that, for a sample of security issues by UK quoted companies 1992–1996, 
firms’ leverage is related to size, profitability, liquidity and the tax shield. This study 
investigate the capital structure choice of UK and Italian companies separately as these two 
countries have different financial systems he check how the  market-based economy and 
bank-based financial market determine the capital structure choice. A descriptive model of 
choice is developed and estimated using Logit and Probit estimation procedure. The results 
show interesting difference between two financial markets and support the idea that UK 
market is more consistent with the recent development of capital structure principles. Further 
results show that size and profitability is positive and negative impact of liquidity and 
bankruptcy risk on financial leverage of companies. The negative effect displayed by the 
available reserves which are taken as a proxy of internally generated funds is consistent with 
the pecking order theory. Unlike in the UK optimal debt level does not seem to be a major 
concern in Italy. In both markets tax advantage of debt is important in determining capital 
structure decision. 
 
In summary, these studies provide evidence suggesting that the capital structure of SMEs in 
UK is also affected by the similar factors to those in large firms and SMEs in other countries. 
However, they differ from the type of the debt use in the capital structure. These studies 
suggest that market for long run debt is not effectively functioning in small firms and small 
firms heavily depends on short term debt to avoid this problem. The common approach that 
has been used in the previous studies of capital structure is the static trade off model. In order 
to address the shortcomings of the static trade off model and as this model is unable to 
correctly describe the firms financing behaviour we use dynamic capital structure model. 
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3.3 Dependent variable, Firm specific and macroeconomic variables that influence 
capital structure  
Determination of leverage in the SME theoretical framework does not substantially differ 
from theory of capital structure of large listed firms, though there are some specific 
characteristics that should be noted. Theory of capital structure dates back to the “capital 
structure irrelevance” proposition of Modigliani and Miller (1958) in relation to the value of 
firms operating in perfect markets.  Following literature placed much emphasis on relaxing 
the assumptions made by Modigliani and Miller, in particular considering agency costs 
(Jenson and Meckling (1976); Myers 1977; Harris and Raviv (1990), asymmetric information 
(Myers and Majluf 1984) signalling (Ross 1977). According to Myers (2001) though current 
state in studies of capital structure comprises a wide variety of theoretical approaches but no 
theory is universally accepted and practically applied. According to the same author “there is 
no universal theory of debt equity choice, and no reason to expect one.  There are several 
useful conditional theories however.” Optimal capital structure theories depend on which 
economic aspect and firm characteristic the study focus on. The trade-off theory focuses on 
taxes, the free cash flow theory emphasis on agency cost and the pecking order theory focuses 
on differences in information. Different theories based on taxes, agency cost and information 
are relevant for financing choice.  Asset (size) profitability and risk are the key determinants 
explained in trade-off theory and growth opportunities link to the pecking order theory. This 
study will attempt to apply the theories of capital structure in the small business sector and 
develop hypothesis that examine the determinants of capital structure in UK SMEs.   
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Following the previous studies
20
 the determinants of capital structure we use the same set of 
firm specific variables as the determinants of leverage. All the firm specific variables we have 
used in this study are computed using the book value. As there is a large variation of the size 
of the firm we have deflated the variables using the total assets. Table 3.1 shows the 
explanatory variables and their expected relationship to debt ratio. 
Table 3.1 
The Explanatory Variables and Their Expected Relationship to Debt Ratio 
Variable Authors Expected 
sign 
Rational 
Size Titman and Wessels 1988 
Rajan and Zingles(1995) 
 
+ Small firm demand less debt due 
to low marginal corporate tax rate, 
higher bankruptcy cost and greater 
cost of informational asymmetry. 
Profitability Chittenden et al.,1996a, 
Titman and Wessels 1988  
 
Ambiguous 
Highly profitable firms should 
have a lower debt ratio 
Net Debtors Michaelas et al 1999 + Long term loans represent smaller 
percentage of small firms.  
Operating risk Titman and Wessels 1988 
Michaelas et al 1999 
_ High risk companies have lower 
borrowing 
Future Growth 
Opportunities 
Long and Malitz,1988 
 
+ Future growth opportunities 
encourage firm to employ more 
debt capital. 
Non-Debt Tax 
Shields 
Bradley et al., 1984 
 
_ Literature indicates that firms that 
have high NDTS are likely to use 
less debt.  
Collateral 
Assets 
Michaelas et al(1999) 
Degryse et al (2009) 
+ Collateral assets decrease the 
problem of information asymmetry 
and reduce the risk of lending. 
GDP Growth Booth et al. 2001 + During a period of economic 
growth firms employ more debt 
capital to finance their expansion 
programs. 
Inflation Rate Korajczyk and Levy,2003 + During an inflationary period firms 
utilize more debt in capital 
structure as the real cost of debt 
falls. 
 
 
  
                                                             
 
20 Bradley et al., 1984, Titman and Wessels(1988), Harris and Raviv (1991), Rajan and 
Zingles(1995), Chittenden et al.(1996a), Michealas et al (1999) and Booth et al(2001). 
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3.3.1 Dependent Variable 
In this study capital structure is the dependent variable and normally define by Total Debt to 
Total Assets (TDA). This variable is computed using the book value. Even though theory 
prefers market based measurement (MM 1958) shows that leverage does not affect the market 
value of the firm. Rajan and Zingles(1995) state that any capital structure theory has not 
specified which leverage measurement should be used. However many researchers (Michealas 
et al ,1999; Ozkan, 2001) use the same measure for leverage.  
 
3.3.2 Firm specific and macroeconomic variables that influence capital structure  
3.3.2.1 Age and Size 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) show that leverage decreases with age, but increase with size. It is 
also argued that larger firms
21
 are more diversified (Titman and Wessels, 1988), have easier 
access to the capital markets, and borrow at more favourable interest rates. Hence, Rajan and 
Zingles (1995) suggest that as large firms are less subject to information asymmetry they are 
more capable of obtaining equity capital and therefore lower the debt capital which means 
that there would be a negative relationship between leverage and size. The tradeoff theory 
suggest that the optimal capital structure for any particular firm will reflect the balance 
between the tax shield benefit of debt and the increasing agency and financial distress costs 
associated with high debt levels.(Jensen and Meckling 1976; Harris and Raviv 1990). Titman 
and Wessels (1988) argue that due to the cost and risk associated with leverage small firms 
maintain less relationship with financial institutions which make small firms less preferable 
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 Size is considered as a proxy for information asymmetry and larger firms are subject to more news than small 
firms as the investment community is more concerned in gathering information of large firms and investigate 
more closely.  
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clients and they are charged at high interest rates while large firms are offered competitive 
interest rates. Confirming this idea Ozkan (2001) further explain that small firms are more 
sensitive to economic downturns and face high chance of liquidation in situations of financial 
distress as they have less resources available. As a result small firms use more short term debt 
than larger firms.  From a financial distress perspective as larger firms are more diversified 
they are expected to go bankrupt less often than smaller ones (Pettit and Singer (1985), so size 
must be positively related to leverage. Following Rajan and Zingles(1995) and Michealas et 
al. (1999) we use natural logarithm of total assets and total sales as a proxy for the size of the 
firm.  
 
3.3.2.2 Profitability 
The Pecking order theory suggest that firms will use retained earnings first as investment 
funds, and subsequently move to debt and new equity only if necessary (Myers,1984). As 
retained earnings have no adverse selection problem and firm would not suffer from the 
information asymmetry that they face when they try to access the external sources of finance. 
Therefore, retained earnings is the cheapest source of finance. Consistent with the Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999), Bennett and Donnelly (1993), Michaelas et al (1999) and Ozkan 
(2001) find that there is a negative relationship between leverage and profitability in UK large 
as well as small firms.  In this case there would be a negative relation between profitability 
and gearing.  
 
There are contradictory views on the relationship between leverage and profitability. MM 
(1963) argues that firms prefer more debt in order to get the tax advantage. Therefore, 
profitable firms employ more debt as increase of leverage increase the tax shield. 
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Furthermore, highly profitable firms are encouraged to have higher level of debt through less 
agency and bankruptcy cost because of their increased ability to meet the debt repayment 
obligations and less likely to be subject to the bankruptcy risk. In a trade-off theory 
framework an opposite conclusion is expected. Firms normally have to pay taxes on their 
profits.  In order to avoid this firms generally like to have more debt in their capital structure 
as interest payments are tax deductible. Tax shield benefits of debt will induce profitable 
firms to use more debt (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Myers 1977; Harris and Raviv 1990). We 
use the ratio of earnings before interest and tax to the total assets as the measure of 
profitability following Rajan and Zingles (1995) Titman and Wessels(1998) and Micheals et 
al(1999). 
 
3.3.2.3 Future Growth Opportunities 
Myer (1977) argued that high growth firms might have more options for future investment 
than low growth firms. For growing firms internal funds may not be sufficient to finance their 
investment opportunities and, hence they like external funds. Following the pecking order 
theory if external funds are required firms prefer debt in order to minimize the information 
cost. Therefore the relationship between growth opportunities and leverage is positive. The 
agency problem suggests that negative relationship between capital structure and firm’s 
growth. Thus highly leveraged firms are more likely to pass up profitable investment 
opportunities, because such an investment will effectively transfer wealth from the firm’s 
owner to its debt holders. Furthermore, growing firms have more flexibility in choosing their 
future investment therefore agency costs are higher (Titman and Wessels, 1998). As a result, 
firms with high growth opportunities may not issue debt in the first place, and leverage is 
expected to be negatively related to future growth opportunities. Following Micheals et. al 
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(1999) we use intangible assets to total assets as a proxy for growth opportunities we test the 
conflicting predictions. 
 
3.3.2.4 Operating Risk 
Due to the agency and bankruptcy costs a firm’s optimal level of gearing is a decreasing 
function of the volatility of earnings as a measure of operating risk (Titman and 
Wessels;1988). Queen and Roll (1987) argue that SMEs are likely to have a higher level of 
operating risk relative to the large firms. According to the theory of financial distress, higher 
operation risk increases the probability of financial distress, so firms have to trade off between 
tax benefits and bankruptcy costs. Due to the higher risk of the earning volatility which means 
that dropping of earning below the debt service commitments increase the financial distress. 
To avoid this risk firms have to reduce their debt level as predicted in trade off theory. 
According to Myers (1977) firms with high earning volatility accumulate cash in good years 
and avoid under investment problems in the future following the pecking order theory. 
Therefore operating risk will be negatively related to debt ratio. Following Titman and 
Wessels (1988) we also use standard deviation of profitability to total assets as the measure of 
operating risk.   
 
3.3.2.5 Tangibility 
Both theory of financial distress and agency theory propound that tangibility has a positive 
relation to capital structure. According to the theory of financial distress, if a firm has a high 
proportion of tangible assets, it will use more debt than a firm with high proportion of 
intangible assets, because the former has lower costs of financial distress in the case of 
bankruptcy. In the UK, it is common for lenders to require collateral or to offer loans only if 
they are secured (Blinks et al.1997) It would therefore be expected that firms which possess 
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fixed assets with a high collateral value will have easier access to external finance and 
probably a higher level of debt in their capital structure relative to firms with lower levels of 
collaterable assets. Because the risk of lending to a firm with more tangible assets is expected 
to be low and lenders will demand low risk premium hence it decrease the problem of asset 
substitution. Rajan and Zingles (1995) confirm the same that use of tangible assets as 
collateral increase the liquidation value of the assets in the event of financial distress.  
Collateralising of assets make borrowers to use funds for the specified projects which reduce 
the agency cost as well as cost of debt.  According to the tradeoff theory there is a positive 
relationship between tangibility and leverage. Further Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that 
issuing debt is cheaper compared to issuing shares as firms with more collaterable assets is in 
a good position to issue debt at an attractive rate which result again a positive relationship 
between tangibility and leverage. Michaelas et al(1999) and Degryse et al (2009) find positive 
relationship between debt ratio and collateral for small firms. To test this prediction for SMEs 
in the UK we use tangible assets to total assets following Rajan and Zingales (1995).  
 
3.3.2.6 Net Debtors 
This is particularly an important area for SMEs as they put less effort on collecting payments 
from customers. Chittenden and Bragg (1997), argue that as shareholders interest and long-
term loans are a smaller percentage of a small firms’ liabilities, there appear to be less scope 
for accommodating late payment of receivables by increasing equity or long term debt. 
Therefore the two main avenues open to small firms suffering from late payments, are to 
increase short term bank borrowings or delay payments to creditors. The way of offsetting late 
payments is trade credit. However, it has also been shown by Chittenden and Bragg (1997), 
that delaying payments to creditors cannot be taken beyond a certain point; we can therefore 
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expect small firms to increase short term bank borrowing when suffering from late payments. 
In the pecking order theory creditors comes first and short term debt next. Therefore we 
expect a positive relationship between net debtors and leverage. Following Michelas et al. 
(1999) net debtors which is measured by debtors minus creditors to total assets shows the 
relationship between liquidity and leverage. 
 
3.3.2.7 Non –Debt Tax Shield  
MM (1963) show that firms which pays corporate tax will increase their leverage in order to 
get the benefit of tax shield. Trade off theory explains the same that tax shield is the main 
advantage of the using debt capital. Tax based theories argue that tax and bankruptcy 
considerations are a primary force influencing capital structure decisions. According to these 
theories, taxpaying firms would be expected to substitute debt for equity, at least up to the 
point where the probability, of financial distress starts to be important. In practice firms do 
not follow this policy. Ray and Hutchinson (1983) show that many small firms do not use any 
debt. As discussed by McConnell and Pettit (1984) and Pettit and Singer (1985) smaller firms 
are expected to be less profitable and to have less use for tax shields than large firms.  
Furthermore they show that smaller organizations derive less benefit from the tax shelter of 
deductible corporate interest. Higher bankruptcy cost and lower tax benefits would work in 
the direction of reducing corporate small business debt below that adopted by otherwise 
equitant to large firms. Therefore existence of non-debt tax shield make leverage more 
expensive and marginal tax saving decrease as the probability of bankruptcy increase with the 
leverage (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980) So the tax rate will be positively related to gearing 
and Non-debt tax shields will be negatively related to leverage. 
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3.3.2.8 Macroeconomic Variables 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) stated that macroeconomic factors alter the impact of firm specific 
variables on capital structure. In addition to that changing macroeconomic conditions 
influence the agency problems and therefore ultimately the adaptability of firms for different 
macroeconomic conditions would result in changing the capital structure of the firm.  
 
Korajczyk and Levy (2003) found that macroeconomic conditions vary over time and the 
capital structure decision also varies over time and across firms. The response of firms to the 
macroeconomic conditions will change the firm value. Therefore managers have to make 
adjustments to the leverage that maximized the value of the investors. In order to maintain the 
debt equity level that maximizes the firm value managers should respond to the 
macroeconomic changes altering the target capital structure and adjustment speed.  Cook and 
Tang (2010)
22
 find the adjustment speed of under-leveraged firms in good macroeconomic 
conditions is slower than the over-leveraged firms which mean that under-leveraged firms are 
less likely to adjust their leverage ratio towards the target.  
 
We examine the effect of macroeconomic condition on the capital structure of SMEs in the 
UK and we have selected GDP and inflation. This selection is based on the firms’ economic 
implications for external financing. For instance inflationary condition which might result in 
adverse effect on the debt holders and increase in the capital expenditure would affect the 
overall debt market increasing the cost of debt. 
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 Cook and Tang (2010) study the macroeconomic condition and capital structure adjustment speed for sample 
of US firms and found a positive correlation between adjustment speed and macroeconomic condition and show 
that macroeconomic conditions have  significant effect on target capital structure. 
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GDP is a broad indicator which describes the difference in wealth in country. Growth in the 
GDP encourages firms to expand their businesses. In particular, in developing countries firms 
become more leveraged as stock market develop. Booth et al. (2001) in their cross sectional 
study, find negative influences of stock market ratio on GDP and inflation rate on total debt 
ratio and positive influence on GDP growth rate. Growth in GDP is a proxy for investment 
opportunity set by firms (Smith and Watts, 1992) and this effect the optimal financing choice 
(Myers, 1977). Therefore GDP growth rate will be positively related to leverage.  
 
In addition to increases in real asset prices, general goods price inflation may also provide an 
incentive towards high leverage because of the tax deductibility of nominal interest payments. 
Nominal interest payments can be separated in to two components, one compensating 
creditors for the decline in the expected real value of their principle and the other for the use 
of the borrowed funds (the real interest paid). The borrower receives a tax deduction, not only 
on that component which reflects the real cost of funds but also on that part which represents 
compensation for reduction in the real value of the principle. The higher the inflation, the 
greater the tax deduction gained through this second component. It is natural think that firms 
with more assets and more collateral available face less obstacle in receiving debt and hence, 
have higher leverage. The expectation of high inflation make credit cheaper today and 
therefore it is positively related to leverage. In contrast with Frank and Goyal(2004), 
Korajczyk and Levy(2003) find that the domestic macroeconomic conditions besides 
inflation, help determine a firm’s leverage. They show that financially unconstrained firms 
take in to account the macroeconomic conditions when issuing debt to equity more than 
constrained firms where less follows the macroeconomic condition in the country. Therefore 
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expected inflation is found to be positively related to the debt. Inflation rate will be positively 
related to debt.  
 
3.4 The Model 
3.4.1 Panel data 
Panel data, also called longitudinal data or cross-sectional time series data, are data where 
multiple cases (people, firms, countries etc) were observed at two or more time periods. There 
are two kinds of information in cross-sectional time-series data: the cross-sectional 
information reflected in the differences between subjects, and the time-series or within-
subject information reflected in the changes within subjects over time. Panel data regression 
techniques allow taking advantage of these different types of information
23
.  
 
3.4.2 Fixed Effects Regression 
Fixed effects regression is the model to use when we want to control for omitted variables that 
differ between cases but are constant over time. It lets us to use the changes in the variables 
over time to estimate the effects of the independent variables on our dependent variable, and 
is the main technique used for analysis of panel data. In order to decide which method we 
should use we applied the Hausman test which is proposed by Hausman (1978) about the 
correlation between regressors and the individual effect. This is an important test to check 
weather observed and unobserved explanatory variables are correlated. Even the estimators 
are correlated with the individual effect fixed effect estimator is consistent but random effect 
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 See the Appendix 3A for more detail. 
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is not. So we test null hypothesis that individual effect and explanatory variables are 
uncorrelated against the alternative hypothesis where individual effects and explanatory 
variables are correlated. Based on the Hausman test we reject the null hypothesis and 
statistically prefer the fixed effect estimation.  
 
3.4.3 Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) 
As suggested by Anderson and Hsiao (1981) Generalized Method of Moment can be used to 
estimate the dynamic model with instrumental variables in the first differenced fixed effect 
model. 
 
The generalized method of moments is a very general statistical method for obtaining 
estimates of parameters of statistical models. It is a generalisation, developed by Lars Peter 
Hansen of the method of moment. The GMM estimator is widely used in the estimation of the 
dynamic panel data model in recent years (Bond et al, 1997; Hall et al, 1998;Ozkan, 2001). 
GMM can be used to estimate the dynamic model with instrumental variables in the first 
differenced fixed-effect models suggested by Anderson and Hsiao(1981). We now move on to 
the discussion of this method
24
.  
 
3.4.3. 1 Description 
The idea of the GMM is to use moment conditions that can be found from the problem with 
little effort. Like any other estimation methods, such as OLS and maximum likelihood (ML), 
require a theoretical relation that the parameters should satisfy. By choosing parameter 
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estimates, the sample correlation between the instruments and the function of parameters is 
satisfied as closely as possible. The theoretical relation is replaced by its sample counterpart 
and the estimates are chosen to minimize the weighted difference between theoretical and 
actual value.  
 
3.4.3.2 GMM estimator in the first difference equation 
There is evidence
25
 that OLS method is inappropriate to estimate our dynamic model. First, 
the serial correlation test reveals that the assumption of serially uncorrelated errors is violated 
and this suggests some degree of misspecification. Second, there is evidence of a negative 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable in the OLS level specification. This is surprising 
since the lagged dependent variable is expected to be biased upward due to correlation with 
the unobservable fixed effects. In the presence of firm specific effects OLS coefficients are 
biased assuming that α is unobservable and covariances between regressors and α are nonzero 
(Hsiao, 1986). Also, OLS will result in inconsistent estimation of the coefficient parameters 
since yi,t-1 will be correlated with αi which is constant. In order to eliminate the specific effects 
it is required to take the difference and avoid this problem. OLS regression does not 
consistently estimate the parameters because (yi,t-1- yi,t-2 ) and (ɛit - ɛi,t-1) are correlated through 
terms yi,t-1 and ɛi,t-1.  Anderson and Hsiao(1982) recommended a consistent estimation 
technique which requires using ∆yi,t-2 = (yi,t-2- yi,t-3) or yi,t-2 as instruments for the first 
difference of the lagged dependent variable where both are correlated with (yi,t-1- yi,t-2) but 
uncorrelated with (ɛit - ɛi,t-1). If the error term ɛit in levels is not serially correlated the 
instrumental variable estimation will result in consistent estimates. As it fails to utilize all the 
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available moment conditions the instrument variables estimation does not essentially lead to 
efficient estimates of the model parameters.  
 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation technique use Arellano and Bond (1991) 
which employs additional instruments obtained by utilizing the orthogonality conditions that 
exist between the lagged values of the dependent variable and disturbances. They study the 
performance of these estimators and show that the GMM estimates result in smaller variances 
than those associated with the Anderson and Hsiao type instrumental variable estimators. The 
GMM estimators allows the instruments to use in each period to increase as one moves 
through the panel, whereas the Anderson and Hsiao type estimators uses only ∆yi,t-2 to 
instrument ∆yi,t-1. The set of valid instruments change depending upon the assumption 
concerning the correlation between Xikt and ɛit. It is suggested that the valid instruments for 
period t for the equation in first differences will be Zit  =  (yi,…., yi,t-2, Xik1,…, Xik,t-1) under the 
assumption that ɛit. is serially uncorrelated, and Xikt is predetermined. That is ,E(Xikt ɛis) ≠ 0 for 
all t,s then all X’s are valid instruments. In this case Zit become (yit,…., yis, Xik1,…, XikT) where s = 
1,….T-2.  
 
3.5 Empirical Model 
Relaxing of Modigliani and Miller (1958) perfect market preposition explain that firms have 
to face transaction cost and provided that they have a target debt ratio. As they can not 
automatically adjust to this target debt level they follow the target adjustment process. The 
target long-term debt ratio of firms is taken to be a function of certain factors explained by 
theory, country specific factors and overall economic condition. This can be express as 
follows: 
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DRit = β1 + ∑ βi xit +εit        (3.1) 
where firms are represented by subscript i = 1,…..N, and time by t = 1,….T. In the model 
leverage ratio, DR is explained in terms of K explanatory variables x1 ,…., xk.  Disturbance 
term εit  assumed to be serially uncorrelated with mean zero and possibly heteroscedastic. βk’s 
are the unknown parameters of interest.  
 
When considering the presence of adjustment cost firms do not automatically adjust their debt 
levels but instead follows target adjustment process. The simple form of the target adjustment 
model states that changes in the debt ratio are explained by deviation of the current ratio from 
a target. Therefore when incorporating adjustment costs firms do not automatically adjust 
their debt level but instead follow a target adjustment model. 
DR it - DR i,t-1 = β (DR
*
 it - DR it-1), 0< β<1     (3.2) 
The regression specification is  
∆DR it = α + β (DR
*
 it - DR it-1) + ε      (3.3) 
 
where: DR
*
i,t , the target debt to assets ratio of firm i at time t. β, the target adjustment 
coefficient. If the transaction cost is zero (i.e. if β=1), then DR* it - DR i,t-1  and the firm 
automatically adjust its debt level to the target debt level triggered by the absence of 
transaction costs. On the other hand, if β=0 then DR it = DR i,t-1 , and it implies that transaction 
cost is too high and no firm adjust their debt level, thus remaining in the debt level of the 
previous period. When the value of β is between 0 and 1, firms adjust their debt level in a way 
that is inversely proportional to the transaction costs.  
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We are going to test whether the capital structure of the firm expressed by the ratio of total 
debt to total assets depend upon its size, future growth opportunities, profitability, operating 
risk, non-debt tax shields, net debtors and collateral assets. In addition to the above mentioned 
firm specific factors the macro economic factors such as real interest rate, growth rate and 
inflation rate are chosen in order to measure the effect of time-specific factors on the capital 
structure decision of SME’s.   
 
The theoretical model of capital structure, which is a function of internal and external 
variables, can be written as  
DR i,t = β0 + β1 SIZE i,t + β2 FGO i,t + β3 PRO i,t + β4 OR i,t + β5 NDTS i,t + β6 ND i,t + β7 CA i,t + 
β8GRt + β9IRt +αi + ɛ i,t        (3.4)  
 
where: DR i,t , the debt to assets ratio of firm i at time t; SIZE i,t , the size of firm i at time t; 
FGO i,t , future growth opportunities of firm i at time t; PRO i,t , the profitability of firm i at 
time t; OR i,t , the operating risk of firm i at time t; NDTS i,t, the non debt tax shield of firm i  
at time t; ND i,t, the net debtors of firm i at time t,; CA i,t  is collateral assets of firm i at time t;   
GRt, growth rate of the economy at time t,; IRt, inflation rate at time t,; αi represent 
unobservable firm and/or industry specific fixed effect; and  ɛ i,t , is the error term.  
 
Capital structure decisions are dynamic by nature and should be model as such in empirical 
analysis. Under the dynamic framework, this study will estimate the dynamic capital structure 
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model by employing a much stronger GMM
26
 estimation technique as proposed by Anderson 
and Hsiao (1982), and Arellano and Bond (1991).  
 
Combining the above (3.3) and (3.4) yields: 
DR i,t = β0 DR i,t-1 + β1 SIZE2 i,t + β2 FGO i,t + β3 PRO i,t + β4 OR i,t + β5 NDTS i,t + β6 ND i,t + β7 
CA i,t + β8GRt + β9IRt +αi + ɛ i,t       (3.5) 
 
We employ the above dynamic model to estimate the determinants of long term target debt 
ratio for SMEs in the UK. αi captured the unobservable characteristics of the firm that have 
significant impact on the firm’s capital structure decisions. They vary across firm but are 
assumed to be constant for each firm. In particular the effects of managerial attitude such as 
ability and motivation or attitude towards risk. They may also capture the time- invariant 
industry effects that are specific to the industry in which the firm operates such as entry 
barriers and factor market conditions. According to Baltagi (1995) this specification is 
required when the purpose of the test is to examine set of firms and make inference within this 
set. In the above model 3.5 we have modelled the target debt ratio as a function of firm 
specific and macroeconomic variables
27
. 
 
Equation 3.6 shows the equation for firm specific variables where αt represents firm invariant 
time specific effects and all other variables are same as equation 3.4. 
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Arellano and Bond (1991) takes in to account firm specific heterogeneity and endogenity of regressors and 
suggested that GMM is the most appropriate estimator. We have used GMM first difference estimator of 
Arellano and Bond(1991).   
27
 In order to capture the industry effects on leverage we have also included industry dummy variables in this 
model but the estimated coefficients of industry dummy variables of all the industries except business or services 
sector are statistically insignificant. Therefore we have not reported the results of industry level. 
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DR i,t = β0 DR i,t-1 + β1 SIZE2 i,t + β2 FGO i,t + β3 PRO i,t + β4 OR i,t + β5 NDTS i,t + β6 ND i,t  
+ β7 CA i,t + + αt +αi + ɛ i,t        (3.6) 
 
In order to check the robustness of our results, we have used the same regression as (3.5) 
above but the size is replaced with the other measure of size and use a size dummy. To 
measure the impact of firm size on determinants of capital structure of SMEs in the UK we 
interact the size with all other variables. In other words we investigate whether the size of the 
firm affects the determinants of capital structure using the equation 3.7.   
 
 
DR i,t = β0 DR i,t-1 + β1 SIZE i,t + β2 SIZE Dummy i,t + β3 SDDR i,t-1 + β4 SDPRO i,t  + β5 SDOR 
i,t + β6 SDFGO i,t + β7SD NDTS i,t + β8SD ND i,t + β9 PRO i,t + β10 OR i,t + β11 FGO i,t + β12 
NDTS i,t + β13 ND i,t +β14 INTt+ β15GRt + β16IRt +αi + ɛ i,t    (3.7) 
 
where: DR i,t , the debt to assets ratio of firm i at time t; SIZE i,t , the size of firm i at time t; 
SIZE Dummy i,t (SD) is a 0,1 dummy variable, SDDR i,t-1 is SD*DR i,t , SDPRO i,t  is SD* 
PRO i,t, SDOR i,t is SD*OR i,t , SDFGO i,t is SD*FGO i,t, SDNDTS i,t is SD*NDTS i,t, SD ND i,t 
is SD* ND i,t FGO i,t , future growth opportunities of firm i at time t; PRO i,t , the profitability 
of firm i at time t; OR i,t , the operating risk of firm i at time t; NDTS i,t, the non-debt tax shield 
of firm i  at time t; ND i,t, the net debtors of firm i at time t,; INTt , real interest rate at time t;  
GRt, growth rate of the economy at time t,; IRt, inflation rate at time t,; αi represent 
unobservable firm and/or industry specific fixed effect and  ɛ i,t , the error term.  
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3.6 Data and Sample 
Data covers nine industries of the UK economy and macroeconomic data such as GDP 
growth, inflation and real interest rate. All the data used in this study was gathered from the 
Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database of UK firms and from Bank of England.  
 
Table 3.2 
Sample Distribution by Sector Classification 
Sector No. of 
Companies 
% of 
Companies 
Agriculture Forestry and 
Mining 
244 6.1 
Manufacturing 463 11.6 
Construction 801 20.1 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 702 17.6 
Hotels and Restaurants 182 4.6 
Transport and Communication 232 5.8 
Business or Services 692 17.4 
Education health and Social 
work 
334 8.4 
Other 334 8.4 
Total 3984 100 
 
This study makes use of 3984 firms that satisfied the definitional and data requirements for 
this research. Researcher selected the sample using simple random sampling procedure to 
represent all firms (except finance sector) representing following industry categories in order 
to avoid the biasness (see Table 3. 2). Agriculture, Forestry and mining, Manufacturing, 
Construction, Wholesale and retail trade, Hotels and restaurants, Transport and 
communication, Business or services, Education health and social work and other. Financial 
firms such as banks, insurance companies and credit unions are excluded from this study 
because these firms tend to have their own characteristics due to specific financial behaviour 
and the nature of the business (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Wald, 1999). Firms selected for the 
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study across different industries have missing data due to age of existence of the company and 
availability. Therefore, researcher selected panel data which consisted at least three years of 
complete information available for the study over the period of 11 years from 1998-2008
28
. 
All firms in the selected sample are small companies which are defined in Chapter 2. 
Descriptive statistics are given in the Table 3.3. 
 
Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean  Std. Dev Min Max N 
TDR 0.373 0.309 0.021 0.897 38856 
LDA 0.109 0.189 0.000 0.814 16934 
SDA 0.264 0.238 0.017 0.976 35921 
Size 5.85 6.78 0.057 10.32 36228 
Profit 0.067 0.239 -1.45 0.748 39065 
OR 0.189 0.103 0.000 0.764 38564 
FGO 0.007 0.0426 0.071 0.871 34828 
NDTS 0.071 0.065 0.000 0.162 34321 
Net Debtors 0.076 0.171 -2.34 0.756 36298 
CA 0.478 0.239 0.004 0.989 36846 
 
The table reports sample mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum for the period 1998-2008. TDR is 
the total debt divided by total assets, LDA is long term debt divided by total assets, SDA is sort term debt 
divided by total assets. Size is the log of total assets, Profit is EBIT divided by total assets, OR is variation in 
profitability divided by the total assets, FGO is intangible assets divided by the total assets, NDTS depreciation 
to total assets, Net Debtors is the debtors minus creditors divided by the total assets and CA is the tangible assets 
divided by total assets.  
 
Descriptive statistics of the private firms is shown in the Table 3.3. This shows that private 
non-financial SMEs have a high leverage at 37.3% average. Long term debt represent 10.9% 
and short term debt represent 26.4%. It is interesting to compare the level of leverage with the 
other studies that have been conducted based on the small business context in the UK. Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) report in the context of US and German firms have similar mean leverage 
of around 0.38. Michealas et al (1999) report that for UK mean of leverage is 42% for 1988-
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1995 period suggesting that SMEs in the UK have changed their financing choice from debt 
to equity or retained earnings. 
 
3.7 Definition of Variables 
Profitability is the ratio of profits before interest and tax to total assets (Chittenden et 
al.,1996a, Titman and Wessels 1988) 
Size refers to the Total Assets (Titman and Wessels 1988). 
Net Debtors refers to the ratio of debtors less creditors to total assets. 
Non Debt Tax Shield is indicated by the depreciation charges to total assets.(Bradley et al., 
1984). 
Future Growth Opportunities are measured by the ratio of intangible assets to total assets 
(Long and Malitz,1985) 
Operating Risk is defined as the coefficient of variation in profitability over the whole 
period.(Titman and Wessels 1988; Micheals et al, 1999). 
Collateral Assets refers to the tangible assets to total assets Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
(Michaelas et al(1999) 
GDP growth is measured as the percent rate of increase in real gross domestic product. 
Inflation rate is the rate of increase of a price index. 
Size Dummy this is a 0, 1 dummy variable which is defined based on the definition for SME. 
If firms no. of employees greater than 50 and turnover equal or greater than 50million Euro or 
balance sheet total equal or greater than 43 million Euro, dummy equal 1, otherwise 0. 
Total Debt Ratio refers to the total debt to total assets (Michaelas et al, 1999, Ozkan, 2001) 
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3.8 Results and Discussion  
We present in Table 3.4 parameter estimates for the equation (3.5) and (3.6) using the 
complete sample. To account for the impact of internal variables on the determinants of 
capital structure we estimate GMM2 using equation 3.6 which includes time dummies. Table 
3.4 reports the GMM estimates of the dependent and explanatory variables. In all models, all 
the variables except the lagged dependent variable are treated as exogenous. We report two 
Wald tests where Wald test 1 is a Wald test for the joint significance of the estimated 
coefficient which is asymptotically distributed as chi-square under the null of no relationship 
and Wald test 2 is a Wald test for the joint significance of the time dummies. m1 and m2 
show first order autocorrelation and second order autocorrelation of residuals which is 
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Sargan test of over 
identifying restrictions which is asymptotically distributed as chi-square under null of 
instrument validity. 
 
With regard to the explanatory variables the results indicate that the majority of the 
coefficients have the expected signs and are significant. As expected the coefficient of lagged 
dependent is positive and significant at the 1% level. Regarding the diagnostic test the results 
of our GMM estimations find that the test for second order autocorrelation is .652 and .582 
respectively for GMM1 and GMM2 which indicates that first order or second order 
autocorrelation does not exist for residuals. The Sargan (.736 and .687) test shows that 
instruments are correct and our model is correctly specified. 
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Table 3.4 
Estimates of Capital Structure 
Dependent variable DR  
Independent Variables 
GMM(1) 
 
GMM(2) 
DR(-1) 0.3673  [0.000]*** 0.4171 [ 0.000]*** 
Size 1.68E-08[0.001]*** 8.96E-09  [0.027]** 
Profitability -0.0601  [0.001]*** -0.0437  [0.000]*** 
Operating Risk 0.0038  [0.001]*** 0.0016 [0.412] 
FGO 0.3211 [0.007]**  0.2346 [ 0.009]** 
NDTS 3.65E-08  [0.145] 4.49E-08 [ 0.131] 
Net Debtors -1.45E-08  [0.107] -1.84E-08  [ 0.213] 
CA 0.213 [0.037]** 0.328 [0.078]* 
Grate 0.0101  [0.019]**  
Inflation 0.0016  [0.000]***  
Adjusted R-squared 0.831 0.786 
No of observations 34234 32467 
Wald Test 1(df) 1472.92(11)*** 652.78(8)*** 
Wald Test 2(df)  53.21(11)*** 
m1 -8.293 -7.875 
m2 .652 .582 
Sargan Test .736 .687 
Notes: Model 1 gives the GMM estimates in first difference and further lags are used as instruments. Model 2 
gives the GMM estimates for firm specific factors in first difference and further lags are used as instruments. 
Wald test 1 for the joint significance of the regressors and Wald test 2 for the joint significance of time dummies. 
m1 and m2 first order autocorrelation and second order autocorrelation of residuals which is asymptotically 
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Sargan test shows the validity of the instruments. 
***, **, and * indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. See also Table 2.3. 
 
The estimation shows that there is positive coefficients for lagged dependent variable which 
indicate that firm adjust to long term financial target. This is consistent with the pecking order 
theory of financing activities which is empirically investigating the target adjustment model 
by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Ozkan (2001), Mira and Gracia (2002), Antoniou 
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(2008) assuming that adjustment cost of increasing and reducing leverage is symmetrical. 
Further they have assumed that cost of moving back (if leverage is above the target) and 
moving towards (if leverage is below the target) is the same. The adjustment coefficient 
which is defined as one minus the value of the estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable, in the model 1 the adjustment coefficient is .63 and model 2 it is .58
29
. This implies 
that it is costly to achieve the optimal capital structure as speed of adjustment is inversely 
relative to the transaction cost.  
 
The speed of adjustment
30
 compared with the Ozkan (2001)
31
 which is based on large firms in 
the UK, it shows that adjustment process is speeder for large firms than for the SMEs in the 
UK. This is not fair to compare these two results as the time period of these two studies are 
different and especially the credit terms for SMEs are much stronger than for large firms.  
 
The coefficient of growth opportunities
32
 is positive and consistent with the pecking order 
theory. This is in line with the other studies (Rajan and Zingales ,1995; Titman and Wessels, 
1988) who use this proxy for growth opportunities. This implies that fast growing small firms 
are likely to have insufficient earning to finance their growth internally. The lack of 
                                                             
 
29
 The  economic interpretation of this estimate suggest a half- life( See Iliev and Welch ,2010)  for the influence 
of the shock which is log (0.5)/log.(0.63) =1.5 years which suggest an active managerial intervention. For 
GMM2 log (0.5)/log(0.58) =1.27 years which means better managerial intervention. Note that no systematic 
attempt hat yet been made in the literature to interpret the empirical results of the speed of adjustment except 
Iliev and Welch (2010). 
30
However Iliev and Welch (2010) find severe biases in comparing the performance of different estimators  but 
do not propose a new estimator and try to reconcile speed of adjustment of existing estimators in their simulation 
analysis and concluded that average manager does not seem to move back to target debt ratio.  
31
 Speed of adjustment is around 1.15 [ log (0.5)/log(0.55)] for the UK large firms according to Ozkan (2001). 
32
 We have tried to use other proxy for this (R&D expenses) but data is not available for majority of the firms.   
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enthusiasm of small business owners to issue equity, created by asymmetric information 
problems and control considerations on top of the relatively higher flotation costs, fast 
growing firms are likely to issue more debt. Findings are similar to other studies pertaining to 
the determinants of capital structure of SME’s leverage in the UK (Michealas et al, 1999) 
Spain (Mira Gracia, 2002) and in India (Bhaduri, 2002). The plausible explanation of this 
association is that most UK SMEs operate in the trade and service sectors, where demand for 
working capital is relatively high. In order to meet the increasing requirement of working 
capital for growth, SMEs normally look for bank loans, trade credits from suppliers, friends 
or other resources. A positive relationship between growth and debt ratio in small firms is also 
reported by Michealas et al.(1996a) and Jordan et al. (1998), although both studies show up 
the relationship not to be significant. We find a significant positive relation between firm 
growth and the debt ratio, the growth factor has a relatively higher degree of impact on capital 
structure relative to the other significant factors in the model. It can be seen that a firm’s 
growth is an important factor among determinants influencing leverage. In general, our 
findings support the hypothesis that growth is positively related to debt ratio. 
 
As can be seen in Table 3.4, size positively effects the leverage of small firms. The positive 
relationship between size and total debt ratio indicates that larger the firm higher the gearing 
ratio. This implies that firm size has a strong influence on the way it finances its operations. 
Relatively larger firms will use more debt to finance their operations, and smaller firms will 
finance their operations more through their own equity and use less debt due to the higher 
financial barriers faces by small firms. Van der Wijst and Thurik(1993), Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) Chittendan et al.(1996) and Michaelas et al(1999) also report a positive relationship 
between firm size and debt ratio. Chittenden et al. (1996) suggest that, consistent with the 
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Pecking Order Theory, there is a positive relationship between firm size and source of 
financing, as smaller firms are more likely to rely on internal funds. Further empirical 
evidence of a significant relationship between firms’ gross sales and use of debt is provided 
by Romano et al. (2001) and Gregory et al. (2005).  Hence, our findings confirm the 
hypothesis and support the trade-off theory over the pecking order theory and imply that 
borrowing capacity of SMEs in the UK is significantly influenced by the financial distress 
risk. Titman and Wessels (1988) larger firms might be less risky and therefore less prone to 
financial distress and can generate more debt at lower interest rate. One possible clarification 
for this association is different stakeholders such as commercial banks, suppliers and clients 
in the market are more familiar with larger firms than small firms and therefore issues of 
information asymmetry are lessened for decisions on providing credit. Moreover larger firms 
have greater bargaining power than small firms when dealing with finance providers and 
therefore, larger firms have more opportunities to get bank loans, trade credit from suppliers 
and liabilities from other sources.  
 
As far as profitability is concerned, our findings generally indicate that profitability has a 
negative relationship with all estimations. The estimated coefficient is significant at 1% level. 
The negative sign of profitability is consistent with the pecking order theory that predicts a 
performance for internal finance rather than over external finance. Since small firms will 
make use of internally generated funds as a first option, those which make use of external 
funds will be those with a lower level of profit. On the other hand firms with higher profits 
will use more internal funds and therefore need to borrow less. The same results also found by 
Van der Wijst and Thurik(1993), Chittenden et al.(1996a) and Jordan et al.(1998). Jenson 
(1986) argue that if the market for corporate control is effective in forcing firms to commit to 
82 
 
paying out cash by levering up. In such a market managers of profitable firms cannot avoid 
the debt financing and suppliers of debt could be more willing to lend firms with higher 
profits. But this is inconsistent with the view that the relationship between past profitability 
and leverage should also be negative as past profitability can be viewed as proxy for future 
growth opportunities (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). 
 
Regarding the association between net debtors and capital structure, our finding show a 
negative coefficient and also statistically insignificant in the model one with macroeconomic 
variables. The negative relationship between net debtors and total debt ratio indicates that 
larger net debtors smaller the gearing ratio. This is contradictory from Michaelas et al (1999) 
and the possible explanation for this might be the rise in short term borrowing (more access) 
discourage long term borrowing (higher collaterals).  
 
As far as non-debt tax shield is concerned, our findings generally indicate that non-debt tax 
shield has a positive relationship with all estimations of leverage. However, the coefficient on 
the debt ratio is statistically insignificant in the first model and it is just significant at 10% 
level in the second model where there are no macroeconomics variables. The positive 
coefficient indicates that the firms with higher level of non-debt tax shield (proxied as ratio of 
annual depreciation expenses to total assets) which can be deducted from the taxable income 
are expected to have more debt than other firms. For instance, firms with higher depreciation 
ratios are more likely to have a higher proportion of tangible assets and fewer growth 
opportunities in their investment opportunity set. This in turn implies a positive relationship 
between non-debt tax shield and debt ratio. Furthermore our results confirm this prediction. 
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The evidence emerges that the operating risk of firms exerts a positive influence on firm 
borrowing decision. This indicates that SMEs with higher operating risk tend to use more debt 
in general and short term liabilities in particular. Hypothesis is rejected although the 
relationship between risk and capital structure is found in this context to be positive rather 
than negative and conflict with the theory of financial distress. Queen and Roll (1987) and 
Petit and Singer(1985) report that bankruptcy cost will higher in small firms and therefore 
would expect a negative relationship between risk and debt ratio. Consistent with this results 
bankruptcy costs are not significant enough to guarantee a negative relationship between 
operating risk and debt ratio. The same relationship found the Michaelas et al.(1999) for UK 
SMEs.  
 
On the other hand the empirical positive relationship between the operating risk and debt ratio 
of small firms, suggests that moral hazard problem outweighs the increased probability of 
bankruptcy. It follows that agency costs are lower in more risky firms due to lower 
underinvestment problems allowing such firms to depend on higher debt ratio. Jordan et 
al.(1998) found the same relationship and they suggest that this positive relationship appears 
to be confusing. According to them during this period small businesses faced a particularly 
hostile environment. The results strongly suggest that firm specific variable dominate all other 
blocks of variables. 
 
Collateral asset is found to be positively related with debt ratio and statistically significant. 
One standard deviation increases in tangible assets increase total debt from 7.83%. This is 
quite similar to the value (8.76%)  reported by Michaelas et al(1999) for SMEs in the UK. In 
order to overcome the informational opacity small firms can use collateral assets to attract 
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long term debt. However, this suggest that SMEs in the UK face high asset substitution 
problem as the level as long term debt is low and in order to avoid the agency cost issues they 
may have to use short term debt. Further this is consistent with Myers and Majlif (1984), 
Michaelas et al(1999) and Degryse (2009). 
 
The estimated coefficient for GDP growth rate is positive as expected and significantly related 
at 5% level to leverage. This result indicates that during the period of high growth, firms 
borrow more. Hence, the findings confirm the hypothesis. Inflation is positive and significant 
at 1% level with the debt ratio and this implies that during an inflationary period firm 
employee more debt in capital structure in order to get the advantage of fall in real cost of 
debt. This result accepts the hypothesis. 
 
Table 3.5 presents the regression coefficients and t-statistics of the time dummies which are 
included in the model 2 above in Table 3.4. According to the model 1 with macroeconomic 
variables and model 2 with only firm specific variables it is evident that small firms use debt  
Table 3.5 
Regression coefficients of Time Dummies 
Year GMM(2) 
2000 -0.0011 (-0.381) 
2001 0.0049 (1.712)* 
2002 0.0027(1.681)* 
2003 -0.0156 (-8.810)*** 
2004 -0.0349 (-13.918)*** 
2005 -0.0029 (-6.719)*** 
2006 0.0066 (17.139)*** 
2007 0.0576 (29.591)*** 
2008 -0.0071 (-5.932)*** 
***, **, and * indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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capital for short time period and paid off debt and might use the retained profit to finance their 
operations. Recent statistics by the British Bankers Association revealed that borrowing by 
the small firms in the UK has fallen by 14% since 1991 due to the financial pressure effect on 
small firms by the recession. Moreover they report that since the recession ended there has 
been a reduction in the external borrowing requirement of small firms which have been able 
to rely on retained earnings.  
 
As a robustness check, we interact all variables with a size dummy. The results (shown in 
Table 3.6) are robust to the ones obtained previously. 
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Table 3.6 
Regression coefficients of variables with size dummy 
Dependent variable DR 
Independent Variables 
GMM(1) 
 
DR(-1) 0.339  [0.000]*** 
Size 1.61E-06  [0.000]*** 
Size Dummy(SD) 0.0538  [0.000]*** 
SDTDR(-1) 0.1521 [ 0.004 ]** 
SDProfitability 0.0060  [0.009]** 
SDOperating Risk -1.491E-06 [0.098]* 
SDFGO 0.0902  [0.203] 
SDNDTS -1.99E-05  [0.105] 
SDNet Debtors 2.10E-06 [ 0.043]** 
SDCA -0.0021(0.039)** 
Profitability -0.0061 [0.000]*** 
Operating Risk 9.36E-08  [0.089] 
FGO 0.1429  [0.002]*** 
NDTS 1.75E-05  [0.087]* 
Net Debtors -2.03E-06  [0.011]** 
CA 0.167 [ 0.087]* 
Grate 0.0069  [0.0654]* 
Inflation 0.0008  [0.911] 
Adjusted R-squared 0.763 
No. of observations  29056 
Wald Test 1(df) 1810.98(17)*** 
m 1 -8.103 
m 2 .951 
Sargan Test .893 
Notes: We report GMM estimates for firm specific factors in first difference and further lags are used as 
instruments. DR is the dependent variable  and see Table 2.3 for description of other variables. Wald test 1 for 
the joint significance of the regressors and Wald test 2 for the joint significance of time dummies. m1 and m2 
first order autocorrelation and second order autocorrelation of residuals which is asymptotically distributed as 
N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Sargan test shows the validity of the instruments.***, **, and * 
indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
As a robustness check the model (presented in Table 3.6) uses a size dummy variable in order 
to measure the impact of size on the capital structure of SMEs. Basically the sample is divided 
in to two based on the size. Furthermore, we multiply all other variables (except size) from 
the size dummy in order to see the influence of size. Unlike the results for the previous model 
explained in Table 3.4 above, the expected signs of some variables are different when size 
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dummy is introduced. But this result clearly indicates the significance of size on leverage. For 
instance, the uses of interaction term on the profitability variable show there is a positive 
relationship with leverage which means that higher the profitability of medium firms greater 
the leverage. Higher the profitability gives a signal to the debt capital providers that business 
is successful or survival is not uncertain which will make them favor the firm and increase the 
availability of loans etc. Size dummy is significant at 1% level and it again confirms that the 
relationship between size and total debt is positive. The sign of the interacted variable of CA 
is negative and significant at 5%. This explained further that bigger the size of the firm lowers 
the collateral requirement. F statistics (29.65) obtained on the interacted variables indicates 
that the coefficients are statistically different from each other.  
 
3.9 Conclusion 
The study presents a panel GMM model to explain firm characteristics and macroeconomic 
variables that affect capital structure of SMEs in the UK over the period of 1998-2008. 
Compared with similar studies this research not only examines the effects of determinants 
related firm characteristics, but also investigates the aspects of macroeconomic changes in 
making capital structure decisions and the speed of adjustment. We analyze whether the 
determinants of capital structure of SMEs are same for large firms and examine the 
determinants of target capital structure of firms and role of adjustment process. More 
specifically, lagged total debt ratio, firm size, profitability and FGO have a significant 
relationship with all measures of capital structure. Moreover, the lagged value of the 
dependent variable found to be a major determinant of capital structure. The result also 
suggest that the almost all the theories of capital structure are relevant to the SMEs in the UK.  
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The key finding of this empirical relevance of the capital structure theory to the small 
business sector, carried out in this study suggest the results are also consistent with the 
prediction of the theory. This study estimated the speed at which firms adjust their capital 
structure and which shows that firm have long term target debt ratio and they adjust to the 
target ratio relatively fast.  
 
In addition, this paper give evidence which suggest that the capital structure of small firms in 
UK is time dependent. The results show that time effects influence the total debt ratio of small 
firms as well as the maturity structure of debt raised by small firms. Furthermore, 
macroeconomic changes are also significantly affecting the capital structure of small firms 
and total debt ratio exhibit a positive relationship with macroeconomic variables.  
 
Another important finding of this study is the size effect. When the firm becomes larger, they 
become more diversified and failure risk is reduced as they can access higher leverage. 
Information asymmetry makes small firms more difficult in accessing the external finance and 
they would face a higher interest cost. Moreover, these source of finance would be financially 
more risky and this would restrict small firms accessing debt finance and ultimately it will 
affect the growth of the small firm.  
 
Macroeconomic factors seem to have important impact as firm level factors in determining 
capital structure. As country become richer firms continue to be financed by debt. The GDP 
growth rate and inflation has a huge effect on the leverage decision of the firm. Growth of the 
GDP provides better financial opportunities for especially for SMEs and this would increase 
the leverage.  
89 
 
 
The study further confirm that small firms be likely to use retained profits as much as possible 
and then go for debt capital only when additional finance is essential. Hence we conclude that 
the estimated coefficients on the firm specific variables of size, profitability, operating risk, 
future growth and collateral assets are consistent with the explanation of the pecking order 
theory.  
 
Besides the government policy makers and financiers have to recognize that the borrowing 
requirements of SMEs are not stable over time. Relatively there appear to be some variation 
in the borrowing needs of small firms that may be related to changes in the broader economic 
conditions of the marketplace. Therefore government policies of financiers may have to vary 
over time to match with the changing borrowing requirements of small firms.  
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CHAPTER 4 
DETERMINANTS OF COST OF DEBT OF SMEs IN THE UK. 
 
4.1 Introduction. 
The previous chapter focused on the capital structure decision of SME’s, while in this chapter 
attention is made to another crucial issue for SMEs namely the cost of debt capital. More 
specifically, the objective of this chapter is to empirically study the determinants of cost of 
debt of non- financial SMEs in the UK. Better understanding of cost of debt determinants 
should result in more accurate capital budgeting decision and create a better alignment 
between manager’s compensation and shareholder value creation.  Evidence suggests that the 
vast majority of SME’s find it difficult to attract the levels of external finance required to fund 
the growth options (Binks and Ennew,1997). Cost of capital literature provides plenty of 
discussions of the determinants of cost of capital (Omran and Pointon,2004; Blass et al, 2004; 
Gregory and  Rutterford,2001), but very little attention has been given to the cost of debt.  
 
The objective of this study is to carry out an empirical testing using panel data methodology 
to determine the factors that explain the cost of debt in non- financial SMEs in the UK for 
period of 1998-2008. 
 
We present some background information on the cost of debt in section 4.1. In section 4.2, we 
discuss the theoretical background of our study. In section 4.3 we review some of the 
empirical studies, we describe our model of cost of debt in section 4.4 and methodology in 
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section 4.5. Dataset and other relevant information we presented in section4.6. In Section 4.7 
we present summary statistics for the full sample and according to the various classification 
schemes we use and discuss our empirical results. Section 4.8 concludes. 
 
4.2 Review of Literature 
The objective of this section is twofold. First in section one (4.2.1) is to uncover the important 
theoretical foundation relating to the cost of debt determinants. The next section (4.2.2) 
provides review of the previous studies relating to the determinants of cost of debt capital.  
4.2.1 Theoretical Background 
The combination of internal and external financial resources in company funding has 
generated disagreement over the years. MM important contribution to capital structure theory 
of 1958, which showed that, given a company’s investment policy, and not taking taxes and 
transaction cost in to account, the choice of financial policy does not affect the current market 
value of the company  is very significant. However, real markets are far from the supposed 
“perfect capital markets” on which MM based their work and numerous studies have proved 
the interdependence among investment decisions, financing decisions and firm value. Further 
the MM proposition (1958 and 1963) highlighted the important issues involving financial 
decision such as cheaper cost of debt compared to equity; the increase in risk and in the cost 
of equity as debt increases, and the benefit in situation where taxes are paid. With taxes and 
deductibility of interest expenses MM concluded that firms should use as much debt capital as 
possible.  
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The basic theories that have dominated the cost of debt capital are the trade off theory, theory 
of information asymmetry and agency theory. Cost of debt of a firm is also determined in the 
capital markets according to the risk–return trade off. Greater the risk, the greater the interest 
rate that will be required.  The trade off theory refers to the idea that marginal benefit of the 
source of finance is equal to the marginal cost of the same. The firms debt-equity decision as 
a trade-off between interest tax deductions and cost of financial distress is controversy about 
how valuable interest deductions are and what kind of financial trouble are most threatening. 
This trade-off between debt and equity depends on the tangible assets of the firm and taxable 
income. Unprofitable companies with risky intangible assets should rely primarily on equity 
financing. According to the trade-off theory, high profits should mean more debt-servicing 
capacity and more taxable income to shield and must give a higher target debt ratio. As 
explained in the chapter 2 the trade-off between cost and benefit shows why companies do not 
have 100% debt as expected from MM (1963). So the firms optimal capital structure is 
determined by the trade-off between the tax advantage linked with debt and the increased 
bankruptcy risk associated with higher leverage. Firms select optimal capital structure by 
examining the net tax advantage of debt financing by comparing debt advantages (tax shield 
benefit, the disciplinary role of debt on managers, Jensen and Meckling (1976) compared to 
equity finance cost relatively low information cost) and the drawback (due to information 
asymmetry between shareholders and creditors, the cost of bankruptcy due to higher debt and 
the cost of financial distress), Dobrica (2007). There is disparity among the researchers on 
what represents the cost and benefit of debt. 
 
Compared to the existing shareholders, the bondholders have no voting right which is one of 
the benefits of debt. So that external debt is more attractive from the point of controlling 
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power
33
. The owners of the firm do not share their control when debt financing is used. The 
most distinct feature of control of firms in general, and SME in particular, is the family 
ownership as debt does not dilute the owner’s ownership interest in the company. 
 
In addition, the other most important benefit of debt is tax deductibility on the company tax 
return, lowering the actual cost of the loan to the company Cost of debt of an unprofitable 
company that pays no taxes would have the total cost before tax. If the interest payments on 
debt are to deduct for tax purposes the reported earning must be zero or positive. If reported 
earnings are sufficient the firm receives a tax refund. High leverage can increase the 
uncertainty of the tax shield associated with the debt for the company. As explained by 
Holmes et al (2004) if the firms earnings decline so that the tax deductibility of interest 
payments is postponed or lost, the cost of debt funds to the company overall rises 
dramatically. So the advantage of tax deductibility is depends on firms earnings.  
 
There are certain factors such as taxes, which favor a company’s use of debt, but others such 
as the cost of bankruptcy, that limit the tax advantage. In this manner, it may be said that 
agency
34
 and signal theories offer considerable help in understanding a company’s use of 
debt. Specially, the use of debt may reduce management discretion and mitigate conflicts of 
interest between management and the contributors of funds to the company. Moreover, as a 
                                                             
 
34 
To pursue their personal agenda shareholders may go for risky investment which raises the default risk. When 
a firm has debt capital, it arises conflicts of interest between stock holders and bond holders which impose 
agency cost on firm which lower the market value of the firm. Going for risky investment finally cause debt 
holders to raise their interest rate which in turn increase the cost of debt capital as well as total cost of capital. 
34
 Agency theory predicts that debt reduces the conflicts between manager and owners as it increase the fraction 
of management’s ownership. As debt agreement restricts managers’ freedom, it is valuable and changes the 
policies. 
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consequence of separating ownership and management, shareholders have less information 
about the company than do managers. In the specific context of debt capital, cost of debt 
capital is mainly associated with the possibility of default and availability of realistic 
information for accurately estimating the default risk. By reducing the information asymmetry 
between firm and lenders, firms can reduce the cost of debt capital. Especially for the interest 
rate charges by the lending institutions is decided by the detailed information provided by the 
firm. For large public firms, such information is readily available and can be generated at 
lower cost instantly. However such information is not readily available or externally verified 
for all SMEs. Since the lending institutions have to add this information collection cost to the 
loan applicant small firm will have to pay a higher cost than large firms.  This causes to 
increase the interest rate charges to small firms. This idea is supported by Stiglitz (1988)
35
. 
 
Stiglitz and Weiss(1981) argue that as credit rationing profitable projects do not have access 
to finance at the same time the other projects with the same profitability would have. This 
arises the consequence of bankers and borrowers having different information about the same 
projects which is known as the asymmetric information leading to the phenomenon known as 
adverse selection and moral hazard.  
 
Storey (1994) shows four other factors that related with SMEs on credit rationing which are 
directly linked with the Stiglitz and Weiss(1981). The high fixed cost of information, variety 
                                                             
 
35
 Stiglitz(1988) explain that small business have to pay very high interest rate as the bank consider the 
probability of default is very high. This happens because of misclassification (the greater the uncertainty leads to 
greater errors in classification) of borrowers and further he explains that the cause for the higher interest is that 
the credit market is not a pure price market.  
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of credit conditions such as interest rate, terms and other conditions used by banks to 
compare, different attitudes, skills and motivation of entrepreneurs show and the high 
mortality rate of the SMEs. In understanding the credit rationing process it is useful to 
describe the decision process of banker to maximize the benefit without any risk and perfect 
information.  As bank has limited information and limited control over the borrowers’ actions 
bank use collaterals as a way to reduce the risk of default and maximize the return. Collateral 
provides an incentive to the entrepreneur to seek less risky projects consequently the banks 
respond to the adverse selection and moral hazard by seeking collateral.  
 
The expected return of the bank is entirely depending on the particular firms’ perception on 
risk. So the cost of debt (interest) that the borrower is willing to pay does not represent 
reliable measure of risk as asymmetric information obstruct the banker to know the profit of 
the project which is known by the borrower. Diversity of business in between the SME sector 
which is not a problem in itself but the complexity to manage the information in more 
effective way making the bank more effort which make the evaluation more costly.         
 
As Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) point out due to the credit rationing among loan applicants who 
appear to be identical some receive and some do not, even if they offered to pay a higher 
interest rate. This probability is higher for SME sector due to the atomization observed by 
type of business. The high fixed cost of information will be more affected to SME as this cost 
is independent of the amount of loan. The attitude of the banker that the borrower would 
deviate from the original objective is much higher in particular for SMEs due to the less 
monitoring throughout the project life.  
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In this way, leverage becomes a signal to the former of the private information in the hands of 
the latter since the directors desire to avoid the problems of bankruptcy convert debt into a 
believable signal (Padron, 1999). Besides, since funding comes from different sources for 
SME (credit market for SMEs and capital markets for large companies) it would make more 
sense to study further what determine the cost of debt capital of SMEs.  
 
The agency theory which is directed at the ubiquitous agency relationship, in which one 
party(the principle) delegates work to another (the agent), who perform that work(Jenson & 
Meckling, 1976). Agency theory is concerned with mainly resolving two problems that can 
occur in agency relationships. First, the agency problem that arises when the desires or goals 
of the principle and agent conflict. Second, when it is difficult or expensive for the principle 
to verify what the agent is actually doing. The problem here is that the principle is unable to 
verify that the agent has performed his duty appropriately. The other conflict is over risk 
sharing which arises when the agent and principle have different attitude towards the risk. 
Agency theory suggests that the debt capital should reduce the conflicts of interest between 
managers and owners as there is a commitment to pay out more cash (Jensen, 1986) and 
managers readiness in over investing in risky investment projects to advance their self interest 
can be controlled by employing more debt capital through debt agreements. On the other hand 
there is agency related cost of debt which arises through the risk sharing. Even though the cost 
of debt (return of debt holders) has been fixed, engage in risky investment projects by 
managers would lead to debt becoming more expensive and less available as a future source 
of finance. Risk sharing (shifting) behavior can effect the interest rate required by the debt 
providers demanding higher rate. In addition to that this could be a cause of losing the 
reputation of the firm as debt providers requiring a higher interest for their money for bearing 
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higher risk which result in acquiring risky investment projects by the managers. This is due to 
the unsuccessful projects where the cost is shared among all security holders.  
 
Response of the debt holders for the risk sharing may again depend on the size of the firm as 
well. Asset structure of the firm shows the ability of the firm to assure the debt holders 
wealth. In relation to the SMEs the risk sharing would not be easy as the asset structure and 
the variability of the cash flow from the use of the assets may be altered. Investment of SME 
may not be in wide range of projects where the growth options are less due to the size of the 
firm. This may lead to debt holders to expect higher return from SMEs as they bear a higher 
risk. Giannetti (2003) argue that larger the size of the firm would be, higher the cost of 
external finance if the financial system does not favor risk sharing. This explains the opposite 
relationship between the size of the firm and the cost of debt capital.  
 
Following the above discussion about the cost of debt which is relating to the risk sharing 
behavior of security holders might be higher for the SMEs. However, this is not the only 
agency related cost of debt. When a firm has debt, the conflicts of interest between managers 
and owners impose agency cost on the firm which lowers the market value of the whole firm. 
The agency cost of debt is consistent with the theory of asymmetric information where the 
both theories addresses the role of information. This recognizes that management at all times 
knows more about the business than owners do and this information asymmetry is one of the 
key factors that allows management to pursue goals that are divergent from shareholders’ 
interests.  
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It is clear that these theories explain the cost of debt capital in different aspects. Higher the 
firm debt is higher the financial risk link to the business, and consequently cost of debt is 
higher.  A higher interest rate either imply riskier applicants (the adverse selection effect) or 
influences borrowers to choose riskier investments
36
 (the incentive or moral hazard effect) in 
order to gain higher return.   
 
As mentioned earlier, adverse selection and moral hazard may have a sizeable effect when 
firms are young or small, which would explain why it is difficult for them to finance through 
the public markets. However, through close and continued interaction, with the finance 
provider a firm may provide a lender with sufficient information  and awareness  about the 
firm's affairs so as to lower the cost and increase the availability of credit. Simply the cost 
depends on the age, reputation and the length of the financial relationship with the lender. To 
distinguish these theories as possible explanation to the cost of debt determinants it is 
important to investigate the firm characteristics, default risk, agency cost and information 
asymmetry problems. 
 
4.2.1 Review of selected empirical studies 
As per the previous discussion it is understandable that most models and analyses build 
assuming that SMEs are heterogeneous set of business with little information available for the 
fact that can be used to the creditworthy. According to a recent report of British Chamber of 
Commerce (BCC, 2008) debt finance is an attractive option for businesses who are reluctant 
to compromise their control over the new investment. There is well known reluctance in debt 
                                                             
 
36
 This provides an incentive to the entrepreneur to commit him  to the project because higher the riskiness of the 
project need to provide suitable collateral to the lender. 
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financing of SME rather using the savings or investment from family and friends. Smaller 
firms will often rationalize financial decision in a hierarchical fashion which is known as 
Pecking Order Framework
37
(Chittenden et al,1996a). Certainly, there is a strong support in 
the theoretical aspect of cost of debt capital for employing higher amount of debt in order to 
enhance the value of the firm.  
 
As Diamond (1991) predicts, the impact of information asymmetries vary according to the 
firm size. Small firms, those without well established reputations use bank debt when they 
have little private information. Large firms with established reputations and access to public 
debt markets choose high concentration of bank debt when they are difficult for outsiders to 
observe. Differences in characteristics among firms of different sizes of firms suggest that 
firms face changing borrowing opportunities as they grow. Diamond (1991) concludes that 
higher credit rating (low risk) and reputation is required for low interest rate and to borrow 
without monitoring. Certainly this supports the idea that cost of debt depend on the risk and 
reputation of the firms. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that the interest rate charged, to an ex 
ante observationally equivalent group of borrowers, determines not only the demand for 
capital but also the riskiness of the borrowers. However, theory of credit rationing suggest  
that creditors may be unwilling to increase interest rate for borrowers with higher risk (Stiglitz 
and Weiss,1981)
38
. These contradictory findings lead large amount of related empirical 
                                                             
 
37
 First use the internally generated funds followed by debt and finally equity.  
38
 In a competitive market prices are higher for uncertain borrowers than for certain borrowers as the lender has 
to incur additional cost in monitoring, assessing and covering  possible bad debts. This implies that more risky 
projects would be charged a higher interest and low risk projects a lower interest rate. But Stiglitz and 
Weiss(1981) show that raising of interest where bank has less information about the expected success of the 
project than the entrepreneur can lead to lower the return of the bank. Because  borrowers no longer find it 
worthwhile borrowing from bank as the bank charge higher interest rates.  
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research focusing on uncovering the relationship between cost of debt capital and firm 
specific factors.   
 
Related literature has evolved from the MM approach, and on individuals (Myers 1977) as 
well as the financial distress derived from insolvency and bankruptcy risks (Brennan and 
Schwartz, 1978; Bradly, Jerrel and Kim,1984) to the most recent contributions,  which take in 
to account the information asymmetries and conflict of interests between the agents involved 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In other words it is the relationship between risk and return, the 
firm’s capital structure directly affect its financial risk which can be describe as the  risk 
resulting from the use of financial leverage.  
 
Although these theoretical approaches deal with cost of debt from different perspectives, what 
they have in common is that they all study large corporations as opposed to medium and small 
enterprises (Michealas et al;1999). Many studies (Sengupta,1998; Koskela and 
Stenbacka,2004) are based on the large firms and studied the cost of debt capital in different 
perspectives. They consider the borrowing patterns, almost exclusively within the context of 
such large companies. But the specific features characterize SMEs make it difficult to apply 
most of the analytical tools. For instance, one of the most important differences between large 
and SME is the unavailability of long term funding through capital markets for SMEs and 
therefore the absence of market prices permitting objective assessment of their value 
(Osteryoung and Newqman, 1993). Such differences suggest a need to take a new look at the 
cost of debt and what factors determine the cost of debt capital of SMEs.  
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Different Implications of theories and empirical studies about the determinants of cost of debt 
capital of different countries and for different types of businesses have commonly included 
size, profitability, collateral assets, age, gearing, sales growth and taxes as the explanatory 
variables. Table 4.1 shows the results of selected number of studies. Panel A shows the 
summary results for the determinants of cost of debt and Panel B shows the definitions for the 
variable and key findings. 
Table 4.1 
Panel A: Summary results for the determinants of cost of debt 
Variable 
 
Petersen and 
Rajan(1994) 
Berger and 
Udell(1995) 
Pittman and 
Fortin(2004) 
Hanley and 
Crook(2005) 
Burke and 
Hanley(2006) 
Hyytinen and 
Pajarinen(20
07) 
Size (-)Larger 
firms pay 
lower interest 
rate 
(-)Larger 
firms pay 
lower 
interest rate 
(+)Find a 
positive 
correlation 
with interest 
rate.  
 (-)Size 
which 
measures 
using the 
projected 
sales shows 
that interest 
margins are 
significantly 
lower for 
larger 
facilities.  
(-)Smaller 
firms pay 
higher cost 
of debt and 
larger firms 
pay lower 
cost of 
debt.  
Profitabili
ty 
(+)Low 
profitable 
firms pay less 
interest. The 
coefficient 
have the 
opposite sign 
to that 
expected.  
Ambiguous (-) Find a  
negative 
coefficient  
  (-) More 
profitable 
firms pay 
less for 
their 
external 
finance  
Age (-)Age of the 
firm has a 
(-)Negatively 
related to 
(-)As firm 
complete 
  (-)When a 
small 
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little effect on 
the rate. 
Younger 
firms pay 
higher 
interest rate. 
loan rate. good credit 
histories 
interest rate 
will decline. 
business 
ages 1 year 
cost of debt 
capital 
decreases 
by 1-2 basic 
points. It is 
a big 
reduction of 
cost of debt 
for a firm 
with an 
average 
amount of 
debt. 
Collateral 
/ Asset 
structure 
(-
)Collaterable 
assets give 
cost 
advantage.  
(-)Higher the 
collateral 
lesser the 
loan rate. 
(+)Interest 
rates are 
increasing in 
collateral.  
(-
)Collateral 
provision 
insure the 
bank 
against the 
downside 
risk of 
default.   
U shaped 
relationship 
between 
interest 
margin and 
collateral 
(+)find a 
positive 
relationship 
with cost of 
debt. 
Gearing (+)Higher the 
financial 
leverage 
increase the 
cost of debt. 
Thus leverage 
decreases 
with age but 
increases with 
size.  
(+)Higher 
the leverage 
increase the 
loan rate. 
(+)Higher the 
financial 
leverage 
increase the 
cost of debt. 
   
Liquidity  (+)Current 
ration shows 
a positive 
relationship 
with loan 
    
103 
 
rate. 
(-)Quick 
ratio shows a 
negative 
relationship 
with loan 
rate. 
Negative 
equity 
  (-)Negative 
equity reflect 
that firms 
experiencing 
financial 
distress may 
incur higher 
borrowing 
costs. 
   
Sales 
Growth 
(-)Firms with 
multiple 
banks have 
lower sales 
growth. 
     
Creditwor
thiness 
     (+)Higher 
creditworthi
ness means 
higher the 
cost of debt 
capital.  
Cash flow   Negatively 
related to 
cost of debt. 
   
Dummy(S
ME) 
     (+)Cost of 
debt is 
higher for 
SME than 
for larger 
firms. 
Year   Not reported.    
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Default on 
payment 
     (+)Default 
on payment  
supports the 
conventiona
l wisdom 
and shows a 
positive 
relationship 
with cost of 
debt. 
Length of 
the 
relationshi
p 
(-)Shorter the 
relationship 
higher the 
interest rate.  
     
Amount 
borrowed 
    (-)Higher 
the amount 
borrowed 
lower the 
interest  
 
Auditor 
choice 
  Negative and 
statistically 
significant. 
High quality 
auditor 
reduce the 
interest rate 
on  debt. 
   
Quality of 
the 
enterprise 
    (+)This 
measures 
the ability 
of the 
lender to 
ascertain 
the 
borrowers 
real 
revealed 
quality. 
This is 
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positive and 
significant.  
Finance/p
urpose 
   (-) To 
measure 
the risk of 
different 
type of 
financing 
this 
variable is 
incorporat
ed and this 
shows a 
negative 
relationshi
p with the 
interest.  
(+)Purpose 
of the loan 
means 
whether it is 
to cover 
working 
capital or to 
cover 
capital 
investment.  
This is 
positively 
related.  
 
Key 
Findings 
*Borrowing 
from multiple 
lenders 
reduce the 
availability of 
credit and 
increase the 
cost of debt. 
* The length 
of the 
institutional 
relationship 
with firm 
have a little 
impact on the 
price. 
 
*Borrowers 
with longer 
banking 
relationships 
pay lower 
interest rate 
and less like 
to pledge 
collateral.  
*Small firms 
are more 
dependent on 
banks for 
external 
finance. 
*Bank 
borrower 
relationship 
plays an 
important 
role in the 
pricing of 
*Information 
asymmetry 
between 
lenders and 
borrowers is 
decreasing in 
firm age.  
*Choosing a 
Big Six 
auditor, 
which can 
reduce debt 
monitoring 
costs by 
enhancing the 
credibility of 
financial 
statements, 
enables 
young firms 
to lower their 
interest rates.  
*A 
relatively 
fixed 
assets 
base, as 
seen in 
higher 
security to 
loan 
values for 
non first 
round 
finance 
raised the 
price and 
risk of 
successive 
financial 
increments
. Customer 
is unable 
or 
unwilling 
*Found a U 
shape 
relationship 
between 
interest 
margin and 
collateral. 
*Initially 
new 
ventures get 
cheaper 
credit by 
providing 
collateral 
however 
greater the 
amount of 
collateral 
means 
greater the 
risk. In 
order to 
compensate 
*Cost of 
debt capital 
is higher for 
young 
firms.  
*When a 
small 
business 
ages one 
year its cost 
of debt 
capital 
decreases 
by 1-2 basic 
points.  
*Negative 
qualitative 
relation is 
robust 
controlling  
for cross-
sectional 
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loans to 
small firms 
with the 
possible 
exception of 
the very 
smallest 
borrowers. 
*Duration of 
firms pre IPO 
histories 
affects 
interest rates 
in their post 
IPO years.  
to move to 
a 
competing 
bank for 
follow-up 
finance.  
*Bank 
compensat
e for 
higher risk 
by 
charging a 
higher 
rate. 
the risk 
lenders 
have to 
charge 
higher 
interest. 
variation in 
unobservabl
e 
creditworthi
ness of 
small firms 
and within-
firm 
variation in 
their 
observable 
creditworthi
ness.    
Source: Compiled by author from the selected review of literature    
Variable 
 
Sengupta(1998) Hooks(2003) Holmes et 
al (1994) 
Rand(2007) Niskanen and 
Niskanen 
(2010)* 
Size (-)Size is negatively 
associated with the 
cost of debt. 
Because of the 
lower market risk 
large firm enjoy 
lower cost of debt. 
(-)Negatively 
associated 
with the use 
of bank debt.  
(-
)Negativ
ely 
related to 
interest. 
(-)Negatively 
related to 
loan rate.  
(-)Bigger 
firm pays 
low interest 
rate. 
Issuer size (+)Positively 
related with cost of 
debt. Economies of 
scale in 
underwriting 
suggest that the cost 
of debt measure 
would be inversely 
related to size of 
issue. 
  (-)Issuer 
size:The 
variable debt 
share is 
negatively 
related with 
interest rate.  
 
Profitabili
ty 
(-) Firms with 
higher profit margin 
are expected enjoy 
(-)Negatively 
correlated 
with bank 
 (+)Firms 
with higher 
profit share 
would have 
(-)More 
profitable 
firm pays 
low interest 
107 
 
lower cost of debt.  debt. to pay higher 
interest cost.  
rate. 
Age  (-)Negatively 
correlated 
with bank 
debt. 
(-) 
Negativel
y related 
to 
interest. 
(-)Negatively 
related with 
interest rate.  
(-)Negatively 
associated 
with interest 
rate. 
Collateral  (+)Positive 
relationship 
with bank 
debt. The 
results 
suggest that 
fixed assets 
act as a 
proxy for 
observability 
of a firm. 
 (+)Positively 
correlated 
with interest 
rate. 
(+)Positively 
related to the 
interest rate.  
Gearing (+)Firms with 
higher debt to 
equity are expected 
to have higher cost 
of debt. 
(+)Positively 
related with 
bank debt.  
  (+)Firms 
with high 
debt to assets 
pay higher 
interest rate.  
Size of 
the 
loan(Loan 
amount) 
   (+)Positively 
correlated 
with interest 
rate. 
 
Convert (-)Convertible debt 
have a lower cost of 
debt. 
    
Subordina
ted debt 
(+)Subordinated 
debt have a higher 
cost of debt. 
    
Business 
cycle 
(+)This is to 
capture the risk 
premium over the 
business cycle. 
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Larger this 
differential, the 
higher is the cost of 
debt.  
Treasury 
Bill 
Higher the TB rate 
higher the cost of 
debt.  
    
Interest 
ratio  
Firms with higher 
time interest ratio 
are expected to 
enjoy lower cost of 
debt. 
    
Reputatio
n 
 (-)Negatively 
correlated 
with bank 
debt as they 
are difficult 
to observe. 
   
STD of 
return 
This is a proxy for 
market risk of the 
issuer so that it is 
expected to be 
positively 
associated with cost 
of debt. 
    
Sales 
growth 
and sales 
 (+)Sales 
growth-
Positive 
which is not 
what the 
theory 
predict. But 
for medium 
firms it is 
negative. 
 (-)Sales 
growth-
Negatively 
related to 
loan rate. 
Sales- 
Positively 
related with 
interest rate. 
 
Managem
ent 
    (+) Increase 
the 
management 
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ownership ownership 
increase the 
cost of debt 
as it 
increases the 
risk.  
Maturity 
period 
(+)Longer the 
maturity is expected 
to have a higher 
cost of debt because 
of its greater risk 
exposure. 
    
Call (-) Call is 
negatively 
associated with the 
cost of debt. 
    
Relations
hip 
   (+)Positively 
related with 
interest cost. 
(-)Negatively 
related to the 
interest rate.  
Location 
of the 
firm 
    (+) Urban 
firms pay 
higher 
interest than 
rural firms. 
Disclosur
e 
(-)Higher the 
disclosures lower 
the cost of debt. 
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Key 
Finding 
*Shows a 
statistically 
significant negative 
association between 
a measure of a 
firm’s overall 
disclosure quality 
and two alternative 
measures of a 
firm’s incremental 
borrowing cost.  
*Lenders and 
underwriters 
consider the 
disclosure quality in 
their default risk 
estimates. 
*Degree of details, 
timeliness and 
clarity of disclosure 
are perceived to 
have a lower 
default risk and 
over cost of debt.  
*Higher the 
uncertainty greater 
the reliance on 
disclosure.  
*factors vary 
by the size of 
the firm. 
*Bank plays 
an important 
role in 
lending to 
businesses 
because of 
information 
asymmetries. 
*Both small 
and large 
firm find 
bank debt 
advantageou
s under 
appropriate 
circumstance
s.  
*Policy 
makers 
should 
consider the 
importance 
of reputation 
building 
services. 
*Small 
firms pay 
more for 
term 
loans and 
lease 
funds 
than 
medium 
and large 
firms.  
*No 
identifiab
le trend 
in favor 
of any 
particular 
industry 
group 
stratified 
by size. 
*Differen
t interest 
rates for 
different 
size 
categorie
s.  
*Larger 
firms get 
cheaper 
credit 
*Informal 
credit market 
plays an 
important 
role for fast 
growing 
firms. 
*probability 
of accessing 
the credit is 
higher in 
rural areas. 
*Borrower 
lender 
relationship 
reduces 
interest rate.  
*Collateraliz
ed lending 
face larger 
interest rate. 
*Relationshi
p between 
managerial 
ownership 
and interest 
margin on 
loan is non 
linear. Banks 
charge 
higher 
interest rates 
at medium 
level 
managerial 
ownership. 
*Firms with 
dispersed 
ownership 
structure 
have easier 
access to 
credit and 
less often 
required to 
pledge 
collateral.  
Source: Compiled by author from the selected review of literature    
*This study uses 3 dependent variables but in this review we have reported one variable only. 
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Table 4.1 
Panel B: Definitions for the Variable and Key Findings 
Variable 
 
Petersen and 
Rajan(1994) 
Berger and 
Udell(1995) 
Pittman and 
Fortin(2004) 
Hanley and 
Crook(2005) 
Burke and 
Hanley(2006) 
Hyytinen 
and 
Pajarinen(20
07) 
Sample, 
period and 
no. of 
observatio
n. 
3404 US 
firms from 
national 
survey of 
small 
business 
finance for 
1988 
3400 US 
SME  for 
1988 
Firms which 
conducted 
IPO between 
1977-1988. 
371 firms 
UK retail 
banks for 
commercial 
loans from 
1998-1999. 
Maximum 
961 
observations. 
214 
application 
for finance 
from major 
UK banks 
from 1998-
1999. 
Small firms 
from 1999-
2002. 
47115 
firms and 
97437 
observation
s. 
Method OLS OLS OLS 2 stage 
design 
Standard 
Tobit  
methodolog
y 
OLS 
Dependen
t variable 
Interest rate 
of firms 
most recent 
loan 
The loan 
rate 
premium 
over bank 
prime rate 
Interest rate; 
Interest 
expense 
divided by 
average debt 
during the 
year. 
Interest rate 
on loan or 
overdraft. 
Interest 
margin 
Interest  
cost to total 
debt / 
Interest 
cost to total 
assets 
Size Book value 
of assets 
Total firm 
assets 
Log of one 
plus total 
assets. 
 Project sales Net sales of 
the firm. 
Profitabili
ty 
Gross profit 
to 
assets/Stand
ard 
deviation of 
gross profit 
to assets 
Pretax 
profit as a 
% of sales 
   Ratio of net 
return to 
net sales. 
Age No of years 
since the 
Number of 
years the 
Number of 
years that 
  Age of the 
firm in 
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firm was 
founded/ 
No. of years 
under 
current 
ownership 
current 
owner have 
the business 
have elapsed 
since the 
firm’s IPO 
years.  
Collateral 
/Assets 
structure 
Not reported Dummy 
variable =1 
if the loan is 
secured 
Total 
property , 
plant and 
equipment 
scaled by 
total assets.  
Collall=Land
, guarantee, 
life policy, 
equity/CLBI
=Collall-
equity 
denominated 
in £1000s 
CEI=Owners  
equity 
denominated 
in £1000s 
Total 
collateralisib
le wealth 
Ratio of 
tangible 
assets to 
total assets. 
Gearing Debt to 
assets  
Total debt 
to total 
assets 
Book value 
of total debt 
deflated by 
firm market 
value 
   
Liquidity  Current 
assets to 
current 
liabilities 
and Current 
assets 
minus 
inventory 
over current 
liabilities. 
Accounts 
receivable 
turnover, 
inventory 
turnover, 
Accounts 
payable 
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turnover. 
Negative 
equity 
  Dummy 
variable to 
identify when 
the book 
value of 
equity is 
negative. 
   
Sales 
Growth 
(Sales-
sales(-
1))/Sales 
    Percentage 
sales 
growth 
during t-1 
Creditwor
thiness 
     Credit 
score rating 
Cash flow   Cash flow 
from 
operations 
scaled by 
total assets. 
   
Dummy(S
ME) 
     SME = 1 if 
the firm is a 
SME, 
otherwise 0 
Year   Calendar year 
in which the 
firm had its 
initial public 
offering. 
   
Default on 
payment 
  The 
difference 
between the 
yield on 
BAA-rated 
corporate 
bonds and the 
yield on 10 
year 
  No of 
unsettled 
payments. 
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government 
bonds for the 
year.  
Length of 
the 
relationshi
p 
No. of years 
since the 
firm started 
operations 
with the 
bank. 
Length of 
the 
relationship 
with current 
lender in 
years 
    
Amount 
borrowed 
    Amount 
borrowed 
 
Auditor 
choice 
  This variable 
has value of 1 
when the 
firm retain a 
Big Six 
auditor; 0 
otherwise. 
  =1 if the 
firm’s 
auditor has 
issued an 
auditing 
note before 
approving 
of the 
firm’s 
financial 
statements. 
=0 
otherwise 
Quality of 
the 
enterprise 
No. of 
banks/ 
Fraction of 
firm debt 
that is 
borrowed 
from its 
current 
lender. 
     
Finance/p
urpose 
   Dummy =1 
if first round 
finance and 0 
otherwise. 
Dummy 
1=working 
capital loan. 
Otherwise 0 
 
115 
 
 
Variable 
 
Sengupta(1998) Hooks(2003) Holmes et al 
(1994) 
Rand(2007) Niskanen and 
Niskanen 
(2010) 
Sample, 
period and 
no. of 
observatio
n. 
Sample obtained 
from the 1987-
1991 annual 
volume of FAF 
reports. Use a 
sample of 103 
different firms.  
Small, 
medium and 
large in 1991 
and 1992. 
Use a sample 
of 265 firms. 
A random 
sample of 
425 firms 
was 
selected 
from 1989 
Australian 
telecom 
yellow 
pages.  
 Survey data 
for 2000-
2001 for 
over 1600   
Vietnamese 
manufacturin
g firms from 
4 provinces.        
2672 
observations 
of  small and 
medium size 
companies in 
Finland for 
the period 
1994-1997. 
Method OLS Tobit ANOVA 
test, 
Scheffe 
test 
Probit OLS 
Industry Seven 
industry 
dummies 
based on 
one digit 
SIC codes. 
Three 
dummy 
variables 
for 
construction
, service 
and retail. 
Firms one 
digit SIC 
code. 
   
Dummy Three 
regional 
dummies 
and six 
dummies for 
type of asset 
with which 
the loan is 
collateralize
d. 
Characteristi
c of loan 
rate.  
Ten other 
dummy 
variables to 
represent 
contract and 
governance 
characteristi
c. 
Big Six; 1 
when the 
firm retains a 
Big Six 
auditor and 0 
otherwise.  
Business 
overdraft 
coded as 1 
for ‘yes’ 
otherwise 0 
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Dependen
t variable 
Yield to maturity 
on first debt 
issued in year 
t+1/Total interest 
cost of the first 
debt issued in 
year t+1 
Bank debt 
concentration
. Bank debt 
to total 
liabilities. 
Interest 
rate for 
over draft, 
term loan  
Interest rate  Interest rate 
spread on 
each firms 
bank loan  
Size Log of book value 
of total assets.  
Total assets Turnover Total Assets Log of Total 
Assets 
Issuer size Log of the dollar 
amount of the 
debt issued. 
    
Profitabili
ty 
Income before 
extraordinary 
items of year t 
divided by the net 
sales of year t.  
Income 
divided by 
the total 
assets.  
 Not reported Income over 
total assets. 
Age  No. of years 
since 
founding 
Age of the 
firm in 
years. 
No. of years 
since 
founding 
Age of the 
firm in years. 
Collateral  Tangible 
assets to total 
assets. 
 Not reported Dummy 
variable 
Gearing Total liabilities at 
the end of year t 
divided by the 
market value of 
common equity at 
the end of year t.  
Total debt 
divided by 
total assets. 
  Debt over 
assets 
Size of 
the 
loan(Loan 
amount) 
   Not reported  
Convert Dummy =1 if 
debt is 
convertible, 0 
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otherwise. 
Subordina
ted debt 
Dummy =1 if 
debt is 
subordinated, 0 
otherwise. 
    
Business 
cycle 
Average yield on 
Moody’s AAA 
bonds for the 
month of issue 
minus the average 
yield on 30 years 
US TB for the 
month of issue. 
    
Treasury 
Bill  
Yield on US 
treasury bond. 
    
Interest 
ratio  
Income before 
extraordinary 
item and interest 
of year t divided 
by the interest of 
year t.  
    
 
Reputatio
n 
 Research and 
development 
to total sales. 
   
STD of 
return 
Standard 
deviation of daily 
stock returns over 
year t. 
    
Sales 
growth 
and sales 
 Annual net 
sales growth 
 Not reported  
Managem
ent 
ownership 
    Percentage of 
managerial 
ownership 
Maturity Log of no of     
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period years to maturity. 
Call Number of years 
to first call to 
divided by no of 
years to maturity. 
    
Relations
hip 
   Not reported Number of 
lending 
banks/ 
Number of 
banks in 
country. 
Location 
of the 
firm 
    Dummy 
variable 1= If 
the firm 
located in 
urban area 
and 0 
otherwise. 
Disclosur
e 
Average of total 
FAF disclosure 
score over the 
years t, t-1, t-2. 
    
 
Financial economics literature confirms quite well the negative relation between the cost of 
debt capital and firm age of large companies. However there are few studies that focus on 
importance of age. Petersen and Rajan (1994) find that effect from firm age onto cost  of debt 
capital is a negative correlation and they widely find that such a correlation may simply be 
due to the unobservable heterogeneity in firm quality. For instance young firm may be more 
prone to default than mature firms’ quality such as firm size, amount of tangible assets and 
industry constant. To control for the variation in the loan rate due to characteristics of the firm 
they include the size (book value of assets), leverage, dummies for the firms industry and 
whether the firm is incorporated. The coefficient reported for the firm characteristics are 
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consistent with these variables being proxies for risk. Larger firms pay lower interest rates. 
Collateral shows a negative correlation with the rate of interest and the importance of 
collateralizible assets in small firm lending is considered by Henley and Crook (2005) and 
found the same relationship.   
 
To control for the variation in the loan rate due to the characteristics of the loan they include 
dummies for whether it is a floating rate loan, for the kind of collateral offered and for the 
type of lender making the loan. They also include regional dummies and industry dummies. 
Estimate the effect of relationships on the interest rate charged. The first dimension of a 
relationship that they include is the length of the relationship of borrower with the current 
lender which is a proxy for the private information the lender has about the borrower. They 
found that firms who have short term relationship with the lender should pay a higher rate. 
The other measure they examine is the non-borrowing side of the firm’s relationship with the 
lender. In addition to the borrowing the firm may have checking or saving deposit with its 
current lender. The third measure of the strength of the relationship is how concentrated the 
firm’s borrowing is. This is associated with lower credit cost, improve lenders control and 
cement the relationship. Keeping contacts with one bank reduce the asymmetry of 
information, reduce the monitoring cost so finally it leads to lower the cost of credit. They 
conclude that borrow from multiple banks are charged a significantly higher rate as multiple 
sourcing weaken the relationships
39
. 
                                                             
 
39
 Being the sole lender to the borrower improves lenders ability to control the borrower’s action to ensure that 
the project is success.  
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Using cross sectional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression for a sample of small 
privately held firms Petersen and Rajan (1994) are among the first to examine empirically 
how bank firm relationship affect the availability of credit and cost of credit. The data comes 
from 1988 National Survey of Small Business Finance conducted by US Small Business 
Administration and the Federal Reserve.  
 
Berger and Udell (1995) use the same dataset as Petersen and Rajan(1994)  and find that 
borrowers with longer banking relationships pay lower interest rate and are less likely to 
pledge collateral. These results are consistent with theoretical arguments (Diamond,1991) that 
relationship lending generates valuable information about borrower quality.  
 
 They have found interesting results for the size of the firm. The total sample which represents 
approximately 90% less than 100 employees and only 10% had 100-500
40.
 OLS regression for 
premium shows a positive relationship with the firm size variable. This may be due to the 
composition of the sample.  Then they regress the firms with total assets above $500,000 and 
found a negative correlation with the firm size which is consistent with the previous studies 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1994). For firms with assets above $500,000 are somewhat stronger than 
the findings for all firms. The Age and Relationship coefficients and t –statistics are larger, R2 
s are higher. Further dummy (Loan is secured by accounts receivable and/ or inventory) for 
collateral is marginally statistically significant only for the firms with total assets above 
$500,000. This suggests that firms with total assets above $500,000 being secured by 
accounts receivable and/or inventory may be in important indicator of higher loan risk.  
                                                             
 
40
 According to the US definition 90% is small firms and only 10% is medium firms.  
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In contrast to the stronger results for firms with total assets above $500,000, the regression for 
the firms with assets below $500,000 shows much greater weaknesses. Only one independent 
variable (Dummy which represents the retail industry) is statistically significant and R2 s is 
about half of those for firms with assets above $500,000. This suggests that the pricing of 
bank loans to very small firms is relatively idiosyncratic and further Berger and Udell (1995) 
point out the reason may be that the reputation and financial accounts of the business and 
owners of small family owned businesses are not economically separable. Lack of personal 
data on the owner which can be used by the bank such as credit history and how long the 
firms have had the personal relationship with the bank, affects the explanation why there is 
fairly low R2 and most of the control variables are insignificant.  
 
Overall the results of the loan rate tests suggest that the lender-borrower relationship plays an 
important role in determining the interest rate but, this is not relevant to the very small firms. 
The result of this study is consistent with the theoretical model of Petersen and Rajan(1994) 
which shows a negative association between loan rates and the length of the relationship but, 
loan rate test results differ from those of Petersen and Rajan(1994) who use the same data set 
because this study focus on lines of credit
41
. 
 
Sengupta (1998) use data on 532 US firms that have total disclosure score from1987-1991 
annual volumes of the FAF
42
 reports. This paper investigates the link between a firm’s overall 
                                                             
 
41
 This study include only Lines of Credit(L/C) loans and exclude transaction-driven loans such as mortgages, 
equipment loans, motor vehicle loans and other spot loans.  
42
 A measure of a firm’s overall disclosure quality is obtained from the annual volumes of the Report of the 
Financial Analysts Federation Corporation Information Committee (FAF 1987-1991). Published by Financial 
Analysts Federation (FAF) branch of the Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR), each 
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disclosure quality and its cost of debt financing. Two alternatives measures of the cost of the 
debt of the firm are considered here. (i) Yield to maturity on new debt issues and (ii) the total 
interest cost of new debt issues and showed that both measures are negatively associated with 
the disclosure measure, after controlling for the potential determinants of firm’s cost of debt.  
 
This study extends the investigation of the consequences of disclosure quality by providing 
evidence of a link between disclosure quality and the cost of debt capital. He found that 
lenders and underwriters
43
 consider a firm’s disclosure quality in their default risk estimates. 
Other things remain constant the firms that are rated favorably by financial analysts for the 
degree of detail, timeliness and clarity of disclosures are perceived to have a lower default 
risk and are rewarded with lower cost of borrowing. Sengupta(1998) provides the evidence 
that firms with high disclosure quality ratings from financial analysts enjoy a lower effective 
interest cost of issuing debt. Consistent with the argument that a policy of timely and detailed 
disclosure reduces lenders and underwriters perception of default risk for the disclosing firm 
reducing its cost of debt.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
 
annual volume provides summary evaluations of disclosure practices for sample firms, based on their aggregate 
disclosure efforts over a fiscal year. Firms are evaluated on their disclosures through annual reports, quarterly 
reports, proxy statements, other published information such as press release and fact books, and direct 
disclosures to the analysts in the form of meetings and response to analyst inquiries. Analyst evaluate the 
timeliness, detail and clarity of information presented and based on the evaluation each firm is typically assigned 
a score out of 100 possible points and separate scores for different disclosure categories.  
43
 A company or other entity that administers the public issuance and distribution of securities from a corporation 
or other issuing body. An underwriter works closely with the issuing body to determine the offering price of the 
securities, buys them from the issuer and sells them to investors via the underwriter's distribution network. 
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Pittman and Fortin (2004) examine the link between auditor choice and debt pricing for newly 
public firms. They argue and proved that as lenders perceive that riskier borrowers must 
provide security for their loans interest rates are increasing in collateral which is consistent 
with the perception in the banking industry. They also predict and shown that interest rates 
will be increasing in leverage which is defined as total short-term and long-term debt scaled 
by firm market value (Petersen and Rajan,1994). The control for profitability is cash flow 
from operation (Petersen and Rajan,1994) which is predicted and show a negative coefficient 
since firms that can generate more cash internally are in a better position to service their 
debts. The negative and statistically significant coefficient for age variable support 
(Diamond’1989) theory that firms’ interest rate will reduce over time. Firm size shows a 
positive correlation with the interest rate although it is expected to have an inverse 
relationship between interest rate and firm size. 
 
The negative and statistically significant coefficient on Big Six auditor
44 
variable imply that 
relying on high quality auditor reduces the firms cost of debt. Their evidence suggest that 
retaining a Big Six auditor, which can reduce debt monitoring costs by enhancing the 
credibility of financial statement, enables young firms to lower their borrowing costs. 
Consistent with Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) they argue that information problems are 
responsible for the severe credit rationing that firms’ encounter in the early years.  
 
                                                             
 
44
 The Big Six auditor are the six largest international accountancy and professional services firms, which handle 
the vast majority of audits for publicly traded companies as well as many private companies, creating an 
oligopoly in auditing large companies. The Big Four firms are shown below, with their latest publicly available 
data. 
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Hooks (2003) use a sample of US firms to examine the determinants of the concentration of 
bank debt in total debt. He studies the determinants of bank concentration by firm size. He 
argues that a firm that is small typically is more difficult for outsiders to observe because of 
little public information is produced about the firm and the firm has no outside reputation and 
he found that smaller the firm lower the concentration on bank debt which is consistent with 
Diamond (1991). The coefficient for tangible assets ratio is significant and negative which 
suggest that firms with low observarbility are more likely to use bank debt than other firms. 
But this relationship is statistically important only for large and medium firms. This 
difference may arise because the model allows the coefficient to change over firm size. 
Income is negatively related to the bank debt concentration for all sizes while sales growth is 
negatively related only for medium and large firms. Further this study suggests that small and 
medium sized firms face difficulties obtaining bank loans as they are difficult to observe 
which is supported by the negative coefficient of R&D.  
 
Burke and Hanley (2006) investigate the relationship between bank interest rate margin and 
collateral for loans issued to new ventures. They find a convex U shaped relationship 
indicating that collateral initially reduces the bank exposure to risk that beyond a point, the 
positive risk wealth association gives rise to greater risk taking propensity among 
entrepreneurs and ultimately higher interest rates
45
.  
 
They find that initially the provision of collateral enable new venture to get cheaper credit and 
by providing bank with more security. However, even greater subsequent amount of collateral 
                                                             
 
45
 See Burke and Hanley(2006) pg.324-327 
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which can be provided by wealthier firms can induce moral hazard through reduce 
entrepreneurial effort, more risk loving behavior or a combination of both. To compensate for 
this greater risk lenders charge higher interest. Larger enterprises in terms of projected sales 
turnover possibly pose lower risk and pay lower interest rate. Ability of the lender to ascertain 
the borrowers real revealed quality is positive and significant. Explanation for this is that 
higher the deterioration of credit quality would be charged a higher interest. Quality of the 
enterprise is a proxy for risk status which observes the borrower’s credit quality through the 
credit rating and decides the interest rate margin. Specifically it is noted that firms with 
deterioration in credit may have to pay higher interest which is based on the idea that higher 
the risk higher the cost of debt.  
 
Hyytinen and Pajarinen  (2007) found that for the small firms, the effect of getting older on 
the cost of debt finance is economically large. Interest cost is defined as the financial 
expenses which consist of interest and other financial expenses and foreign currency losses. 
They have used two versions of dependent variable. The first is defined as the ratio of interest 
cost to total debt and the second is the ratio of interest costs to total assets. The main 
explanatory variable is the age of the firm in years and another important variable is the 
creditworthiness measured using the credit score rating. However, credit score rating is also a 
proxy for the risk. This gives the lender a fast objective measure of credit risk. Other control 
variables include sales which measures the size of the firm. By incorporating dummy variable 
for SME this study tries to compare the cost of debt capital of small firms and large firms. In 
addition to that there are 5 other control variables such as profit, audit, auditor, default and 
sales growth.  
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As shown in Table 4.1 the results in Hyytinen and Pajarinen  (2007) confirm the expectations. 
In particular the estimated coefficient for the main variable, age is negatively signed and 
significant. They also find that cost of debt capital is higher for young firms even after 
changes in observable creditworthiness are controlled. The findings about the age of the firm 
is consistent with the age effect document in Petersen and Rajan(1994)
46
 and suggests that the 
return to maturing one more year is not negligible in the market for small business debt 
finance.  The estimated coefficient for the tangibles suggest that within-firm growth of 
collateralizible wealth is not what drives the negative relation. This is consistent with  Pittman 
and Fortin(2004). Further they conclude that their results are consistent with the view that the 
lender-borrower conflict is empirically relevant and that the return to aging, which for various 
reasons alleviate the conflict, is not negligible in the market for small firm debt finance. This 
finding imply that if the high cost of debt to young firms are driven by the informational 
problems, such as adverse selection or moral hazard. 
 
Further, Berger and Udell (2002) note that the issue of credit availability to small firms has 
earned worldwide concern recently. Small firms are also vulnerable because of their 
dependence on financial institutions for external funding, as these firms do not have access to 
public capital markets. Moreover theoretical analysis of credit rationing suggest that small 
firms may be particularly vulnerable because they are often so informational 
incomprehensible. In other words, the informational asymmetry insiders and outsiders tend to 
be more sensitive for small companies, making the more costly the external financing. As a 
result small firms with attractive investment opportunities may face funding issues.  
                                                             
 
46
 As pointed out by Petersen and Rajan (1994) an additional year reduces the interest rate by 1.4 basis points 
and found some evidence for declining age effect.  
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In practice there is a considerable variation in the use of debt capital. In particular some SMEs 
do not use any debt at all and very few use external equity or long term debt (Wilson,1980). 
This reflects the shortcomings of the SME owner/manager on the demand side and, or 
deficiencies on the part of financial institutions and capital market on the supply side. Further 
Wilson (1980) explains small companies have particular difficulties in undertaking high-risk 
projects. By definition such projects are likely to be large in relation to the size of the firm, 
and the resources available in terms of finance and management is limited. A small firm is 
commonly unwilling to enter in to a joint venture because of reluctance on losing the 
controlling power. A further set of difficulties
47
 is involved where the firm concerned is not 
only small, but also new
48.
  
 
Holmes et al (1994) study the cost of debt for small and large firms in Australia by collecting 
the information on the cost of debt for firms operating in retail, wholesale, manufacturing and 
service sectors. Further they focused on the relative cost of the loan application for small 
firms compared to large firms. Average interest by size and age failed to indicate any 
statistically significant differences in the average interest rate charged for trading 
(commercial) bank overdraft. For trading(commercial) bank term loan shows a significant 
difference in average interest rate for small firms(18.34) when compared to medium(16.70) 
and large (15.65) firms.  However observed differences indicate that micro-small older firms 
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 One other main problem that SMEs face is the collateral. Perhaps the most frequently used collateral by SMEs 
is the owners own house. Differences in the estimation of valuation of asset between bank and borrower occur 
(See Storey 1994).    
48
 Experience in many countries suggests that setting up new enterprises is not only always the best way of 
undertaking high risk projects. A better approach could be for innovators to try to persuade an established 
company to take up and develop their idea. Then the chance of failing the project is lower as management 
expertise and financial back is there. In this way, if it fails, the cost can be offset against profits earned elsewhere 
in the enterprise and the burden thereby effectively share with the tax payers.  
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pay lower average interest rates than micro-small firms less than 10 years old. Scheffe
49
 test 
indicates a significant difference in the average cost of lease for micro-small (18.54) and 
small firms (18.49) compared to large firms (15.03). For finance company lease and other 
sources of funds no significant differences in average interest rates across the four categories 
were reported.  
 
Supporting the argument of Titman and Wessels (1988) that information asymmetry and 
transaction cost influence the cost of debt Holmes et al (1994) shows a significant difference 
exists between application costs incurred by micro-small and small firms as compared to 
medium and large firms. 
 
Titman and Wessels (1988) support the idea that information asymmetry and transaction costs 
influence then firm’s choice of funds. Further they found that smaller firms use more short 
term debt than larger firms and implied a significantly negative estimated coefficient on the 
size variable and the short-term debt. Again this suggests the higher degree of information 
asymmetries and higher transaction costs that small firms face when issuing long-term debt or 
equity. Clearly this shows higher the information asymmetry and transaction cost greater the 
cost of debt capital. In addition they found that profitable firms with sufficient internal funds 
tend to have less debt or equity relative to the market value of their equity which indicate by 
the negatively significant coefficient on the profitability.  
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 Scheffe test is a parametric multi-comparison procedure which tests the hypotheses that the means of each pair 
of waves are equal. 
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Tagoe et al (2005) studies the financial challenges of Ghana SMEs and aimed to indentify the 
finance sector liberalization on the financing of SMEs. The findings imply that SME investor 
relations, skills, record keeping and provision of collateral improve SME access to formal 
credit. This study further showed that good information management and the ability to use 
information to present a well- crafted business for financing reduces the risk perception and 
increases the chance of SMEs getting adequate funds.  
 
Economic theory predicts that the worse the informational asymmetry is the higher is the cost 
of external finance. The amount of information available about a firm increases the longer it 
has been in the business. Accumulation of information reduces the adverse selection and the 
cost of external finance. Diamond (1991) has shown that a firm which has not yet established 
a reputation and therefore has a low credit rating, attempts to borrow from a bank.  Diamond 
and Verrecchia (1991) investigate that disclosure, liquidity and cost of capital and provide a 
framework to analyze effects of changes in information asymmetry on security pricing, while 
providing cross-sectional predictions about differences in sensitivity of security prices to 
information asymmetry. Generally this is by examining the effects of corporate disclosures 
that reduce information asymmetry.  Further, policies that reduce the information asymmetry 
will increase the liquidity of the market for a firm’s securities, which induces the larger 
traders who anticipate making future large trade increases the competition with the market 
makers and reduce the volatility of future order imbalances and leading to exit market makers. 
For smaller firms the cost of capital is high as they disclose less.  
 
Niskanen and Niskanen (2010) investigate the impact of managerial ownership on loan 
availability and credit terms for SMEs in Finnish. They find that increase in managerial 
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ownership decrease the loan availability. This means that managerial ownership potentially 
creates conflicts of interest between managers and bond holders. This would ultimately 
increase the collateral requirement and cost of debt due to the higher risk.  Consistent with 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) this study find that firms with close relationships with financial 
institutions have a lower cost of capital ,better access to credit, the existence of a relationship 
lowers the cost of credit and borrowing from multiple banks increases the cost and collateral 
requirement  and reduce the availability of credit. This suggests that SMEs could benefit from 
a closer relationship with their banks.  
 
The results for the firm specific variables suggest that bigger and more profitable firms pays 
lower interest rates consistent with other studies (Petersen and Rajan,1994; Sengupta,1998; 
Hooks,2003; Pittman and Fortin,2004;Hyytinen and Pajarinen,2007). Firm age can be seen as 
a proxy for the private information the lender has about the borrower and it improve 
availability of loan and reduce the collateral requirement plus cost of debt. Dummy  variable 
which represent the collateral suggest that firms which are required to put up collateral also 
pay interest. This is inconsistent with the predicted negative relationship which is based on 
the idea that level of collateral is negatively related the risk level of the investment project. 
Niskanen and Niskanen (2010) try to reconcile the positive relationship with interest rate by 
suggesting that the usage of collateral is positively associated with the risk involved. This is 
consistent with Pittman and Fortin (2004). Specifically it is noted that the perception in the 
banking industry that riskier borrowers must provide security for their loans. In addition to 
that this can be interpreted as a result of using number of lending banks where the increase in 
the number of lending banks increases the likelihood of collateral requirement. Consistent 
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with the prediction the location of the firm shows that rural firms have easy access to funds 
than firms situated in urban locations.   
 
Thus age of the firm, debt to assets, relationship lending and managerial ownership do not 
seem to have an impact on the loan interest rate of Finnish firms for the period of 1994-1997. 
Overall, this study suggests that when lending to SMEs bank consider agency cost involved 
with the managerial ownership.  Further it suggests that dispersed ownership reduce the 
agency cost, stronger the capital structure and more capacity raise additional capital.  
However, the Finnish capital market circumstance evident that banks are the only source of 
external finance for SME. This point regarding the source of finance is also confirmed by 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) that they note that firms diversify their sources as they become 
larger and less clear that age has any effect on diversification. In general results of Niskanen 
and Niskanen (2010) appear to support asymmetric information, adverse selection and moral 
hazard which may have a sizeable effect when firms are young or small that explain why they 
find it hard to raise money in the public markets. However through close and long term 
contacts with the lender, firm would provide the lender sufficient information so as to lower 
the cost and increase the availability of credit. 
 
Financial structure of a corporation provides the market with information about the firm with 
the market value of the firm increasing with the level of debt (Ross, 1977). This can be taken 
to mean that, if managers raise the level of debt, then it is for the reason that their expectations 
for the future of the company permit it to meet its obligations.  
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According to Berger and Udell (2002) one of the most powerful mechanisms for ensuring that 
small firms can get an adequate supply of credit is relationship lending. They explain the key 
relationship is not the relationship between the bank and the firm, but rather the relationship 
between the loan offer and the firm’s owner.50 Further they explain what is this relationship 
that lender has to have soft data such as information about character, its local community and 
reliability of the firm’s owner, which may be difficult to quantify through the normal channels 
of banking operations. This has an important implication for the consolidation of the financial 
institutions. Berger and Udell (2002) suggest that this is not practical and has negative impact 
on relationship lending as it is difficult to transmit the soft data of the borrower through the 
formal management layer in large lending institutions. Further consolidation would badly 
affect the small businesses funding gap due to the lost banking relationship. This would lead 
to adverse selection and moral hazard problem. For instance, this would ultimately affect 
small firms with investment opportunities to face to a funding gap as the potential finance 
providers cannot rightly confirm that firm has access to quality projects or/and funds will not 
be used to an alternative project. Hence, changes in banking system would significantly 
impact on the SME as they highly depend on the financial institutions for external finance as 
they do not have access to public capital market. Berger and Udell (2002) develop a model to 
emphasize that the banking relationship is not the relationship between bank and the borrower 
but the relationship with the loan officer and the owner of the firm.  
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 Except for the smallest loans, banks have to secure their position by evaluating borrowers’ credit worthiness. 
This is one of the credit analysis criteria which is called character(five Cs of credit analysis, character, capacity, 
capital, collateral and coverage of potential borrowers; Tirole(1996)).For many bankers, character determines if 
a small business loan will be approved at all. The problems involved in dealing with the characters are non-
corporation with the bank, fraud, litigation and write-off are a significant limits. These factors are however less 
important with large firms as they are managed by a team of individuals.  
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Omran and Pointon (2004) study the determinants of cost of capital by industry within an 
emerging market in particular the Egypt. Based on sample of 119 companies the analysis is 
undertaken. To achieve the objective of this study cost of capital is split in to component cost 
for equity and debt. They found that different industries are affected to different cyclical
51
 
variations. For example, in prosperous time the property sector may outperform other sectors, 
yet may be less insulated when the economic climate changes unfavorably. However, it can 
be argued that the on account of political and economic situation in Egypt, investors might 
ask for a higher return because they will bear more risk compared with other countries.  
 
Rand (2007) examines the extent to which borrowing constraint restrict from access to credit 
and identifies individual, firm and loan characteristics which determine the cost of capital in 
Vietnamese manufacturing. He notes that only 14 and 25% of these enterprises are credit 
constrained and these enterprises would increase their holding by between 40 and 115% if 
borrowing constraint were relaxed. Moreover it emerges that informal credit market play an 
important role for fast growing firms. Thus he analyzed firms, which get access to credit, and 
examined the empirical determinants of credit availability and the interest rate on the most 
recent loan. The analysis demonstrated that 35% receive credit from informal sources, larger 
firms get cheaper credit, Informal credit markets play an important role for fast growing 
firms, probability of accessing credit is higher in rural area, demand for external funds is 
significantly higher in rural areas than the larger urban areas. 
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 SME who rely more on banks, are more affected than larger firms by business cycle-related fluctuations(See 
Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994) 
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This study found that government bank charge significantly higher interest on collateralized 
loans indicating that government bank may use other different criteria to determine the 
interest rate. Private banks are charged significantly low interest rate from larger loan 
amounts and loans based on collateral. Age is negatively related with interest rate but it shows 
that age does not plays a significant role as a determinant of cost of debt for Vietnamese 
Manufacturing firms which is contrary to the findings in Petersen and Rajan (1994). Firms’ 
reputation measured by the age of the firm therefore does not seem to influence the interest 
rate of Vietnamese SMEs. 
 
Undoubtedly, this is wide support for the notion that cost of debt for small enterprises is 
higher than for other enterprises. The above review explains why the cost of debt for small 
business is higher than for other firms. It is result of specific characteristics of small 
enterprises. First of all, the small enterprises are more risky than other firms. Next, in small 
enterprises agency costs and information asymmetry are different than in other firms. All of 
them cause the growing of the cost of debt for small enterprises.  
 
To contribute to the cost of debt of SME’s debate, this study draws from the key findings and 
procedures of previous work. In particular, the explanatory variables, their measurements, and 
predictions regarding relationships with the dependent variable, are based on the studies 
reviewed above. 
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4.4 Model of cost of debt 
4.4.1 Theoretical predictions 
As per the review in the previous section impact of the main explanatory variables on the cost 
of debt are based on the trade off theory, agency theory, and theory of credit rationing, theory 
of asymmetric information plus empirical studies. In an attempt to contribute to the 
determinants of cost of debt capital of SMEs in the UK, the findings and procedures of 
previous work is vital and the summery of the perdition is given as follows. 
 
4.4.2 The dependent variable. 
4.4.2.1 Cost of debt.  
The dependent variable is the interest cost on the firm’s debt, which is calculated as its 
interest expense for the year divided by its average short-term and long-term debt during the 
year. This includes the risk free rate plus the risk premium. The reported cost of debt consists 
of interest paid to banks, paid on hire purchase, paid on leasing and other interest paid.  
 
In this study we measure the dependent variable (COD)
52
 as interest cost over total debt. Total 
debt represent short term debt and long term debt for the period of which the interest cost 
accrue. However, we trim the data
53
 to address extreme observations, and then we discard the 
firms’ year observation outside the 5th and 95th percentile.  
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 See Appendix 4A 
53
 In the dataset (raw dataset) 16.83% firms had no debt and 37.75% had no interest reported. In here it is 
important to note why some firms have no debt. This could be that the vast majority (39%) of the firms in this 
dataset is micro firms and they may not demand for debt.  It could be that they do not need any debt or even they 
had a need, on the other hand some firms may reluctant to use debt if the cost of the debt is very high and not 
very profitable to employee debt capital. 
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4.4.3 Explanatory Variables 
4.4.3.1 Firm Age 
Diamond’s (1989, 1991) theory of reputation formation in debt markets predicts that interest 
rates will decline over time  as firms’ compile good credit histories. Older firms might have 
established a reputation, resulting in lower levels of asymmetric information. Smaller firms, 
due to economies of scale in information production and distribution, might produce less 
information about themselves thus having higher formation of asymmetry (Pettit and Singer, 
1985). As there is only limited information available on young firms, lenders depend largely 
on firms disclosures to evaluate their performance and future prospects (Sengupta, 1998). 
Lenders would have conduct costly information production and monitoring using alternative 
sources in the absence of proper information for the relatively small firms. We expect that 
firms with greater level of asymmetric information (younger or smaller firms) will use less 
debt at higher cost. So the age will be negatively related to the cost of debt
54
. The existence of 
asymmetric information for smaller firms makes the bank more wary of lending to this type of 
firm on the ground of greater uncertainty. This causes them to charge higher interest on 
lending. However, as the business mature asymmetry of information will increasingly favour 
the business (Storey, 1994). In addition, it is argued that the greater availability of information 
on older firms decreases information asymmetries associated with equity. Thus, mature firms 
should tend to use capital market for equity relatively more, than younger firms. Further, it 
can be argued that older firms are likely to have higher accumulated retained profit so these 
firms need not to depend more on external debt finance.   We measure firm age as the number 
                                                             
 
54 Higher the age lowers the risk where by lowering asymmetry of information.  
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of years that have elapsed between their incorporation date and the year of concern for the 
study. 
 
4.4.3.2 Size  
The size of the firm allow lenders to calculate its market power and therefore, to indirectly 
estimate its insolvency risk. The bigger the volume of assets, the profits, the sales or the 
number of employees, the greater the self financing capacity, and the probability that the 
activities tend to be more diversified
55
 and, as a result, less risky and less prone to bankruptcy. 
In line with trade off theory these firms therefore have negative link with the cost of debt and 
size. The size is related to the other group of variables that determine the capital structure of 
the enterprise. Many studies suggested that there is a positive relationship between leverage 
and size. Large firms more often choose long-term debt, while small firms choose short-term 
debt (Marsh, 1982)
56
. Large firms may be taking the advantage of economies of scale
57
 
(Berger and Udell ,2006) in issuing long-term debt and may even have bargaining power over 
                                                             
 
55
 Diversification is generally associated with less risk as the larger portfolio will always assumed to be reduced 
return volatility compared with smaller portfolios.  Larger the firm have better opportunities for diversification 
both domestically and internationally and can have properties in greater variety of lot sizes than smaller firms 
and therefore large firms have a greater potential to diversify, reduce return volatility and thereby reduce risk.  
56
 Using a sample of UK quoted companies between 1959 and 1970 (Marsh, 1982) conclude that long-term debt 
ratio, and the ratio of short-term to total debt are functions of company size, bankruptcy risk and asset 
composition. 
57
 Economies of scale arise when the cost per unit falls as output increases. Large business can pass on lower 
costs to customers through lower prices and increase its share of market which poses a threat to smaller firms. 
Many small firms find it harder to obtain finance (especially long term furnace) even they obtain it, the cost of 
the finance is often quite high. As small firms are perceived being riskier than large firms and this make easier to 
find potential lenders and to raise money at lower interest rates for large firms. This is because of asymmetry of 
information. Berger and Udell(1995) point out that existence of financial intermediaries are the best evidence 
that the economies of scale on information are possible. This means that average cost of information decreases as 
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In particular according to Berger and Udell (2006) large firms may be able to take the advantage of economies of 
scale in the processing of hard information.  
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creditors
58
. In addition, larger firms are often diversified and have more stable cash flows, and 
so the probability of bankruptcy for larger firms is less relative to the smaller firms. This 
suggests that the size could be negatively related to the cost of debt. This negative relationship 
of size and leverage is also viewed as support for the asymmetric information (Myers and 
Mailuf, 1984). Small size is likely to have severe information asymmetries and SMEs are 
unlikely to have adequate and reliable financial statements (Doanh and Pentley, 1999). This 
means SMEs generally face more difficulties in accessing loans from financial institutions. 
Hence, this suggests that the cost of debt is negatively related to the size of the firm.  We 
measure the size in two different ways, natural logarithms of total sales and total assets. 
 
4.4.3.3 Collateral Assets 
Collateral requirement is a powerful tool that allows financial institutions to offer credit on 
favorable terms to SMEs whose informational asymmetry otherwise can result in either credit 
rationing or extension of credit on relatively unfavorable terms. Boot et al (1991) suggest that 
firms with potential collateral are likely to fund through bank loans.  They suggested that 
collateral can be used as a signal of borrowers. As firm has more information about the 
probability of success, providing collateral is seemed to be a positive signal to the lender. In 
addition Berger and Udell (1995) argue that some banks specialize in lending to the firms 
with substantial asymmetric information problems. These can be reflected in the nature of 
loan contract terms such as rate of interest and collateral. Edwards and Fischer (1994) state 
that collateral seems to be one of the requirement for the majority of bank loans in Germany 
and UK. Berger and Udell (1990) report that collateral is an important feature of more than 
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 Further, Rand (2007) argued that larger firms can borrow at better terms as they have better information and 
good reputation. 
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70% of all commercial and industrial loans made in the U.S. There is considerable prior 
evidence that interest rates are increasing in collateral (e.g., Scott and Smith, 1986; and 
Blackwell et al., 1998), which is consistent with the idea that in the banking industry  risky 
borrowers must provide security for their loans (Morsman, 1986 and Hempel et al., 1986). 
Burke and Hanley (2003) focus on the relationship between collateral and risk aversion. They 
show that for any given level of wealth, higher collateral induces borrowers to be more risk 
averse hence raising banks expected profit for any given interest margin. This implies that the 
coefficient on the control for asset structure, which is the fraction of total assets in property, 
plant, and equipment, will be negative.  
 
4.4.3.4 Profitability 
In an agency theory framework, if the market for corporate control is inefficient, managers of 
profitable firms will use the higher level of retained earnings in order to avoid the disciplinary 
role of external finance. This prediction is consistent with Petersen and Rajan(1994), 
Sengupta(1998), Hooks(2003), Pittman and Fortin(2004), Hyytinen and Pajarinen(2007), and 
Niskanen and Niskanen (2010). So the expected correlation between profitability and cost of 
debt is negative.  
 
4.4.3.5 Gearing  
Positive association between gearing and cost of debt is found in the previous studies 
(Rajan(1994), Udell(1995), Fortin(2004)) and this reflect the fact that higher the leverage 
greater the risk. Therefore, a positive relationship between bank debt ratio and the leverage is 
expected. Considerations based on trade off theory is also support a positive relationship 
between cost of debt and gearing.  For instance, highly levered firms face a higher cost of 
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financial distress which can lead to bankruptcy and that will increase the risk. If the company 
is perceived as being risky, for whatever reason, lenders are likely to demand higher returns to 
compensate for the risks involved, where a very high rate of interest is demanded.  Hooks and 
Opler (1993) find that bank borrowing is highest among firms employing relatively little debt 
in their capital structure. There is a positive relationship between gearing and cost of debt to 
reflect the capital perspective of financial risk
59
. 
 
4.4.3.6 Liquidity  
High liquidity indicates the inefficient use of funds and the low liquidity limit profitable 
investment. On the other hand higher liquidity lowers the bankruptcy risk, and lower the 
liquidity higher the bankruptcy cost despite of having more wealth in the form of assets.  So it 
is debatable and the correlation between cost of debt and liquidity could be negative or 
positive. The current assets to current liabilities represent the liquidity level in our model. 
 
4.4.3.7 Sales Growth 
In line with agency theory growth in sales means the efficiency of management which implies 
the lower the business risk as this is a good indication that firm has adequate cash to meet its 
operating expenses. Therefore sales growth has a negative correlation with cost of debt. This 
is consistent with Hyytinen and Pajarinen (2007) and Ahmed et al.(2002). Sales growth is 
measured as annual percentage change in firm’s sales. 
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 See  Chang and Rhee, 1990. 
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4.4.3.8 Creditworthiness 
This measures the individual companies’ ability to meet the debt obligations. When lenders 
choose to extend credit to an individual or business, that extension of credit is based on the 
understanding that the borrower will have resources that can be used to repay the debt.  Risk 
measure runs from 0 (high risk) to 100(highly secure). QUI
60
 score is used to measure the 
creditworthiness
61
. This is a 0, 1 dummy variable which is defined as if credit score is 
between 0-50 equal 0 and otherwise 1. The expected relationship with cost of debt is negative 
( Hyytinen and Pajarinen,2007). 
 
4.4.3.9 Audit Dummy 
This dummy is created to measure the riskiness of the firm. This variable is intended to proxy 
for credit risk, with observably riskier borrower predicted to pay higher interest rates. If the 
firm’s auditor has issued an unqualified audit report equal 1 otherwise (qualified) equal to 0 
(Hyytinen and Pajarinen(2007). This prediction is consistent with Pittman and Fortin(2004) 
and (Hyytinen and Pajarinen(2007). The relationship between audit dummy and cost of debt 
we expect as negative. 
Table 4.2 shows the expected coefficients of the explanatory variables.  
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 Developed by CRIF decision solutions limited by taking in to account; 
 -Adverse documents appearing against company on the public file and timeliness of getting account 
filed. 
 -Underlying economic condition 
 -Financial performance of the company as evident in their balance sheet and profit and loss account.  
 -In determining score number of separate calculations are performed using various combinations of the 
key financial items such as turnover, PBT, working capital, intangibles, cash and bank deposits, creditors, bank 
loans and over draft, current assets, current liabilities, net assets, fixed assets, share capital, reserves and share 
holders fund. 
61
 See the Appendix 4E for more details. 
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Table 4.2 
Expected sign of variables 
Variable Theory/Empirical evidence Expected 
sign 
Rational 
Age Trade off theory - Mature firms suffer less 
information problems and rely 
primarily on internal funds thus 
find less cost of debt. 
Older firms have access to debt at 
better terms due to the longer 
record of proper treatment of 
creditors. 
Size  Trade off theory - Larger firms suffer less 
information asymmetry problems 
hence find external finance more 
attractive.  
Profit  Trade off theory, Agency 
Theory 
- Having sufficient retained earnings 
thus rely less on external funds.  
Collateral Assets Trade off theory - Tangible assets can be offered as 
security to lenders and are likely to 
have high value on liquidation. 
Audit Dummy Hyytinen and Pajarinen(2007) - Qualified or unqualified audit 
report gives the lender a sign of 
riskiness of the firm. 
Liquidity Trade off theory +- Higher the liquidity shows the 
inefficient use of funds and lower 
liquidity limit the profitable 
investment. 
Gearing Agency Theory + Higher the external finance may 
lead to higher cost of debt capital. 
Sales Growth Agency Theory - Growth in sales gives an assurance 
for the lender. 
Creditworthiness Hyytinen and Pajarinen(2007) - Higher the credit score lower the 
cost of debt. 
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4.5 Methodology 
Since the sample comprises the heterogeneous set of non-financial companies belonging to 
different sectors of activity, it is reasonable to think that individual firms may have their own 
characteristics that differentiate them from others. Moreover, their variations across time 
justify a panel data model as given below. Based on the theories discussed above and 
reviewed empirical studies of Petersan and Rajan (1994) and Hyytinen and Pajarinen (2007) a 
model of cost of debt capital is as follows. The panel data model has explained in detail in 
chapter 3.  
 
 (COD)i,t  = β0+β1 (AGE)i,t + β2 (SIZE)i,t + β3 (PROFIT)i,t + β4 (GEARING)i,t + β5 (CA)i,t + 
β6 (LIQUIDITY)i,t + β7 (CREDITSCORE)i,t + β8 (AUDIT DUMMY)i,t + β9 (SALES 
GROWTH)i,t + αi+ αt + εi,t                      (4.1) 
 
Where variable definitions are as follows. COD is the ratio of interest expenses
62
 to total debt; 
AGE is either the number of years since the year of incorporation or 0, 1 dummy variable
63.
   
SIZE is either natural log of total assets (SIZE2) or log of turnover; PROFIT is profit before 
interest and tax as a ratio of total assets; GEARING is the ratio of debt to equity; CA is the 
ratio of intangible assets to total assets; LIQUIDITY is the ratio of current assets to current 
liabilities; CREDITSCORE is the QUI Score. AUDIT DUMMY is a 0, 1 dummy variable and 
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 This includes, Interest paid to bank, paid on higher purchase, paid on leasing and other interest paid. 
63
 Here we have created a 0, 1 dummy for age where age of the firm is equal or less than 10 equal 0 and 1 
otherwise. 
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SALES GROWTH is the growth in annual sales. εi,t  is a disturbance term assumed to satisfy 
usual regression model condition. 
More detailed definition of all variables is enclosed in Appendix 4A. 
 
4.5.1 Endogeneity 
It is important to know whether an explanatory variable is endogenous in a specific structural 
equation because it affects the way in which parameter should be estimated. The econometric 
form of endogeneity is whether the parameters of interest in the context of the specific 
structural model are affected by correlation between any explanatory variables and the 
disturbance term (Maddala, 2001). In this basic model, profit and gearing is endogenous and 
is likely to be correlated with the disturbance, or error term. Therefore, OLS estimation cannot 
be performed. In this case the appropriate estimation method is Two Stage Least Square 
(2SLS). 
 
4.5.2 Two Stage Least Square (2SLS)      
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
We assume that the correlation of some error terms are not 0. Two stages
64
 in 2SLS refer to 
                                                             
 
64
Stages in two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression analysis:  in ordinary least square method, there is a basic 
assumption that the value of the error terms is independent of predictor variables. When this assumption is 
broken, two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression analysis helps us to solve this problem. Two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) regression analysis assumes that there is a secondary predictor that is correlated to the 
problematic predictor but not with the error term. Given the existence of the instrument variable, two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) regression analysis uses the following two methods: 
1. In the first stage of the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression analysis, a new variable is created 
using the instrument variable.  
2. In the second stage of the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression analysis, the model-estimated 
values from stage one are then used in place of the actual values of the problematic predictors to 
compute an OLS model for the response of interest.  
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(1) a stage in which new dependent or endogenous variables are created to substitute for the 
original ones, and (2) a stage in which the regression is computed in OLS fashion, but using 
the newly created variables. The purpose of the first stage is to create new dependent 
variables which do not violate OLS regression's recursivity assumption. 
 
In 2SLS regression analysis, a problematic causal variable is the dependent or endogenous 
variable whose error term is correlated with the other dependent variable error term. In 2SLS 
regression analysis, a problematic causal variable is replaced with the substitute variable in 
the first stage of the 2SLS regression analysis.             
 
4.5.3 Instruments 
In two-stage least squares 2SLS regression analysis
65
, an instrument variable is used to create 
a new variable by replacing the problematic variable. This is accomplished using OLS 
regression, with the problematic causal variable as the dependent and instrumental variables 
as the independents. The instruments are the exogenous variables with direct or indirect 
causal paths to the problematic causal variable but which have no direct causal path to the 
endogenous variable whose disturbance term is correlated with that of the problematic causal 
variable. The predicted values of this regression equation are the values of the new causal 
variable which replaces the problematic causal variable.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
65
 See Green, W.H.(1997) pp 740-742 for more detail of 2SLS. 
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4.5.4 Firm Fixed Effects  
There may be unobservable firm specific factors that influence the cost of debt. One way to 
control for this is to use firm fixed effects. Fixed effects models assume the unobserved 
variables differ between subjects but are constant across time for the same subject. 
Conceptually, this is as if you created a dummy variable for every subject to control for 
subject-specific case effects in a standard multiple regressions. Fixed effects are the most 
common type of panel data regression model. Note that a set of time dummy variables can be 
created to run time fixed effects as a way to examine the effects of time periods. 
 
4.6 Data 
This section explains the sample selection, and descriptive statistics. We obtain a 
comprehensive sample to examine the determinants of debt pricing of all active
66
 companies 
which satisfy the definition for SME’s in the UK from 1998-2008 from the FAME data base.  
We employ all active firms from 1998 to 2008 and exclude finance sector from the sample as 
their financial structure is fundamentally different from that of other firms due to regulation 
and the financial nature of their operations. In fact, their debt-like liabilities are not strictly 
comparable to the debt issued by non-financial firms. Further, regulations such as minimum 
capital requirements may affect their capital structure (Scholes et al, 1990).  
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 Firms which are actively in business operations that survives through the period of study. 
147 
 
4.6.1 Sample Selection and Data 
Appendix 4B shows the sample distribution by two digits Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC). Total 4072 firms are eliminated from the sample which represents the finance sector. 
We also dropped 5% of the observations in the upper and lower tail of our dependent variable 
to limit the effect of very large and very small denominators which would generate unusual 
ratios, and this lowers the sample again. Finally the selected sample consists of unbalanced 
panel of 50987 firms
67
.  The empirical analysis covers only 10 years in spite of having data 
for eleven years, due to the definitions of some variables in the model. 
 
4.6.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.3 shows the descriptive statistics (mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum) for all variables over the period 1998-2008. The mean of the COD is 3.9%. The 
average the AGE of the firm is 10 years and the median PROFIT is 2.45% which indicate 
moderate profitability. The median of SALESGR is 5.7%
68
, which in turn suggest that the 
firms in our sample are on average growing rapidly. The AUDITDUMMY shows that auditor 
has issued unqualified audit report on the firm’s financial statement for more than 97% firms 
in the sample.  AGEDUMMY shows that more than 50% of companies are older than 10 
years.  
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 See Appendix 4D for Number of firms stratified by years. 
68
 This may be that one third of firms in the sample are more than 20 years old and approximately 33% are 
medium firms.  
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Table 4.3 
Descriptive Statistics* of dependent and explanatory variables N=50987 
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum SD Observations 
 
COD 0.0395 0.0173 0.572 8.46E-06 0.0583 408279 
PROFIT 0.0245 0.0489 0.597 -2.712 0.1936 468765 
LIQUIDITYRATIO 3.7291 1.32 85.3 0.0194 8.1603 372662 
GEARINGRATIO 3.4298 69.76 97.6 0.0352 6.9187 244809 
LOGSALES 5.2742 8.8741 17.469 0.0239 3.4123 279667 
LOGSIZE 4.5867 5.6148 17.006 1.3298 3.8187 501878 
CA 0.2957 0.1969 0.7845 0.7098 1.5498 392896 
STD 62.98 67.983 100 2.237 4.4628 407896 
AGE 10 7 98 1 7.7695 509857 
QUI SCORE 67.5643 77 99 1 21.093 365606 
SALESGR 0.273 0.0579 0.969 -0.910 9.6598 212040 
AUDITDUMMY 0.97433 1 1 0 0.17983 409359 
AGEDUMMY 0.50971 1 1 0 0.43734 509857 
*See Appendix 4A and Table 2.3 for definition of variables.  
 
Appendix 4C presents the correlation matrix and there are number of interesting points to note 
when looking at the matrix. As expected there appears to be high and positive correlation 
between the alternative firm size proxies. The correlation coefficient between SIZE and 
SIZE2 is 0.82.          
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
While a high positive correlation among alternative proxies is expected. We can see that both 
SIZE and SIZE2 (Log Sales and Log Assets) is positively correlated with COD which does 
not support the conventional insight
69
.   
 
When looking at the correlation matrix there is another important point to note that none of 
the explanatory variables of the equation 4.1 is highly correlated with other.  
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 Expected relationship between size and cost of debt is negative. 
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4.6 Empirical Procedure  
The empirical procedure involves panel data procedure. All the stages will be described 
consecutively. 
Table 4.4 
Results for the regression of overall sample 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 
Dependant 
Adj R squared 
Observations 
F-statistic 
J Statistic 
Variable 
COD 
.487 
106901 
7.742 [.0000] 
0.574 
COD 
.498 
106423 
6.546 [.0000] 
0.602 
COD 
.581 
107928 
7.465 [.0000] 
0.482 
COD 
.492 
106490 
6.537 [.0000] 
0.659 
C -0.049[.0001] 
*** 
-0.029[.0067] 
*** 
-0.075 [.0309] 
** 
-
.217[.0000]*** CA 0.039 [.0000] 
*** 
0.045 [.0000] 
*** 
0.016[.0000]**
* 
0.098[. 0]
* AGEDUMMY -0.002[.0029] 
**  
-
0.002[.1678]** 
-0.002 [.0921] 
* 
0.005[.0191]** 
GEARING 0.008 [.0003] 
*** 
. 11[.0000] 
*** 
0.003 [.0000] 
*** 
0.007[.0000]**
* PROFIT -
0.027[.0583]* 
-0.029[.0002] 
*** 
-0.024 [.0185] 
** 
0.098[.0000]**
* LIQUIDITY -0.007[.0000] 
*** 
-0.006[.0000] 
*** 
-0.008 [.0000] 
*** 
0.007[.7329]  
LOGSIZE 0.081 [.0000] 
*** 
   
LOGSALES  0.061 [.0000] 
*** 
0.090 [.0000] 
*** 
0.086[.0000]**
* SALESGR -0.007 [.7643] -0.011 [.8328] -
0.0107[.0000]*
** 
0.008[.0107]** 
QUISCORE 4.78E-
05[.1834] 
5.98E-
05[.1739] 
8.76E-
05[.1943] 
0.0001[.0452]* 
AUDITDUMMY -
0.0103[.4923] 
-0.0 09[.3095] -
0.0194[.0398)*
* 
0.0091(.0764)* 
STDTD   .120[.0 00]*
 
 
STDTD2    -
.039[.0001]*** DUMMYSTDTD     
DUMMYSTDTD2    0.438[.0000]**
* DUMMYCA    -
0.129[.0002]**
* 
DUMMYPROFIT    -0.191[.0000] 
** DUMMYLOGSA
LES 
   -0.039[.0000] 
*** DUMMYAGEDU
MMY 
   -0.033[.0000] 
*** DUMMYSALES
GR 
   -0.001[.0376] 
** This table presents the regression results for cost of debt using fixed effects estimation for the period of 1999-
2008 for SMEs in the UK. P values are shown in the parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively and the diagnostic test statistics. As far as the diagnostic test are concerned we find no 
evidence of heteroskedasticity according to White test. Test for second-order serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 
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The use of different definitions resulted in different sample sizes for each model as indicated 
in Table 4.5. To address the question, what determine the cost of debt capital, we begin with a 
simple estimation specification in which we regress COD on all firm specific variables 
namely, CA, AGEDUMMY, GEARING, PROFIT, LIQUIDITY, LOGSIZE, AUDIT 
DUMMY, QUISCORE and SALES GROWTH year effect and fixed effect which control for 
unobserved firm heterogeneity. As our data is panel data we have included both time specific 
and firm specific error term. Therefore error term has 3 components and αi represents firm 
specific fixed effects, αt controls for time specific macroeconomic influences and εi,t is the 
idiosyncratic error term. The result of this estimation is presented in the Table 4.4 under the 
Model 1. 
 
The Model 1 uses the following equation. 
(COD)i,t  = β0+β1 (CA)i,t +β2 (AGEDUMMY)i,t  + β3(GEARING)i,t + β4 (PROFIT)i,t + β5 
(LIQUIDITY)i,t + β6(LOGSIZE)i,t+ β7 (CREDITSCORE)i,t + β8(SALES GROWTH)i,t + β9( 
AUDIT DUMMY)i,t + αi+ αt + ε i,t       4.2 
 
In Model 2  LOGSIZE replaces LOGSALES which measures the size in terms of sales. As a 
robustness check we have used a different measure for size. The objective of this estimation is 
to find which measure of size effectively explains the relationship between cost of debt and 
size.             
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(COD)i,t =  β0+β1 (CA)i,t +β2 (AGEDUMMY)i,t + β3(GEARING)i,t + β4 (PROFIT)i,t + β5 
(LIQUIDITY)i,t +β6(LOGSALES)i,t + β7(SALES GROWTH)i,t + β8 (CREDITSCORE)i,t + 
β9( AUDIT DUMMY)i,t +  αi+ αt+  ε i,t       4.3 
 
The coefficients obtained from the above (4.3) model does not show the effect of short term 
debt and long term debt on the COD. As noted in the previous chapter (Chapter 3) that we 
have found that short term debt is an important source of finance of SMEs in the UK. In order 
to test this we interact Short Term Debt with other variables using a dummy. The estimated 
coefficient on the interacted terms are predicted to have opposite sign to that of the 
explanatory variables on their own in line with the predicted relationship with the explanatory 
variables. Model 3 shows the other variables that we considered in Model 2 with the STDTD. 
STDTD is a variable which represents the ratio of STD to TD
70
.  
 
 (COD)i,t =  β0+β1 (CA)i,t +β2 (AGEDUMMY)i,t  + β3(GEARING)i,t + β4 (PROFIT)i,t+ β5 
(LIQUIDITY)i,t + β6(LOGSALES)i,t+ β7(SALES GROWTH)i,t + β8 (CREDITSCORE)i,t + 
β9( AUDIT DUMMY)+β10(STDTD)i,t  + αi+ αt+εi,t          4.4 
  
In Model 4 we have interacted DUMMYSTDTD with CA, PROFIT, LOGSALES, 
AGEDUMMY, and SALESGR. Then we have introduced DUMMYCA DUMMYPROFIT 
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 See Appendix 4B. 
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DUMMYLOGSALES DUMMYAGEDUMMY and DUMMYSALESGR to the model. 
DUMMYSTDTD is 0,1 dummy variable which is equal to 1 for STDTD=1, otherwise 0.  
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Table 4.5 
Results for the regression of micro, small and medium firms. 
 Micro Small Medium 
 
Dependant 
Adj R squared 
Observations 
F statistic 
J Statistic 
Variables 
 
MODEL 1 
COD 
.453 
12089 
5.78(.000) 
0.387 
MODEL 2 
COD 
.304 
11498 
8.98(.000) 
0.363 
 
MODEL 3 
COD 
.364 
13129 
5.38(.000) 
0.392 
 
MODEL 1 
COD 
.412 
29098 
5.09(.000) 
0.428 
 
 
MODEL 2 
COD 
.366 
22653 
6.81(.000) 
0.435 
 
MODEL 3 
COD 
.383 
22657 
7.19(.000) 
0.446 
MODEL 1 
COD 
.429 
42983 
7.02(.000) 
0.487 
MODEL 2 
COD 
.404 
40019 
7.69(.000) 
0.489 
MODEL 3 
COD 
391 
40028 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.56(.000) 
0.491 
 
C 
-0.018 
(.0209)** 
0.009 
(.7691) 
-0.091 
(.1604) 
-0.041 
(.1506) 
-0.047 
(.0918) 
-0.035 
(.3163) 
-0.032 
(.0714)* 
-0.021 
(.5904) 
0.037 
(.1416) 
CA 
0.076 
(.0000)*** 
0.039 
(.0901)* 
0.052 
(.0022)*** 
0.029 
(.0000)*** 
0.027 
(.0129)** 
0.021 
(.0769)* 
0.032 
(.0012)** 
0.019 
(.1581) 
0.010 
(.8109)** 
AGEDUMMY 
-0.002 
(.9287) 
-0.002 
(.6193) 
-0.009 
(.0443)** 
-0.007 
(.2122) 
-0.006 
(.2756) 
-0.007 
(.6128) 
-0.003 
(.1934) 
-0.003 
(.2198) 
-0.008 
(.0356)** 
GEARING 
-0.008 
(.2128) 
-.010 
(.0053)** 
-0.006 
(.2387) 
0.001 
(.0018)*** 
0.001 
(.0000)*** 
0.001 
(.1845) 
0.001 
(.0000)*** 
0.001 
(.0000)*** 
0.001 
(.0000)*** 
PROFIT 0.098 0.132 0.078 -0.069 -0.049 -0.017 -0.018 -0.026 -0.025 
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(.0059)** (.0017)** (.2383) (.0287)** (.0239)** (.8113) (.3398) (.6176) (.3428) 
LIQUIDITY 
-.009 
(.0189)** 
-0.006 
(.4178) 
-0.004 
(.0876)* 
-0.002 
(.0102)** 
-0.001 
(.0595)* 
-0.003 
(.0243)** 
-0.009 
(.0976) 
-0.002 
(.0003)*** 
-0.002 
(.0078)** 
LOGSALES 
0.023 
(.0000)*** 
-0.013 
(.7756) 
0.006 
(.3198) 
0.008 
(.0001)*** 
0.007 
(.1029) 
0.007 
(.0432)* 
0.009 
(.0001)*** 
0.006 
(.0118)** 
0.004 
(.0001)*** 
SALESGR 
-0.001 
(.0000)*** 
-0.001 
(.0001)*** 
-0.001 
(.0912) 
-0.001 
(.0000)*** 
-0.001 
(.0417)** 
-0.001 
(.7583) 
-0.001 
(.6198) 
-0.001 
(.9765) 
-0.002 
(.2128) 
AUDITDUMMY 
0.032 
(.1028) 
0.045 
(.1872) 
0.078 
(.0179)** 
0.012 
(.9165) 
0.023 
(.3923) 
0.007 
(.6764) 
-0.007 
(.5876) 
-0.006 
(.5843) 
-0.007 
(.8038) 
STDTD  
0.408 
(.0000)*** 
  
0.394 
(.0000)*** 
  
0.198 
(.0000)*** 
 
STDTD2  
-0.298 
(.0000)*** 
0.049 
(.0004)*** 
 
-0.298 
 (.0000)*** 
0.051 
(.0004)*** 
 
-0.229 
(.0000)*** 
0.010 
(.2981) 
DUMMYSTDTD   
-0.046 
(.1489) 
  
-0.048 
(.1925) 
  
-0.100 
(.0000)*** 
DUMMYCA   
-0.033 
(.0409)** 
  
-0.049 
(.0851)* 
  
0.023 
(.1309) 
DUMMYPROFIT   
-0.039 
(.6978) 
  
-0.089 
(.1187) 
  
-0.088 
(.1325) 
DUMMYLOGSALES   -0.001   -0.006   0.006 
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(.7987) (.7278) (.0027)** 
DUMMYAGEDUMMY   
-0.007 
(.7187) 
  
0.006 
(.9287) 
  
0.002 
(.9318) 
DUMMYSALESGR   
0.078 
(.0178)** 
  
0.004 
(.0904) 
  
0.007 
(.2592) 
This table presents the regression results for cost of debt of micro, small and medium firms using fixed effects estimation for the period of 1999-2008. P values are 
shown in the parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. As far as the diagnostic test are concerned we find no evidence of 
heteroskedasticity according to White test.Test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null 
of no serial correlation. 
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Table 4.5 shows the regression results for cost of debt for the micro, small and medium size 
firms. In the Model 1 we have included all the variables.  
 (COD)i,t  = β0+ β1 (CA)i,t +β2 (AGEDUMMY)i,t  + β3(GEARING)i,t + β4 (PROFIT)i,t+ β5 
(LIQUIDITY)i,t + β6(LOGSALES)i,t+ + β7(SALES GROWTH)i,t + β10(AUDITDUMMY)i,t  
+ αi+ αt+  εi,t            4.5 
 
Model 2 shows the all the variables in the basic model, STDTD and STDTD2. 
(COD)i,t  = β0+ β1 (CA)i,t +β2 (AGEDUMMY)i,t  + β3(GEARING)i,t + β4 (PROFIT)i,t+ β5 
(LIQUIDITY)i,t + β6(LOGSALES)i,t+ + β7(SALES GROWTH)i,t +  β10(AUDITDUMMY)i,t  
+  β11(STDTD)i,t  + β12(STDTD2)i,t + αi+ αt+  εi,t      4.6 
 
In Model 3 we have interacted DUMMYSTDTD with CA, PROFIT, LOGSALES, 
AGEDUMMY, and SALESGR. Then we have introduced DUMMYCA DUMMYPROFIT 
DUMMYLOGSALES DUMMYAGEDUMMY and DUMMYSALESGR to the model. 
DUMMYSTDTD is 0,1 dummy variable which is equal to 1 for STDTD=1, otherwise 0.  
(COD)i,t  =  β0+β1 (CA)i,t +β2 (AGEDUMMY)i,t  + β3(GEARING)i,t + β4 (PROFIT)i,t+ β5 
(LIQUIDITY)i,t + β6(LOGSALES)i,t+ + β7(SALES GROWTH)i,t +  β10(AUDITDUMMY)i,t  
+ β11(STDTD2)i,t + β12(DUMMYSTDTD2)i,t + β13(DUMMYCA)i,t + 
β14(DUMMYAGEDUMMY)i,t + β15(DUMMYPROFIT)i,t+ β16(DUMMYLOGSALES) i,t + 
β17(DUMMYSALESGR)i,t + αi+ αt + εi,t        4.7 
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4.7 Results and Discussion 
To address the question, what determine the cost of debt capital, we begin with a simple 
estimation specification in which we regress COD on CA, AGEDUMMY, GEARING, 
PROFIT, LIQUIDITY, LOGSIZE, SALESGR, QUISCORE and AUDITDUMMY year effect 
and fixed effect which control for unobserved firm heterogeneity. The results of this 
estimation are presented in the Table 4.4 under the Model 1. J statistic is a test for the 
overidentifying the restrictions distributed as chi-square under the null of validity of 
instruments which shows that instruments we are using are correct and our model is correctly 
specified.  
 
As shown in the Table 4.4 and 4.5 the adjusted R-squared values are relatively high. Further, 
the estimated coefficients, including the constant are in most cases show the expected 
relationship with cost of debt except SIZE and CA.  
 
In Model 1 the results show that except AGEDUMMY all other variables are highly 
significant.  As expected, age is negative but not significant. LOGSIZE and CA do not show 
the expected relationship but they are highly significant. In the Model 2 we use LOGSALES 
to measure the size and the results show that age remains negative and insignificant. These 
findings mean that the cost of debt capital is higher for younger firms even after within firm 
changes and unobservable firm heterogeneity, as captured by firm fixed effects, are controlled 
for.  AUDITDUMMY shows the expected sign with the cost of debt and significant only in 
Model 3. The variable which measures the creditworthiness, QUISCORE is not significant 
and does not show the expected sign in any of the estimations. Studying the Table 4.4, the 
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intercept, is consistently negatively signed in all model and highly significant in almost all the 
cases.  
 
The last column (Model 4) as explained before the interacted variables with DUMMYSTDTD 
namely DUMMYCA, DUMMYPROFIT, DUMMYLOGSALES, DUMMYAGEDUMMY, 
and DUMMYSALESGR. Except DUMMYSALESGR all other variables are highly 
significant and show the expected relationship. This implies that short term debt is more 
important in determining the cost of debt.  
 
The estimated coefficient on AGEDUMMY is negative in all cases except in Model 4 
although it is significant only at the 5 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels in 
MODEL 1, 2 and 3 respectively. This negative sign is consistent with the pecking order 
theory as we shown in Table 4.1. The first estimation reported in Table 4.4 suggests that when 
small businesses are more than 10 years old, its cost of debt capital decrease by 2 basis point. 
Then we interact the sample of the firms that use only short term debt and both short term and 
long term debt. The finding shows that when we interact the sample that consist of the firm 
that are less than 10 years old, the effect of aging on the cost of debt capital is somewhat 
larger for younger firms. This is again confirm that reputation of the firm has a bigger impact 
on cost of debt irrespective of the way they finance (short term or long term).  
DUMMYAGEDUMMY which is the interacted variable with short term debt shows a 
negative relationship with the cost of debt. This is consistent with the earlier finding of 
Peterson and Rajan (1994), on the effect of age on the cost of debt.  
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The results obtained for SIZE are relatively strong for the variable measuring in terms of log 
turnover and log size. Size is consistently positively related with the cost of debt. This is 
different from the expected relationship and these findings are inconsistent with the 
information asymmetries and pecking order theory explanations. But in Model 4 the 
interacted variable with DUMMYSTDTD is highly significant and show negative relationship 
with cost of debt as expected. This gives us a signal that COD is reduced for larger firms 
when they employ only short term debt in financing their business activities. Again this is an 
indication of the importance of size in determining cost of debt capital and thus the nature of 
the relationship between external finance and cost of debt in terms of short term debt is 
confirmed the panel data procedure. Antoniou et al (2008)
71
 argues that different transaction 
and contracting costs discourage small firms from raising external funding forcing them to 
rely on their retained earnings. Hence, they are likely to borrow short-term bank debts in order 
to avoid diseconomies of scale and the costs of financial distress. Storey (1994) has confirmed 
the same that many small business owners are strongly opposed to sharing ownership either 
with financial institutions or with other individuals and so use short term debt financing.  
 
The other inconsistently signed variable in Table 4.3 is collateral assets CA. This variable is 
highly significant at 1% significance level in all cases but shows positive relationship with the 
cost of debt capital. These findings are inconsistent with the this study’s expectation of a 
negative link between cost of debt and collateral assets and trade off explanations as given in 
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 This paper aims to investigate the determinants of choice between private and public debt for British and 
German listed companies and concludes that relation between dependent and independent variables is country 
dependent and evidence record few similarities in debt mix structure of two countries. Findings confirm that the 
debt ownership decision of listed firms is not only depend on firm characteristics but also the outcome of legal 
and financial environment and corporate governance.  
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Table 4.1. How to interpret these positive coefficients of CA is not clear. May be this is an 
indication of highly risk borrowings. Higher the risk greater the collateral requirement. Hence 
this is a measure of risk and this could be an indication of the SME in the UK are highly risk 
borrowers.  Further this could be due to the counter-intuitive nature of the lenders. Since the 
SMEs generally expose to greater risk, collateral assets that they have would be unattractive 
security option for high risk firms and the same assets would make more attractive security 
for low risk firms. 
 
The firm profitability measure coefficient is significant in all cases. This significance and the 
negative correlation with the cost of debt is consistent with the pecking order theory and 
agency theory. These findings further suggest that more profitable firms pay less for their 
external finance and that growth orientation increases the costs of external finance. Further 
this is consistent with Krishnan and Moyer (1997) that there is negative relationship with 
profitability
72
. So the importance of firm profitability in determining the cost of debt capital 
and the nature of the relationship between external finance and profitability is clear from the 
panel data procedure.  
 
Liquidity is negatively related to the cost of debt and in all the cases it is highly significant. 
Liquidity factors are indeed likely to be more important in determining cost of debt since 
customers are more likely to pay cash in SMEs. As a measure of short term firm risk liquidity 
shows a negative relationship which implies that firm has required short term funds for 
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 Supporting the pecking order hypothesis of Myers(1984),  Krishnan and Moyer (1996) explained that firms 
with higher reserves have lower cost of capital whereas negative coefficient for profitability is inconsistent with  
Omran and Pointon(2004) reveals that firms with higher reserves have a higher cost of capital.  
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financing and it reduces the risk of non-availability of funds. As a result of this firm cost of 
debt capital will be reduce as there is sufficient funds available for profitable investment. 
Hence it is not surprising that liquidity is a factor that explains the cost of debt capital.  
 
For the SME the coefficient of sales growth is negative and is not statistically significant in 
first 2 cases. Only in Model 3 and 4 it is significant but in Model 4 it is positive. The negative 
coefficient is consistent with what the pecking order theory predicts.  
 
Financial and business risks are key factors, as indicated by gearing. The sign of the 
coefficient is positive as expected and all the Models show highly significant at 1% 
significance level. However these findings are inconsistent with the Omran and Pointon 
(2004) where they found a negative relationship.  
 
AUDITDUMMY which measures the riskiness of the firm is significant in the Model 3 and 
Model 4 shows the expected link with the cost of debt. This supports the conventional 
wisdom that if one default on payments and/or does not comply with accounting regulations, 
the cost of external finance will increase.  
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Table 4.6 
Summary results of the empirical analysis 
Variable Expected 
sign 
Estimated coefficient 
C  Highly significant at 1% significant level and consistently 
negative. 
CA - Consistently positive and highly significant at 1% 
significant level. Interacted equation with DUMMYSTDTD 
shows the negative correlation. 
AGEDUMMY - Consistently negative and weakly significant at 5% and 
10% level in 3 cases out of 6. 
GEARING + Highly significant at 1% significant level and positive in all 
cases. 
LIQUIDITY +- Highly significant at 1% significant level and consistently 
negative. 
PROFIT - Except model 2 significant in all cases and negatively 
correlated. 
LOGSIZE - Consistently positive and highly significant at 1% 
significant level. Interacted equation with DUMMYSTDTD 
shows the negative correlation. 
LOGSALES - Consistently positive and highly significant at 1% 
significant level. Interacted equation with DUMMYSTDTD 
shows the negative correlation. 
SALESGR - Negative And highly significant with STDTD. 
AUDITDUMMY - Negative and significant in one Model only 
QUISCORE + Positive and insignificant. 
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The above summary relates to the overall estimation shown in Table 4.4. In addition to the 
overall estimation we have split the sample in to three based on the size
73
 of the firm and 
estimated explanatory variables and residuals from fixed effects model.  Table 4.4
74
 shows the 
empirical estimation results for the determinants of cost of debt concentration by firm size. 
According to the results shown in Table 4.4 it is evidenced that the size of the firms matters. 
In contrast, except LOGSALES and CA all other variables show the expected relationship 
with cost of debt in medium size firms. It shows that for micro firms higher the profit greater 
the cost of debt and for small and medium firms it is negatively related to cost of debt. 
Gearing is also shows a negative relationship with micro firms while positively related with 
small and medium size firms. As can be seen from Table 4.4 the most interesting implication 
is that the determinants of cost of debt are highly sensitive to the size of the firm. 
 
4.8 Conclusion. 
According to the summary results, particularly from the panel data procedure, give the 
impression to support the predictions. As illustrated in the factors previously found to be 
important in determining the cost of debt capital of SMEs and have similar weight on the cost 
of capital of SMEs in the UK. Using a large panel of UK SMEs, we document the following 
main conclusions about the determinants of cost of debt.  
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 As the variables (LOGSIZE, LOGSALES) which measure the size of the firm in the estimation did not show 
the expected relationship and to see what factors are more important in determining cost of debt capital of micro, 
small and medium firms, we divided the sample in to 3 based on the definition for SME. The results of this 
estimation clearly show that there is an impact of size on the cost of debt.  
74
 In these estimations we have dropped the QUISCORE as that variable is not significant at all in any of the 
estimations. 
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The cost of debt has been a popular issue in corporate finance for a long time, however 
insufficient attention has been paid to the factors that drive the cost of debt in the SMEs. 
Possibly the most unambiguous finding of this study is that size matters in firm cost of debt 
determinants.  In fact, with the pecking order theory and trade off theory and control 
considerations cost of debt tends to decrease with the size of the firm. The strong positive 
relationship with the firms’ use both long term and short term debt may be the results of 
growth opportunities. Particularly it appears that growing firms with needs for external funds 
prefer long term finance but it is again expensive for SMEs. Strong negative relationship with 
firms which use only short term finance indicates that SMEs use more short term finance 
rather long term external finance. This is an interesting finding that shows SMEs are more 
depend on the short term finance may be they have no access to long term opportunities and 
even they have access to long term debt they have to pay higher cost compared to the large 
firms. This also implies that many small businesses are strongly opposed to sharing ownership 
and use short term debt financing as noted in Titman and Wessels (1988) and Story(1994). 
 
Similarly, the positive sign of collateral assets shows that for the firms which employee both 
long term and short term finance show higher the collateral higher the cost of debt. But this is 
not consistent with the theory or some previous studies (Boot et al, 1991). But this is 
consistent with Niskanen and Niskanen (2010)
75
 which implies that collateral is positively 
associated with the risk involved. Further the interacted variable with DUMMYSTDTD is 
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 Niskanen and Niskanen (2010) find that dispersed ownership structure have easier access to credit and are less 
often required to pledge collateral. In this case the collateral requirement of SMEs in UK is high as the 
ownership is cantered to a single person, family or very few people.   
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consistent with tradeoff theory and implies that short term finance is strongly support the 
importance of collateral assets in determining the cost of debt. These findings on collateral 
imply that firms may improve their chances of obtaining cheap debt capital by increasing the 
number of owners in the firm. The result of this study reported that the size and collateral 
assets are significantly important determinant of SMEs short term debt cost. 
 
Profit, Gearing and Liquidity appear to be much more important. All these 3 variables are 
suggested to be very important in determining of SME short term and long term cost of debt.  
Profit seems to play an important role in determining cost of debt and the implications of this 
are that SMEs may well limit their growth to the finance they have available internally. This 
is strictly consistent with the pecking order theory for SMEs but is a major constraint on 
economic development. Higher the profitability lower the cost of debt indicates that risk is 
low and this is in line with the trade off and agency considerations. Our investigations also 
suggest that micro firms cost of debt capital is higher than small and medium size firms. For 
micro firms higher the profitability greater the cost of debt which means that asymmetric 
information and moral hazard leads to charge a higher interest rate as asymmetry of 
information between the lender and the firm obstruct the lender to know the actual risk of the 
firm. 
 
Finally, even though some variables in Table 4.4 do not show the expected relationship with 
the cost of debt same as in the overall estimation this evidence provide that size reflects the 
reputation in financing choices. A micro firm is typically more difficult for outsiders to 
observe because it produces little public information about the firm and firm has no outside 
reputation.  Likewise medium well established firm built a strong reputation which allows it 
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to tap cheap credit in external market. In particular, short term debt seem to play more 
important role specially in micro firms in determining cost of debt.  
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CHAPTER 5 
THE EFFECT OF CAPITAL STRCUTURE ON PROFITABILITY: AN EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS OF SMEs IN THE UK 
5.1 Introduction 
It is widely reported that in the static trade-off theory
76
 of capital structure, a more profitable 
firm is predicted to have a higher leverage ratio. The empirical relevance of trade off theory 
has often been questioned. Company chooses the debt and equity mix by balancing the costs 
and benefits.  Competent managers who identify the appropriate mix of debt and equity 
minimize the firm cost of finance, maximize the profitability and thereby improve the 
competitive advantage. Different firm specific strategies implemented by the managers to 
gain the competitive advantage to the firm and thereby enhance the firm value result in 
performance differences (Gleason et al, 2000).  
 
The previous two chapters focused on capital structure decision and cost of debt capital of 
SME in the UK, while the objective of this chapter is to analyze the effect of debt policy on 
the profitability of SMEs in the UK. 
 
The expected return from any investment is the sum of risk free rate and the risk premium or 
extra return to compensate for the risk. So the profitability is risk free rate plus risk premium. 
Firm has to consider the risk associated with every single activity very carefully as it affect 
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 This theory explains that corporations usually are financed partly with debt and partly with equity, It states that 
there is an advantage to financing with debt, the tax benefit of debt and there is a cost of debt financing which 
include bankruptcy costs and non- bankruptcy costs. The firm that is optimizing its overall value will focus on 
this trade-off when choosing how much debt and equity to use for financing (Frank and Goyal, 2005). 
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the return of the investment. In this study we focus on what is the impact of capital structure 
on the risk premium of SMEs in UK.  
 
This paper contributes to the literature by utilizing recent advances in panel data econometrics 
to investigate the determinants of profitability for non-financial SMEs in the UK. The primary 
objective of this chapter is to find the important factors in determining profitability of SMEs 
in the UK. To this time there has been no UK study of the determinants of profitability of 
SMEs in the UK.  
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 explains the relevant theoretical background 
5.3 review the selected existing literature. In section 5.4 we describe our model of 
determinants of profitability and in section 5.5 theoretical prediction and data we describe in 
5.6. Section 5.7 explain the estimation results and 5.8 the conclusion of the study.  
 
5.2 Theoretical Background 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) provided that the well known theory of irrelevance of capital 
structure where financial leverage does not affect the firm’s market value. MM generally 
viewed this as a purely theoretical result since in order to derive it, they had to assume away 
many important factors in which would influence capital structure decision. Specifically 
theory was based on very unrealistic assumptions which we cannot see in the real world such 
as perfect capital market, homogenous expectations, and perfect competition in which firms 
operate without taxes and transaction costs that are incurred in trading securities where all the 
relevant information is available without any cost. This provides the base with which to 
examine real world and to consider reason why capital structure is relevant. In particular 
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presence of bankruptcy costs and favorable tax treatment of interest payment lead to the 
notion of an “optimal capital structure” which maximize the value of the firm and minimize 
the cost of capital.  
 
MM(1963) revised their former (MM,1958) standpoint by incorporating benefit of tax as a 
determinant of capital structure choice arguing that employing more debt capital would 
increase the profit of the firm as interest paid on debt is a tax allowable expense. It is 
considered that cost of debt would be smaller than equity as the government would be 
indirectly subsidizing the expenses with interest. This means the value of the tax on revenue 
would be reduced from the same amount spent on paying interest. Therefore, the profit of the 
firm would be smaller in comparison with a company without debt. Therefore, Modigliani 
and Miller (1963) propose that in order to maximize the value of the firm they should use as 
much debt capital as possible where they ignored the risk. However, as the profit will be 
proportional to a smaller equity, the profit per share tends to be larger. Later researchers 
suggested alternatives to the MM theory by introducing agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976), pecking order theory (Myers and Mujlif, 1984) and theory of bankruptcy 
(Titman,1984).  
 
Theories that have been developed to explain the capital structure of firms include bankruptcy 
cost, agency theory and pecking order theory. Bankruptcy costs are the increased costs of 
financing with debt instead of equity that result from a higher probability of bankruptcy. 
These costs may be higher for the SMEs compared to the larger firms. According to the 
Warner (1977) and Brealey and Myers(1992) the cost associated to the bankruptcy possibility 
such as legal and administrative costs would increase with the debt reducing the profitability 
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and the value of the firm. Titman (1984) shows that bankruptcy costs are the loss in profits 
incurred by the firm as a result of the unwillingness of stakeholders to do business operations 
with them. In addition to that the use of debt capital also leads to agency costs.
77
 Agency cost 
arises as a result of the relationship between shareholders and managers (Jenson and 
Meckling, 1976). Higher leverage can mitigate conflicts between managers and shareholders 
concerning the choice of investment (Myers 1977).  
 
Agency theory suggests that capital structure decisions should be taken in order to minimize 
the agency conflicts (agency cost) thus increase the profitability of the firm (Berger 2000). 
Conflict between the interests of shareholders and debt holders is the one particularly 
important agency issue. In particular, following a more riskier but higher return strategy 
benefits the shareholders but not the debt holders. A more risky strategy increases the risk of 
default on debt, but debt holders being entitled to fixed return will not benefit from higher 
return for bearing a higher risk. So this may higher the profitability if the higher risk increase 
the return, however if the risk goes bad, debt holders also have to share the loss which would 
show a negative relationship between profitability and debt
78
.  
 
The trade-off theory, the dominated theory of capital structure predicts that firms will try to 
maintain optimal capital structure by matching cost and benefit of debt. Trade-off Theory 
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 Agency cost is a type of internal cost that arises from or must be paid in to an agent acting on behalf of a 
principle. This arises because of core problems such as conflicts of interest between shareholders and 
management. Shareholders wish for management to run the company to increase the value of shareholders but, 
the management may wish to grow the company in ways that maximize both their objectives and the best interest 
of shareholders.  
78
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
171 
 
introduced by Myers (1984) advocates the necessity of establishing a balance between tax 
saving arising from debt, decrease in agent cost and bankruptcy, financial distress costs. The 
firm cannot achieve the ultimate objective of value maximisation if they form a capital 
structure only with external resources or without any external resources. According to trade-
off theory, in order to achieve an optimal capital structure, firms need to establish a balance 
between costs (Ghosh and Cai, 2001) which would lead to maximize the firm profitability. 
Firm profitability in a way reflects the effect of different capital structures and differing 
business risk
79
. Further trade-off theory suggests giving priority to the debt financing 
considering the benefits of various strengths and the restrictions caused by debt financing 
costs. So there should be an ideal leverage ratio and profitability and leverage ratio is 
positively related.  
 
Myers and Majluf (1984) have formulated a pecking-order hypothesis that places debt as the 
preferred source external financing. The pecking order theory predicts that firms will issue 
equity as a last resort. Capital structure is created in accordance with the priority order of 
diversified resources aimed at answering the financial needs of firms (Frank and Goyal, 
2007). Specifically, they issue equity when firms exhaust their debt capacity. Thus, firms’ 
debt capacity plays a significant role in the choice and the size of debt financing. 
 
 The pecking order explains a negative relationship between capital structure and profitability, 
why the most profitable firms generally borrow less or vice versa. Not because they have low 
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 In practice firm tend to use target capital structure a mix of debt and equity. Since capital structure mix 
involves a strategic trade-off between risk and expected return, the optimal capital structure policy must seek a 
prudent and informed balance between risk and return which maximize the shareholders wealth and minimizes 
WACC (Gaius, 2007). 
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target debt ratio but because they don’t need external money for financing activities as they 
have generated sufficient money from the business operations. If the firm has no sufficient 
funds for their capital investment firm issue debt which makes the firm less profitable
80
. On 
the other hand it is argued that higher the profitability greater the investment opportunities 
available. This indicates management is doing a good job and, or firm is undercapitalized. So 
in order to support the firm activities, operate effectively and grow and make the appropriate 
investment firm can increase debt capital. Firms with higher tangible assets are expected to 
have higher debt capacity and lower costs of financial distress thereby increase the 
profitability. This is consistent with the trade off theory which explains that the tax shield 
from debt finance thus improves the profitability. 
 
Brealey and Myers, 1992; Gitman, 1997; and Weston & Brightam, 2000 contend that a capital 
structure concerns the composition of the liability of the company, or more specifically, which 
is the relative participation of the several financing sources in the composition of the total 
obligations. Simply the capital structure of a firm concerns the mix of debt and equity the firm 
uses in its operation. Brealey and Myers (1992) studies the cost associated with the 
bankruptcy possibility, identifying direct, legal administrative and indirect cost determined by 
the difficulty of managing a company during its bankruptcy process,. They concluded that 
such cost increases with the debt capital and it will reduce the firm profitability. If the cost of 
debt is lower than the cost of equity, the firm with larger degree of financial leverage tends to 
present in normal conditions of operation, higher ratio of profitability on equity. This means 
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 Higher the borrowing would risk financial distress and lower the return. Financial distress can lead to reduce 
the efficiency of the management and conflict of interest between bondholders and shareholders. Shareholders 
interest is to invest in risky project which increase the return but the risky projects are not the interest of debt 
holders. This also increase the probability of the firm value to decrease further since these projects net present 
value is negative and cost may occur from lost profit.  
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that discounting the operational risk uncover from execution of companies business functions 
by the possibility of occurrence of rates of return lower to the expected ones. According to 
Brealey and Myers (1992) estimation of cost of each capital source, basically serve to 
determine the minimum rate of profitability demanded to make the firm’s investment more 
attractive. Brealey and Myers (2003) state that the firm can issue dozens of distinct securities 
in countless combinations but it attempts to find the particular combination that maximizes 
the market value of the firm. As each source has a specific cost, the return rate can be 
influenced in a significant way of each composition.  
 
Booth et al (2001) study the choice of the optimum capital structure in compliance with three 
models. Firstly the static trade off model confirms that the firm chooses how much debt 
finance and how much equity finance to use by balancing the costs and benefits. An important 
purpose of this theory is to explain the fact that firms are usually financed partly by debt and 
equity. It states the advantages (benefits) and disadvantages (costs) of financing and the 
marginal benefit of further increases in debt declines as debt increases, while the marginal 
cost increases so that a firm that is optimizing its overall value will focus on his trade-off 
when choosing how much debt and equity to use for financing.  Secondly, Agency theory 
suggests that possible conflicts of interests among internal and external interested parties 
determine the optimal capital structure which increases the profitability and value of the firm 
that pay off the agency cost with other financial costs. Finally, the Pecking order theory states 
that firms prioritize their sources of financing from internal financing to equity. Based on the 
market imperfections and asymmetric information the choice will be based on the possibility 
of generation of funds to the firm, given the asymmetry of information.  
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Based on the concept of asymmetric information the concept of optimal capital structure is 
also expressed by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984). Myers (1984) argued with the 
notion of an optimal capital structure based entirely on the trade off of cost and benefit of debt 
in a word of information asymmetry between owners and managers. Further he mentioned 
that corporate financing practice does not confirm with a simple tradeoff model and he 
suggested the existence of a pecking order among the financing sources used by firms. The 
existence of information asymmetry between firm and finance providers leads to vary the cost 
of finance between the difference sources of finance. Condition in which at least relevant 
information is known to the firm but not to the all other interested parties. Potentially, this 
could be a harmful situation where one party can take the advantage of other party’s lack of 
knowledge. This may cause the equity holders to expect higher return on their investment and 
finally this would cost more to the firm which means that equity financing will more costly 
than debt financing. In the same way this claim is valid for the internal finance and new debt 
holders. This indicates that debt increases the risk due to asymmetric information and agency 
problem hence return on equity must also increase. But also the more debt capital cause 
problems for the debt holders hence the cost of debt would be higher.    
 
If the cost of debt is lesser than the cost of equity the firm with larger degree of leverage could 
earn higher rate of profitability on equity in the normal business operations. Clarifying the 
same further, implies that discounting the operational risk determined by the possibility of 
occurrence of rates of return lower to the initially expected ones. The issue in estimation of 
cost of each capital source and the practical validity of the weighted average cost of capital is 
basically provide the minimum rate of profitability demanded to make the firms projects more 
attractive (Brealey and Myers;2007).  
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Firms employ variety of techniques and strategies in order to increase the return on equity.  
Basically, a company can adopt high or low financial leverage as capital structure is one such 
strategy. The firms have an incentive to maximize debt capital in order to maximize their 
return on equity. So financial leverage is positively related to the return on equity. 
 
On the other hand higher financial leverage position is coupled with high financial risk. The 
capital accumulation is at risk of loss if the firm enters into financial distress. In order to 
protect the reputation of the firm and capital and maintain the financial strength the firm 
decreases financial risk by taking on low financial leverage position, where the financing 
decision is linked with operations of the firm. The higher business risk associate with higher 
return on assets is coupled with lower financial risk over lower financial leverage. Thus, 
financial leverage is negatively related to the return on assets.  
 
5.3 Review of selected empirical Literature 
Review of the selected empirical literature consists of two subsections where section 5.3.1 
reviews the previous studies relating to large firms of other countries and UK and small firms 
of other countries.  Section 5.3.2 reviews the literature relating to SMEs in the UK.  
5.3.1 Empirical studies on Large and other country Small firms  
The relationship between capital structure and the firm profitability has been the subject of 
considerable debate. Pecking order theory suggests that capital structures are determined 
largely by the history of needs for external finance and explains negative intra-industry 
correlation between profitability and debt-equity ratio. 
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Several early studies suggested that there is a negative correlation between firm performance 
and leverage. Using the data from retailers in 14 European countries which are grouped into 
four cultural clusters, Gleason et al (2000) show that capital structure for retailers vary by 
cultural clusters. Using both financial and operational measures of performance it is shown 
that a negative correlation between capital structure and firm performance.  Using the OLS 
estimation they suggest that the higher the leverage may cause agency problems which finally 
lead for a lower performance of the firm.  
 
The concept of productivity, efficiency and effectiveness are related to corporate 
performance, as these concepts mean the optimal utilization of scare resources (Achabal et 
al.(1984). Increasing leverage has a positive impact on the firm value and the performance of 
the company. Researchers (Jenson & Meckling, 1976; Noe, 1988; Goddard et al, 2005) 
suggest that debt positively affect the firm value and performance.
81
 Managers who have 
actual need of improving firm performance would employ more debt as increasing debt would 
also increase the bankruptcy and liquidation cost. Survey of chief finance officers by Graham 
& Harvey (2001) discusses the how managers are concerned with maintaining their financial 
flexibility which effect their firm credit score. When deciding the credit score firms take in to 
account the range of factors including firm performance which provide indirect evidence that 
managers issue debt keeping in view of expected future performance. This means that amount 
of debt the firm have can influence the marginal cost.  
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 Increase in debt would increase the risk and increase the return on assets as well as due to the tax shield. 
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Gleason et al (2000) concluded that utilization of different level of debt and equity in the 
firms’ capital structure is a firm specific strategy which influence on firm performance. Using 
primarily Hofstede’s82 classification of national cultures, and data on European  retailers, the 
result in this study provide conclusive evidence that capital structures vary by cultural 
classification of retailers. This provides evidence that due to the agency conflicts, retailers 
over leverage themselves, thus negatively affecting their own performance. Another 
implication of this study is that larger size is associated with higher performance
83
.  
 
Other studies such as Goddard et al (1996) analyze the dynamics of profitability investigating 
the persistence of profits of 995(796 manufacturing and 199 service) large public limited 
companies for the period of 1972 in UK manufacturing and service sector firms. Firm size 
appears to be determinants of persistence of profit for manufacturing but not for services, 
which suggest that barriers to entry may differ between the two sectors. In service sector than 
in manufacturing sector, in determining long run profitability industry wide characteristics are 
important. For both sectors firm size and average growth found to be significant and 
positively related to long run profitability. Stronger significant of the estimated coefficient in 
manufacturing sample may be due to the larger number of observations available for 
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 Hofsede (1994) defines culture as the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of 
one group or category of people from those of another. This definition covers many different cultural factors 
such as legal environment, tax environment, economic environment and technical capabilities. Another cultural 
classification scheme is presented by Hofsede (1980) identifies four dimensions of national culture; 
individualism power distance, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance.  
83
 Economic integration in the European Community suggests that aggressive firms, including retailers, should 
be looking for ways in which firm size can be increased to derive the benefits from economies of scale and 
market bargaining power.  
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manufacturing sector. The differences between two sectors is quite small, manufacturers 
operate in a more competitive environment than service sector firms. 
 
Goddard et al (2005) investigate the determinants of profitability for manufacturing and 
service sector firms in Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and UK for the period of 1993-2001. 
Evidence shows that there is a consistently negative relationship between size and 
profitability, gearing and profitability and positive relationship between liquidity and 
profitability. The negative significant relationship between gearing and profitability indicates 
that highly geared firms may tend to suffer as gross profit dedicated to servicing debt 
increases. Positive relationship with liquidity and profitability would be an indication of 
adapting quickly to the changing environment and have a beneficial effect on profitability. 
For all five countries market share and profitability shows positive and significant 
relationship. Further they have found that in manufacturing than in service sector the positive 
gradient is steeper and show that European manufacturing firms engage in costly strategies of 
building excess capacity, advertising and promotion and innovation in order to gain the 
market share and discourage the new competition.  
 
Goddard et al (2006) using 96 large quoted manufacturing and service companies in UK for 
the year 1970-2001 applying panel unit root test found that a large proportion of the cross 
sectional or time series variance in firm level growth rates cannot be explained by variations 
in firm sizes. Profitability studies based on the persistence of profit hypothesis have typically 
drawn inferences from a large number of time-series autoregressions for normalized firm-
level profit rates in contrast to the cross-sectional orientation of the empirical growth 
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literature. Time-series behavior of firm level profit indicates the effectiveness of competition 
in eliminating abnormal profit. 
 
Comparing the persistence of profits Goddard and Wilson (1996) investigate for a new sample 
of UK firms using data for the period 1972-1991. This study includes a sample of a 
contingent of service sector firms allowing comparison between manufacturing and service 
sector. Estimations reveal that average persistence coefficient very slightly higher for service 
firms than for manufacturers. Measures of initial profitability and long run profitability 
confirm that relevant correlation coefficient is slightly higher for service firms than for 
manufacturing firms. This suggests that on average manufactures operate in a more 
competitive environment with lower barriers to entry than service sector firms. An 
investigation of firm specific factors and characteristics which explain persistence of profit 
and long run profitability reveal significant variation in different industrial groups within 
manufacturing sector. So the different industries might have differences in financing priorities 
as well as the determinants of profitability for different industries may also be varied.  Firm 
size found to be an important variable of persistence in manufacturing but not in service. This 
suggests that entry barriers are correlated with the firm size
84
. For both manufacturing and 
service sector firm size and average growth are both found to be significant and positively 
related to long run profitability.  
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 Firm size is important in determining the strength of barriers to entry in manufacturing sector, probably 
through economies of scale. In service sector size is not important in determining the strength of entry barriers. 
Other than economies of scale, absolute cost advantage or product differentiation, product characteristics or 
location are important in determining entry barriers in service sector in UK.  
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Investigating the effect of capital structure on profitability of listed firms on the Ghana stock 
exchange Arbor (2005) reveal a significantly positive relationship between ratio of short term 
debt to total assets and ROE.  This suggests that profitable firms use more short term debt to 
finance their business operations. Representing 85% of total debt finance in Ghana short term 
debt shows the most important component of source of finance. Nevertheless, a negative 
relationship between the ratio of long term debt to total assets and ROE was found. This is 
explained by the fact that long term debts are relatively more and employing higher 
proportion of them could lead to low profitability. This finding is consistent with Miller 
(1977) and Fama and French (1998)
85
. For the total debt and return rate the results show a 
significantly positive association. OLS regression results also show that the profitability 
increase with the size and sales growth.  
 
Arbor (2007) examined the relationship between capital structure and performance of SMEs 
in Ghana and South Africa during a six year period 1998-2003. The empirical results indicate 
that short term debt is significantly negatively related to the gross profit margin of both 
countries and long term debt has significant positive relationship with gross profit margin of 
both countries.  Total debt found to be significantly negative. In the case of Ghana this study 
found significantly negative association with all the measures of capital structure and return 
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 If the financial markets are competitive and both corporations and investors are taxed then the equilibrium 
value of the levered firm equals that of the unlevered firm. Miller (1977) show that firm could generate higher 
after tax income by increasing the debt equity ratio, and this additional income would result in a higher payout to 
stockholders and bondholders. Debt is substituted for equity, the proportion of firm payout in the form of interest 
on debt rises relative to payouts in the form of dividends and capital gains on equity. Higher taxes on interest 
payments than on equity return reduce or eliminate the advantage of debt finance to the firm. Miller (1977) 
argues that as in MM (1958)value of the firm is still be independent of capital structure and higher the debt 
capital could lead to lower the profitability. Fama and French (1998) conclude that low debt is associated with 
higher profit.  
181 
 
on assets while the South African sample shows significantly positive relationship between 
return on assets and short term debt and trade credit. Both, long term debt and total debt, the 
results show statistically significant negative relationship with return on assets. These 
negative relationships imply that SMEs generally are averse to use more equity because of the 
fear of losing control and therefore employ more debt in their capital structure. In addition to 
avoid the losing controlling power one other reason to employ more debt capital would be to 
avoid agency problem. On the other hand employing more debt capital is risky and would 
cause to result in high bankruptcy cost and ultimately it will cause to reduce the performance 
of the firm. Arbor (2007) has shown that presence of control variables (firm size, sales 
growth) and capital structure has a significant influence on the performance of SMEs in 
Ghana and South Africa. According to Arbor (2005) and Arbor (2007) it is clear that short 
term debt of listed firms in Ghana and SME shows two different relationships with 
profitability which suggest that profitable large firms use more short term debt and SME 
found that short term debt are more expensive.  
 
The study of Sonia Ban˜os-Caballero et al(2009) offers new evidence on the relationship 
between working capital management and profitability where they found that there is a 
concave relationship between working capital and level that balances costs and benefits and 
maximizes their profitability. This indicates that SMEs have an optimal working capital level 
that maximizes their profitability. In addition to that this study show that firms profitability 
decreases when they move away from their optimal working capital. The sample comprises 
SME from Spain for 2002-2007 and use the two step GMM estimator. They found that size, 
sales growth and leverage negatively correlated with profitability. In addition to the capital 
structure there are some other factors which affect the profitability. 
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Teruel and Solano (2006) the effect of working capital management on the profitability of a 
sample of Spanish SME for the period 1996-2002.  Results show that managers can create 
value by reducing their firms number of days accounts receivable and inventories. In the same 
way, shortening the cash conversion cycle also improve the firm’s profitability. An SME’s 
ROA is reduced by lengthening the number of days accounts receivable, number of days 
inventory and number of days accounts payable. The same results found by Deloof (2003)86 
for large firms confirm the importance of working capital management for firms. Lengthening 
the payment period improves profitability as it raises sales. So lengthening the number of 
days accounts payable negatively affect the profitability. They suggested that firm 
profitability can also be improved by reducing the number of days of inventory. Deloof 
(2003) further justifies that less profitable firms tend to delay payment of their bills. Teruel 
and Solano (2006) find that profitability is positively associated with size and growth which 
could be firms investment opportunities is an important factor allowing firms to enjoy 
improved profitability.  
 
However, some studies have shown that debt has a positive effect on firm profitability. 
Confirming the Pecking order hypothesis Hadlock & James (2002) evaluate the possibility of 
the banking system to provide a certain financial assistance to the companies, confirms that 
the choice among equity and debt will be fundamentally decide by the market evaluation of 
share. They analyzed the financing decision of 500 non-financial companies and found that 
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 Deloof(2003) finds that the working capital management is the part of short run policy of the firm and further 
the components of the working capital, accounts receivable and payable, inventories are highly related to the 
profitability.   
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those that were sub-evaluated chose bank financing. As the market interprets the loan as a 
positive force which enhances their return the company prefer the bank loans. Hadlock & 
James (2002) concluded that companies prefer debt financing as they anticipate higher return. 
It is believed that large debt holders have an interest in seeing that managers take performance 
improving measures.  
 
Analyzing the relationship among taxes, financing decision and the firm value Fama and 
French (1998) concluded that debt does not allow tax benefits. They argue that if the earning, 
dividend and investment in the full regressions do not capture all the information in debt 
about profitability, the regressions cannot isolate the tax effects of debt as the debt slopes are 
mixes of tax, agency, asymmetric information, bankruptcy and proxy effects. Because, the 
negative information about debt (agency, asymmetric information and bankruptcy) 
overwhelms any tax or other benefit of debt. So, the high leverage degree generates agency 
problems among shareholders and creditors that predict negative relationship between 
leverage and profitability.  
 
The finance theory and literature argue that the firms actually have more debt in their capital 
structure than is appropriate. According to Harris and Raviv (1991) higher level of debt 
support the interest of managers and shareholders and managers may under estimate the costs 
of bankruptcy reorganization or liquidation. These leads to higher level of debt than 
appropriate in the capital structure which would then result in lower performance. Harris and 
Raviv (1991) argued that capital structure is related to the trade-off between cost of 
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liquidation and return from liquidation to both shareholders and managers
87
. Thus, firms 
might have more debt capital in their capital structure than is suitable as it gains benefits for 
both shareholders and managers which of course mitigate the agency problem too.  
 
Ananiadis and Varsakelis (2008) using panel data analysis for data from the Athens Stock 
Exchange (ASE) addresses the two questions assuming the national culture and the legal 
tradition of Greece. First, does the capital structure affect the performance in the same way as 
in the mature economies?  and the second does the short run financial policy of the firm affect 
the performance under what circumstances?. Using the data for the period of 1995-2000 of 
130 industrial firms listed on ASE they find that with respect to the impact of capital structure 
on ROA, are similar to those found in countries with similar financial sector to the Greece
88
. 
Further they find that WCM, financial leverage has a positive impact on profitability and high 
inventories turnover may lead to lower sales and consequently to low profitability 
 
In answering the question that how much the industry matter in explaining the firm 
performance Powel (1996) finds that industry membership only explains 20% of financial 
performance. Using a sample of undiversified firms competing in variety of industries  of 
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 If the cash flow is poor debt gives investors the option of liquidation. The costs here are the information costs 
associated with determining whether or not liquidation should occur. Higher levels of debt make default more 
likely thereby making the liquidation decision more appealing. Consequently, firms with higher liquidation 
values will have more debt than those with lower liquidation values. 
88
 This study explains two reasons similar to other studies on profitability. One is the culture of high uncertainty 
avoidance national culture and the pro-creditor commercial law. In this case managers consider  that the 
bankruptcy cost of financial distress, for the firm and themselves, is high and  to minimize these cost they choose 
low debt and high equity. The other reason is that restructure the capital structure in favor of equity in times of 
stock exchange expansion as lower cost of transaction. 
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Federal Trade Commission Line of Business data Powel(1996) conclude that not all of the 
unexplained performance variance attributable to firm specific factors as some will also 
attributable to shared generic strategies, strategic group membership, other shared resources 
or chance. Further this study address the shortcomings in the previous methodologies such as 
incorporation of personal interviews with the CEOs. 
 
5.3.2. Empirical evidence on SMEs in the UK 
In relation to the SMEs Roper (1999) for UK data, suggests turnover growth and return on 
assets are only weakly related in the short-term, above average growth rates are therefore no 
guarantor of high profitability. They found that SME performance is shown to depend on 
strategy choice with turnover growth being particularly strategy dependent. This study 
develops a simple structural model relation to the small business performance firms’ market 
position and the characteristics of their owner- managers. 
 
Glancey (1998) investigate the determinants of growth and profitability in small 
manufacturing firms in Tayside region in Scotland using 38 firms for the period of 1988-
1990. The paper examines the impact of key determinants such as size, age, location and 
industry group of small firm performance identified by the previous literature. Findings of this 
paper suggest that entrepreneurs in the larger firms are motivated by financial factors and for 
the smaller firms lifestyle factors are the motivational factor. Firm characteristics are found to 
be of limited in explaining the firm profitability. Glancey (1998) confirm that an older firm 
may have a more rigid organizational structure not in line with the changes in the up to date 
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market conditions can negatively effect the firm performance and found that  size does not 
affect the performance.  
 
To sum up, firms with higher bankruptcy cost (higher risk firms) tend to have less debt in 
their capital structure. The lower the level of debt reduces the overall risk. Firms with higher 
agency costs tend to have more debt capital in their capital structure. From the above 
literature analysis it is understandable that profitability can be improved by reducing the 
agency cost as agency cost plays major role in achieving the optimal capital structure.  
Similarly is it also noticed that owner managed firms are more willing to take risk than 
managerial controlled firms.  
 
The review of empirical studies which have been carried out worldwide confirm the factors 
that determine the profitability. Firm size, leverage, industry type, liquidity, age ownership 
characteristics and sales growth are the popular variables among the researchers. Theses 
studies vary from each other as they have used different periods, countries, industries and firm 
specific factors. 
 
With respect to the previous studies this paper adds new evidence about the effect of capital 
structure on the profitability of SMEs in the UK which are much less common in the 
economics literature. However these studies have also applied the theories which were 
originally developed using the larger firms. Thus there has been substantial amount of 
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empirical studies in relation to the large firms. The relationship between explanatory variables 
and their measurements are based on the above review. 
 
5.4 Model of determinants of profitability 
5.4.1 Empirical Model 
The empirical procedure utilizes the all the available observations from 1998-2008 for all the 
firms described as above.  
 
5.4.1.1 Panel data Procedure 
Panel character of data allows for the use of panel data methodology. The process of 
estimation of equation will be the Panel Two Stage Least squares. Panel data sets possess 
several major advantages over conventional cross-sectional or time-series data sets (e.g., 
Hsiao (1985a, 1995, 2000). Panel data usually give the researcher a larger number of data 
points which increase the degree of freedom and reduce the collinearity among the 
explanatory variables thus improve the efficiency of econometric estimate. This approach is 
more useful than either cross section or time series alone
89
.  
 
The coefficient on the independent intercept (α0) can vary across companies and over time. 
The simplest model is to pool the data in which case there is one fixed intercept. It is unlikely 
that the profitability models are fully specified.  For example there are no available proxies 
for factors like the magnitude of distress costs or industry effects that are important to the 
profitability. Moreover the data is unbalanced, as the number of observations for each 
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 As this study collect data from SMEs the availability of data for the whole period of study is not fulfilled. So it 
is helpful in this analysis to use panel data instead of cross section or time series.  
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company is different. Thus, a simple pooling might not result in either efficient or unbiased 
estimates.  The fixed effect model allows us to use the data, while the intercept is allowed to 
vary across firms and time.  The effects of omitted explanatory variables can be captured in 
the changing company intercept. In addition to that by including a fixed time effect the model 
automatically assess the impact of the macro environment on profitability.  
 
Model estimation using panel data requires first to determine whether there is a correlation 
between the unobservable heterogeneity of each firm and other control variables of the model. 
We would obtain the consistent estimation by means of the within–group estimator, if there is 
a correlation (fixed effects). If not,(random effect) the more efficient estimator can   be 
achieved by estimating the equation through Generalized Least Squares(GLS).  
 
Using the Hausman(1978) test it can be determined whether the effects are fixed or random 
under the null hypothesis
90
 E(ηi/Xit). Here Xit is all other regressors.  
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 If the null hypothesis is rejected the effects are considered to be fixed. The model can be estimated by OLS. 
Accepting null hypothesis would mean to have random effects and the model have to be estimated by GLS. 
More efficient estimator of β we achieve in this way. 
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The basic model can be written as, 
Yit = αi + Σ βk Xk,it +λt +ηi+ ε i,t       (5.1) 
Fixed effect model allows different intercepts for each individual firm and firm specific 
effects are assumed constant over time (αi is firm specific constant term). 
It is assumed here that the slope and intercept coefficients are the same across the firm and 
time (See Baltagi,2001; Gujarati, 2004). So OLS provides consistent and efficient estimates 
of α and βk where the above equation (5.1) be converted into; 
Yit = α + Σ βk Xk,it +λt +ηi+ ε i,t       (5.2) 
α is the overall constant for all firms. 
By performing the F- test we could test the joint significant of dummies. i.e. H0: µ1 = µ2 =… 
=µN-1 =0 by performing an F- test
91
. 
 
We measure the effect of capital structure on profitability. The model for the empirical 
investigation can be stated as follows. 
ROAi,t = α0 + α1 LIQUIDITYRATIOi,t + α2 LOGSIZE i,t + α3 GEARINGRATIO i,t +  
                α4 STDTD i,t + α5SALESGR i,t +λt +ηi +ε i,t    (5.3) 
Where the subscript i denotes the cross section, i= 1,2…n and t  denotes the time t=1,2…n. 
ROAi,t  is return on assets of firm  i in time t, LIQUIDITYRATIO i,t is liquidity of firm i in 
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 See Chapter 4 of Baltagi(2001). 
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time t, LOGSIZE i,t is sales or total assets of firm i in time t, GEARINGRATIO i,t is the 
financial leverage of firm i in time t, STDTD i,t is the short term debt as a ratio of total debt of 
firm i in time t and SALESGR i,t is the sales growth of firm i in time t.  The parameter λt is a 
time dummy variable to pick up aggregate factors which influence profitability, although  
does not allow variation across firms, ηi the unobservable heterogeneity of each firm and εi,t 
measures the random disturbance. Like Krishnan and Moyer (1997) we also use two proxies 
to measure profitability
92
.  
An alternative model for equation 5.3 can be written as follows with the proxy of the 
dependent variable.  
ROCEi,t = α0 + α1 LIQUIDITYRATIOi,t + α2 LOGSIZEi,t + α3 GEARINGRATIOi,t +  
                α4 STDTDi,t + α5SALESGRi,t +λt +ηi +ε i,t    (5.4) 
 Where all variables are defined as above excluding the dependent variable, ROCEi,t. ROCEi,t 
is the return on capital employed of firm i in time t. 
 
5.5 Theoretical predictions 
The following predictions have summarized based on the trade off theory, pecking order 
theory, agency theory and the previous empirical studies to capture the impact of other 
variables on profitability.  
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 See appendix 5A for detailed variable definition and descriptive statistics are included in Table 4.2. ROA 
shows how well the management is employing the company’s total assets to make a profit and ROCE provide 
more comprehensive evaluation of how well management is using the debt and equity it has at its disposal.  
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5.5.1 Profitability. 
The pecking order theory of Myers (1984) Myers and Majluf(1984), and Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers(1999) suggest firms prefer to finance investment first from retained earnings, second 
from  debt  and third from equity.  More profitable firms should have lower leverage ratio 
than less profitable firms as they are able to finance their investment opportunities with the 
retained earnings according to the theory. Moreover the theory says that leverage has a 
negative effect on the firm profitability. This idea is strengthen by Gleason et al (2000), Arbor 
(2005) and Arbor (2007) more profitable firms tend to use earnings to pay debt and therefore 
they would have a lower leverage than less profitable firms.  
 
In this study two profitability measures are used in which one indicate the firm management 
use total assets to make profit and other indicates how well management use the debt and 
equity capital to enhance the firm profitability. The profitability is measured using the Return 
On Assets (ROA) (Abor,2007;Arcas and Bachiller, 2008;Goddard et al,2005)  and return on 
capital employed (ROCE)(Krishnan and Moyer,1997).  
 
5.5.2 Leverage 
In the literature the leverage is measured in several methods. Three leverage measures use in 
this study are total debt to total assets, long term debt to total assets or short term debt to total 
assets
93
 and gearing ratio. Since long-term debt is issued more rarely, it may measure a longer 
run relationship and may be more insensitive to unexpected financial crises than is total debt 
(Krishnan and Moyer,1997).  Highly geared firms tend to suffer as the proportion of gross 
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 Both ratios are measured for each year. 
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profits dedicated to servicing debt increases and the proportion accruing to shareholders 
shrinks accordingly (Goddard et al, 2005). They found that the relationship between gearing 
and profitability is negative. 
 
According to the agency cost hypothesis the higher debt or low equity to capital ratio reduces 
the agency cost. There are several measures that can be used as a measure as leverage such as 
debt to total assets is used as the leverage measure and debt to equity can also be used as a 
measure of leverage. In this study leverage is measured by debt to equity ratio.  
 
5.5.3 Size 
Natural logarithm of Assets measure the firm size and inclusion of assets in the model allow 
for the possible relationship between size and profitability of the firm. In addition to that here 
we use log turnover of the firm as a proxy for the size. It has been suggested that firm size 
should be positively related to the profitability of the firm
94
. In addition there are economies 
of scale in transaction costs associated with long term debt that are not available to smaller 
firms. Small firms may be borrowing more because the relative cost of issuing equity is 
higher for them (Titman and Wessels, 1988) which ultimately reduce the profitability.  
Goddard and Wilson (1996) found that size to be an important determinant of profitability in 
manufacturing sector and entry barriers are correlated with firm size.  Alternatively Goddard 
et al (2005) argue that growth tends to lead diseconomies of scale, the relationship between 
size and profitability could be negative.  
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 See Goddard and Wilson(1996),Abor(2007) 
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5.5.4 Liquidity ratio 
Liquidity indicates rate at which the firm is able to react to sudden changes in the 
environment. A firm holding a high proportion of liquid assets is less exposed to sudden 
changes in its financial position. High liquidity reduces the exposure to the risk of being 
unable to meet short term financial commitments. For a sample of Belgian firms Deloof 
(2003) find that effective liquidity management (working capital management) is an important 
driver of corporate profitability. On the other hand, holding a higher level of liquid assets may 
restrain its ability to make use of profitable long term investment opportunities. This implies 
that there is a negative relationship between profitability and liquidity. Deloof (2003) find a 
significant negative relation between gross operating income and the number of days accounts 
receivable, inventories and accounts payable of Belgian firms. For a sample of SMEs in 
Spanish for the period of 1996-2002 Teruel and Solano( 2006) find a significantly negative 
correlation between profitability and liquidity. Goddard et al (2005) find a positive 
relationship between the profitability and the liquidity ratio.  
 
5.5.5 Short term debt 
This variable measures the affect of short term debt to total debt on profitability. Arbor (2005) 
and Arbor (2007) study the effect of capital structure on the corporate profitability and found 
that there is a positive relationship between short term debt ratio and profitability. Increase in 
short term debt tends to be less expensive and therefore this would increase the profit of the 
firm.  
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5.5.6 Long term debt 
This measures the impact of long term debt to total debt (LTD) on profitability. Previous 
studies (Booth et al, 2000; Arbor, 2005; Arbor, 2007) show that there is a negative 
relationship between LTD and profitability. This implies that higher the LTD decreases the 
profitability as LTD is relatively more expansive.  
 
5.5.7 Sales growth 
Sales figures reflect both long term and short term changes of the firm. Sales growth is an 
indicator for the demand for the firm’s goods and services. Increase in sales will allow 
increase of the assets via the profit generated. Arbor(2005) shows that there is a positive 
relationship between profitability and sales growth
95
.  
 
The following Table (5.1) shows the expected sign of the explanatory variables based on the 
literature. 
Table 5.1 
Expected sign of the variables 
Variable Theory/Empirical 
Evidence 
Expected 
sign 
Rational 
LIQUIDITYRATIO Goddard et al (2005) +/- High liquidity reduces 
the exposure to the risk 
of being unable to meet 
short term financial 
commitments. On the 
other hand keeping 
higher level of liquid 
assets restrains the ability 
to make use of profitable 
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long term investment.  
GEARINGRATIO Goddard et al (2005) - Highly geared firms tend 
to suffer as the 
proportion of gross 
profits dedicated to 
servicing debt increases 
and the proportion 
accruing to shareholders 
decrease accordingly. 
SDA Abor (2007), Abor (2005) +/- Increase in STD with a 
relatively low interest 
will lead to 
increase/decrease 
profitability. 
LDA Abor (2007), Abor (2005) - Increase in LTD is 
associated with decrease 
in profitability. 
TDA Abor (2007), Abor (2005) -/+ Increase in TD is 
associated with an 
increase in profitability. 
LOGSIZE Goddard and 
Wilson(1996) 
+ Higher the size greater 
the profitability. 
LOGSALES Goddard and 
Wilson(1996) 
+ Higher the size greater 
the profitability. 
SALES GROWTH Abor (2005) + Growth in sales directly 
related to the growth in 
profitability. 
STDTD Abor (2005) + Higher the short term 
debt higher the 
profitability. 
 
5.6 Data 
Data was obtained from the FAME database. Selecting all firms from all industries reduce the 
problems associated with selecting a sample from specified industries. This study selects all 
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private limited firms in all sectors (except finance sector) SMEs in the UK. Finance sector has 
excluded from the data as their financial characteristics and use of leverage is substantially 
different from other companies. We use data from 1998-2008. Our analysis cover data from 
1999-2008 as data for year 1998 are used to calculate some variables for 1999. We dropped 
companies with zero sales. We remove all outliers in the dataset by excluding observations 
that lie in the 1% tails of each regression variable. Finally the selected sample
96
 consists of 
unbalanced panel of 54183 firms. 
 
5.7 Estimation and Results 
Table 5.2 shows the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for all the variables for total 
sample, sectors and by broad sectoral classification of manufacturing and service. Table 5.2 is 
divided in to two panels A and B. Panel A represent the mean, standard deviation and 
observations for the dependent and independent variables. Panel B represent the correlation 
matrix. Descriptive statistics show that average ROA is 7.3%, while ROCE is 25%. The 
average log sales are 7.6 million and log size is 4.75 million. There are number of important 
points to note when looking at the mean of gearing ratio, that firms are highly levered on 
average. Financial leverage is very high for the SMEs in the UK. The average sales growth is 
0.063 for SMEs in the UK during the period under study.  TDA 79.9% indicates that 
approximately 80% of total assets are financed through debt, of which 47% short term debt 
and 33% long term debt showing the fact that UK SMEs are largely depend on short term 
debt for financing their operations may be due to the difficulty in accessing long term finance 
or young firms are resistant to use external finance and rely on internally generated funds. 
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However as can be seen from the Panel A of Table 5.2, the standard deviation is very much 
higher for almost all the variables.   
 
There does not appear to be high correlation between any of the explanatory variables except 
the proxies of profitability and size
97
.  As expected the variables that alternatively represent 
the firm size and profitability shows a high and positive correlation. The correlation 
coefficient between LOGSIZE and LOGSALES is 0.79, while that between ROA and ROCE 
is 0.81. 
 
With regard to the sector statistics sector 7 that is business and service sector shows the 
highest standard deviation for most of the variables such as ROA, ROCE, LOGSALES, 
GEARINGRATIO, TDA and LDA. All sectors shows minus mean growth for sales. Mean 
ROA is negative for sector 1 (Agriculture, forestry and mining), sector 6 (Transport and 
communication), and sector7 (Business and service) indicating that the companies have bad 
performance (negative assets) in the analysed period. The highest average ROCE reports in 
the construction sector (sector 3) which is 43%.  
 
It can be seen that the average profitability in the manufacturing firms is greater than that of 
the service sector firms. This means that in manufacturing sector risk is higher than in service 
sector. This is consistent with the Goddard et al (2005) for large firms in UK and some other 
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 As can be seen in the correlation matrix STDTD and LDA, LDA TDA, SDA TDA, STDTD SDA, TDA 
GEARINGRATIO and SDA GEARINGRATIO are also highly correlated because they all are alternative 
measures of leverage.  
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EU countries during mid 1990s. On average manufacturing firms use less debt than service 
sector firms do. Statistics shows that service sector firms finance its total assets using 
approximately 95% of debt capital. However the dispersion of data is very high for the service 
sector.  
 
In relation to the standard deviation of the variables it is verified that the all the variables 
show very high standard deviation. Goddard et al (2005) show in their study that the UK 
sample represents firms from different risk levels as well as broad sectoral classification of 
manufacturing and services. This is because the sample represents diverse set of firms
98.
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 Pl see the sample selection under data (5.3.2) and the definition for SME in Chapter 2. The sample has 2055 
firms with 1 employee, 10700 firms with 5 or less employees and 15135 firms with 10 or less employees.  
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Table 5.2: Summary statistics for the dependent and independent variables 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Total Sample Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3 
Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N 
ROA 0.073 24.555 581774 -0.241 14.469 8142 0.103 15.328 90332 0.248 11.065 39079 
ROCE 25.027 114.61 506579 12.103 99.919 7239 16.460 90.537 80778 43.395 117.912 32085 
LOGSALES 7.642 294.444 355842 7.566 2.273 5161 8.578 1.628 64472 7.969 2.143 25120 
LOGSIZE 4.751 3.786 867195 5.267 4.022 12056 6.371 3.636 115258 5.221 3.748 54923 
GEARINGRATIO 265.108 791.403 377624 245.996 794.237 5793 212.946 646.313 74641 218.096 703.157 32264 
LIQUIDITYRATIO 3.183 7.832 505694 3.608 8.945 7019 1.849 4.356 76987 1.536 3.348 33932 
SALESGR 0.063 294.444 287939 0.074 19.920 4238 0.059 27.613 54213 -0.048 849.702 20350 
TDA 0.799 51.693 581774 0.746 12.411 8142 0.565 16.266 90335 0.335 4.489 39079 
SDA 0.467 16.975 581774 0.590 12.376 8142 0.311 4.254 90335 0.262 4.137 39079 
LDA 0.331 48.293 581774 0.156 0.993 8142 0.254 15.687 90335 0.073 0.913 39079 
STDTD 0.716 0.365 400090 0.689 0.366 6068 0.716 0.340 76804 0.777 0.301 30720 
Variable Sector 4 Sector 5 Sector 6 Sector 7 
Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N 
ROA 0.055 15.311 86675 0.013 1.898 13561 -0.038 20.109 25922 -0.017 36.716 171993 
ROCE 21.889 90.657 76361 17.536 91.139 11612 24.106 104.2618 22497 34.685 144.079 146045 
LOGSALES 8.637 1.819 60065 7.395 1.670 9471 8.156 1.910 18976 6.958 2.324 120108 
LOGSIZE 6.055 3.585 111969 5.072 3.993 20526 5.603 3.697 34815 4.208 3.795 275593 
GEARINGRATIO 237.285 691.197 69979 375.118 951.372 9553 265.643 734.182 18966 347.706 953.195 100678 
LIQUIDITYRATIO 1.498 3.891 74582 1.864 5.476 11871 1.979 4.645 22500 3.142 7.759 151634 
SALESGR 0.093 443.853 50093 0.022 8.052 7686 -0.074 65.155 15827 -0.014 58.085 96335 
TDA 0.640 22.969 86675 0.653 5.140 13561 0.638 10.176 25922 1.434 91.442 171990 
SDA 0.527 11.907 86675 0.317 3.370 13561 0.477 9.522 25922 0.686 21.085 171990 
LDA 0.113 1.629 86675 0.335 3.578 13561 0.160 2.476 25922 0.747 88.002 171990 
STDTD 0.770 0.319 72240 0.511 0.419 11087 0.699 0.351 20086 0.730 0.380 116064 
200 
 
Variable Sector 8 Sector 9 Manufacturing Service 
Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N 
ROA 0.070 5.610 59876 0.232 26.019 86194 0.097 14.636 224231 0.057 29.096 357642 
ROCE 11.633 81.238 54799 23.231 119.293 75163 22.808 96.402 196463 26.428 124.776 310210 
LOGSALES 6.717 1.868 11931 6.602 2.283 40538 8.469 1.841 154818 7.006 2.266 201024 
LOGSIZE 4.433 3.206 83336 3.336 3.488 158719 5.991 3.680 294206 4.115 3.681 573089 
GEARINGRATIO 177.418 641.573 26020 274.527 863.731 39730 224.228 679.083 182677 303.429 882.086 194975 
LIQUIDITYRATIO 6.898 12.242 51985 5.001 10.488 75184 1.722 4.302 192520 4.080 9.250 313262 
SALESGR -0.017 7.127 8789 -0.059 14.534 30399 0.0564 436.905 128903 -0.092 50.087 159157 
TDA 0.239 4.648 59876 0.613 21.431 86194 0.561 17.879 224231 0.948 64.393 357642 
SDA 0.125 2.280 59876 0.473 21.338 86194 0.396 14.788 224231 0.512 18.211 357642 
LDA 0.113 4.018 59876 0.139 1.828 86194 0.164 10.017 224231 0.436 61.081 357642 
STDTD 0.578 0.422 24087 0.684 0.396 42934 0.746 0.328 185832 0.689 0.393 214258 
Sector 1=Agriculture forestry and mining, Sector2=Manufacturing, Sector3= Construction, Sector4=Wholesale retail and trade, Sector5=Hotels and Restaurants, 
Sector6=Transport and communication, Sector7=Business and Service, Sector8=Education, health and social work, Sector9= Other 
Panel B: Correlation matrix 
Variable ROA ROCE SALESG
R 
LOGSIZE LOGSALES LIQUIDITY
RATIO 
GEARINGRATI
O 
TDA SDA LDA STDT
D ROA 1  
       
 
 ROCE 0.8101 1 
       
 
 SALESGR 0.0003 0.0003 1 
      
 
 LOGSIZE 0.1669 0.2254 -0.0065 1 
     
 
 LOGSALES 0.0989 0.1150 0.0159 0.7930 1 
    
 
 LIQUIDITYRAT
IO 
-
0.0179 
-0.0232 -0.0034 -0.0357 -0.1803 1 
   
 
 GEARINGRATI
O 
-
0.0386 
-0.0100 0.0006 0.0242 -0.0245 -0.0490 1 
  
 
 TDA -
0.0696 
-0.0438 0.0013 0.1054 -0.0391 -0.1574 0.4773 1 
 
 
 SDA . 439 0.0322 0.0001 0.0192 -0.0037 -0.2037 0.3680 0.7515 1  
 LDA -
0.0442 
-0.1037 0.0017 0.1326 -0.0535 0.0287 0.2361 0.5197 -0.1729 1 
 STDTD . 21 0.1082 -0.0032 -0.1209 0.0203 -0.0632 -0.0556 -0.1833 0.3993 -0.7714 1 
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5.7.1 Panel data estimation 
The panel data estimation uses variants of equations and all the available yearly observations 
from 1998-2008 for all firms as explained in 5.3.2. The estimation is done using 2SLS fixed 
effect. The analysis is based on variants of equations (5.3) and (5.4) incorporating alternative 
proxies to measure profitability
99
 (ROA, ROCE), leverage [TDA (LDA+ SDA), 
GEARINGRATIO] and size (LOGSIZE). As can be seen in the variable definition Appendix 
5A there two alternative measures for profitability, two main alternative measures for 
leverage and two alternative measure for size of the firm. On the top of that we have 9 sectors 
and we have classified the sectors in two as manufacturing and service. Thus there are 14 
different variations of equation (5.1) and 14 different variations of equation (5.2). The result 
of the panel estimation is given in Table 5.3. The results are organized in four different 
panels. Panel A represent all the Total sample estimations for ROA, Panel B represent all the 
Total sample estimations for ROCE, Panel C and Panel D shows all 9 Sector estimations and 
the other sector classification, manufacturing and service for alternative measures of 
profitability and leverage.
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 This is extremely important as we can separate the fundamental earning power of the company from the 
effects of management financing decision. For instance,  firms with identical EBIT may have different net 
income depends on the different level of debt finance they employ in the capital structure.   
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Table 5.3: Panel regression for the period 1998-2008 
Panel A: Total Sample; Dependent is ROA 
*,**,*** indicates statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. As far as the diagnostic tests are 
concerned we find no evidence of heteroskedasticity according to White test. Test for second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial 
correlation.  
Variables Coefficient  Prob. Coefficient  Prob. Coefficient  Prob. 
C -0.5976 0.0000*** -0.6466 0.0000*** -0.7285 0.0000*** 
LIQUIDITYRATIO -0.0157 0.0000*** -0.0116 0.0000*** -0.0166 0.0061** 
LOGSIZE 0.0572 0.0000*** 0.0605 0.0000*** 0.0612 0.0000*** 
GEARINGRATIO -0.0184 0.0000***     
TDA   -0.0642 0.0000***   
SDA     0.0641 0.0085** 
LDA     -0.0509 0.0496** 
SALESGR 0.0076 0.9185 0.0080 0.1177 0.0073 0.3195 
STDTD 0.0039 0.0148** 0.0043 0.0221** 0.0035 0.0471** 
Adjusted R 2 0.846 0.847 0.752 
Observations 170232 178232 181157 
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Panel B: Total Sample; Dependent is ROCE 
Variables Coefficient  Prob. Coefficient  Prob. Coefficient Prob. 
C -21.1456 0.0000*** -2.4499 0.6043 -8.0097 0.0098** 
LIQUIDITYRATIO 
 
-0.1539 0.0001*** -0.2177 0.0348** -0.1189 0.0010** 
LOGSIZE 5.3080 0.0000*** 1.4102 0.0143** 8.0897 0.0008** 
GEARINGRATIO -0.0573 0.0000***     
TDA   -0.0313 0.0093**   
LDA     -0.0592 0.0003*** 
SDA     0.0471 0.0089** 
SALESGR 0.0016 0.8989 0.0002 0.7485 0.0021 0.6720 
STDTD 11.0195 0.0000*** 22.9783 0.0000*** 18.4370 0.0000*** 
Adjusted R 2 0.498 0.265  0.429 
Observations 167446 205005  204639 
*,**,*** indicates statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. As far as the diagnostic tests are 
concerned we find no evidence of heteroskedasticity according to White test. Test for second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial 
correlation 
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Sector 1=Agriculture forestry and mining, Sector2=Manufacturing, Sector3= Construction, Sector4=Wholesale retail and trade, Sector5=Hotels and Restaurants, Sector6=Transport and 
communication, Sector7=Business and Service, Sector8=Education, health and social work, Sector9= Other. *,**,*** indicates statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. As far as 
the diagnostic test are concerned we find no evidence of heteroskedasticity according to White test. Test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically 
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation 
 Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3 Sector 4 Sector 5 Sector 6 
Variables Coefficient  Prob. Coefficient  Prob. Coefficient  Prob. Coefficient  Prob. Coefficient  Prob. Coefficient  Prob. 
C -181.8214 0.0000*** -72.6017 0.0000*** 23.8582 0.1956 -0.0765 0.0005*** 28.5479 0.2571 49.0573 0.0041** 
LIQUIDITYRATIO 0.2486 0.6416 0.0105 0.9441 -0.7701 0.2248 0.0013 0.0061** 0.1316 0.6665 -0.1192 0.7718 
LOGSIZE 21.4768 0.0000*** 10.1820 0.0000*** 1.2013 0.5958 0.0020 0.0000*** 1.6742 0.5758 3.6678 0.0665* 
GEARINGRATIO -0.0072 0.0003*** -0.0100 0.0000*** -0.0126 0.0000*** -2.17E-05 0.0000*** -0.0010 0.3893 -0.0049 0.0006*** 
SALESGR 0.1251 0.4885 0.0230 0.2625 0.0001 0.7906 0.0005 0.0010*** 0.1221 0.7489 -0.0059 0.5225 
STDTD --20.0951 0.0042** -4.4887 0.0099** -18.2190 0.0000*** 0.0009 0.0016** -5.2659 0.1762 9.0926 0.0180** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.441 0.343 0.552 0.531 0.527 0.407 
observations 2521 36141 13660 33546 4577 9561 
F Statistics 17.56*** 13.23*** 15.11*** 15.65*** 16.18*** 15.10*** 
 Sector 7 Sector 8 Sector 9 Manufacturing Service 
Variables Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. 
C -27.1859 0.0014** 71.5956 0.0095** -30.9878 0.0000*** 0.0523 0.0661* 0.0533 0.2259 
LIQUIDITYRATIO -0.1917 0.1717 -0.1691 0.6140 -0.4140 0.1203 0.0013 0.0133** -0.0015 0.0332**  
LOGSIZE 6.9345 0.0000*** 6.8868 0.0523* 7.8359 0.0002*** 0.0070 0.0344** 0.0131 0.0156** 
GEARINGRATIO -0.0015 0.0355** -0.0051 0.0080** -0.0040 0.0036** -2.72-05 0.0000*** -3.05E-05 0.0000*** 
SALESGR 0.0578 0.0000*** -0.9885 0.2990 0.1029 0.1941 9.84-07 0.6175 0.0002 0.0000*** 
STDTD 16.2563 0.0000*** 19.6104 0.0020** 12.5026 0.0020** -0.00095 0.8703 0.0057 0.6126 
Adjusted R-squared 0.529 0.476 0.507 0.9586 0.445 
observations 50021 4375 13344 86312 83953 
F Statistics 14.92*** 16.23*** 14.88*** 15.19*** 16.06*** 
Panel C: Estimations for sectors. Dependent variable is ROA 
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Panel D: Estimations for sectors. Dependent variable is ROCE 
 
Sector 1=Agriculture forestry and mining, Sector2=Manufacturing, Sector3= Construction, Sector4=Wholesale retail and trade, Sector5=Hotels and Restaurants, Sector6=Transport and 
communication, Sector7=Business and Service, Sector8=Education, health and social work, Sector9= Other. *,**,*** indicates statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. As far as 
the diagnostic test are concerned we find no evidence of heteroskedasticity according to White test. Test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically 
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 
Variables Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3 Sector 4 Sector 5 Sector 6 
Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. 
C -163.1484 0.0000*** -74.4447 0.0000*** 53.1800 0.0016*** -22.7189 0.0153* 55.5192 0.0248* 49.0573 0.0041** 
LIQUIDITYRATIO 0.0922 0.0677* 0.3281 0.0093** -1.8385 0.0000*** 0.1088 0.5732 0.0419 0.8667 -0.1192 0.7718 
LOGSIZE 22.2320 0.0000*** 12.1102 0.0000*** 0.7687 0.7223 4.9401 0.0000*** 4.2406 0.1590 3.6677 0.0665* 
GEARINGRATIO -0.0089 0.0143** -0.0060 0.0000*** -0.0081 0.0000*** -0.0095 0.0000*** -0.003 0.7693 -0.0049 0.0006*** 
SALESGR 0.0507 0.7712 0.0081 0.9378 0.0002 0.7489 0.0005 0.4231 0.2259 0.4303 -0.0058 0.5225 
STDTD -39.7903 0.0002*** -43.0535 0.0000*** -40.9743 0.0000*** 6.3709 0.0016** -5.0419 0.4462 9.0925 0.0180** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.478 0.357 0.553 0.417 0.526 0.407 
observations 2764 38125 14615 33279 4577 9561 
F Statistics 15.28*** 13.88*** 16.81*** 14.55*** 15.98*** 14.20*** 
Variables Sector 7 Sector 8 Sector 9 Manufacturing Service 
Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. 
C -25.7639 0.0002*** 58.0832 0.0087** -27.1682 0.0849* -35.904 0.0000*** -12.917 0.0476** 
LIQUIDITYRATIO -0.1917 0.1717 -0.1397 0.5496 -0.8467 0.1890 0.0125 0.9159 -0.2216 0.0376** 
LOGSIZE 6.9345 0.0000*** 7.9326 0.0610* 8.1956 0.0001*** 6.5356 0.0000*** 4.8799 0.0000*** 
GEARINGRATIO -0.0015 0.0355** -0.0078 0.0059** -0.0068 0.0089** -0.0099 0.0000*** -0.0024 0.0000*** 
SALESGR -0.0578 0.0000*** -0.7320 0.9674 0.1890 0.2980 8.38E-05 0.8438 0.0312 0.0001*** 
STDTD 16.2563 0.0000*** 11.4931 0.0038** 9.8905 0.0043** -7.6862 0.0000*** 14.3604 0.0000*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.548 0.525 0.573 0.444 .518 
observations 49912 4467 12872 85601 81878 
F Statistics 15.42*** 14.37*** 14.66*** 14.90*** 15.26*** 
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In panel A and B of Table 5.3 the estimated coefficient on ROA and ROCE are highly 
significant in all cases.   
 
The variable firm size measured by LOGSIZE is always highly significant with positively 
signed estimated coefficients in all the estimations.  Firm profitability is positively associated 
with firm size, so that large size seems to favor the generation of profitability. This is same for 
the both measures of size.  Increase in profitability with the size of the firm support the earlier 
findings by Miller(1977), Fama and French(1998), Deloof (2003), Abor(2005), Teruel and 
Solano( 2006) and  Abor(2007).  
 
The estimated coefficient for the leverage ratio is negative and highly significant. The two 
alternative variables GEARINGRATIO and TDA are significant at 1% and 5% level in all 
estimations. The negative sign is consistent with the literature
100.
  Firms that become highly 
geared may tend to suffer, as the proportion of gross profits dedicated to servicing debt 
increasing and proportion allocated to the shareholders shrinks accordingly. Benito and 
Vlieghe (2000) found that one third of firms classified as highly geared recorded relatively 
low profitability for UK firms for the period of 1974-1998. 
 
Liquidity ratio is negative for all the estimations of ROA and ROCE. Further it is significant 
at 1% or 5% level for ROA and ROCE. There is evidence that lack of liquidity has been an 
                                                             
 
100
 See Abor(2007) Goddard et al(2005)and Abor(2005). 
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important cause of business failure. Higher the liquidity lower the profitability confirms the 
negative correlation between net profit to assets and earnings before interest and tax to capital 
employed. A survey conducted by the society of practitioners of insolvency (1999) reveals 
that lack of working capital and non-paying debtors are increasingly cited by companies as 
the primary reason for failure. 
 
Sales growth shows positive relationship with the profitability. It is not significant in any of  
the estimations except for some sectors. Sales growth which could be an indication of a firm’s 
business opportunities is an important factor allowing firms to enjoy improved profitability. 
Here the sign of sales growth is positive in all of the estimations for total sample for both 
estimations of ROA and ROCE. This is consistent with the previous findings of 
Deloof(2003), Abor(2005), Teruel and Solano( 2006) and Abor(2007). 
 
The variable which measures the impact of short term debt on profitability is highly 
significant in all the estimations and it is negatively correlated with the profitability. These 
findings are not consistent with the Fama and French (1998) and Abor (2007).  
 
Panel C and D show the estimated results for different sector classifications on the 
profitability measure of ROA and ROCE. Panel C shows the estimation results for the 
estimated coefficient on the profitability measure of ROA for all 9 sectors and other sector 
classification of manufacturing and service. All the variables are highly significant and all the 
variables show the expected relationship with the dependent variable in sector 4(Wholesale 
208 
 
retail and trade) for one measure of profitability (ROA). None of the variables in sector 
5(Hotel and Restaurants) are significant. In sector 3(Construction) only three variables are 
significant and show the expected relationship with the profitability. All other sectors (except 
sector 3 and 5) show more variables are significantly correlated with the profitability. 
 
LIQUIDITYRATIO
101
  shows positive or negative relationship with profitability and it is 
significant only in sector 4. LOGSIZE is highly significant in sector 1,2,4,7 and 9 and weakly 
significant in sector 6 and 8. This variable shows positive relationship with the profitability as 
predicted. GEARINGRATIO is highly significant and negatively correlated with the 
profitability for all sectors. Only in sector 5 it is insignificant but shows a negative 
correlation. In this estimation SALESGR which measures the sales growth of the firm shows 
the expected relationship as well as it is highly significant in sector  4 (Wholesale Retail and 
Trade) and 7 (Business and Service). STDTD shows positive correlation with profitability in 
all sectors except sector 1,2, 3 and 5 and it is highly significant in sectors except sector 
5(Hotel and Restaurants). 
 
The other classification of sector as Manufacturing and Service shows quite interesting 
results. LIQUIDITYRATIO, LOGSIZE, GEARINGRATIO and SALESGR show the same 
correlation with the profitability as expected in both sectors. Except STDTD all other 
variables are significantly affect the determinant of profitability in service sector. For the 
manufacturing sector LIQUIDITYRATIO, LOGSIZE and GEARINGRATIO are the 
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 The inconsistent coefficient of liquidity is not uncommon in the literature. See Deloof(2003)  
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significant variables that determine the profitability.  Adjusted R-squared which is 0.95 of 
Manufacturing sector shows that this model has a greater ability to predict the relationship 
between profitability and other variables whereas service sector adjusted R squared is 0.44.  
 
Panel D is shown the estimations for the sectors and the estimated coefficient on the firm 
profitability measure is ROCE. As shown in panel C, this estimation also shows that none of 
the variable in sector 5 (Hotels and Restaurants) is not significant. LIQUIDITYRATIO is 
highly significant only in sector 2 and 3 and weakly significant in sector 1. LOGSIZE variable 
is highly significant in sector 1, 2, 4, 7 and 9 and weakly significant in sector 6 and 8. Firm 
size is not a significant factor in determining profitability in sector 3 (Construction) and 5 
(Hotels and Restaurants) in this estimation. Firm size is consistently positively linked to the 
dependent variable. Firm leverage is also negatively correlated with the dependent variable 
and highly significant in all sectors apart from sector 5(Hotels and Restaurants). SALESGR 
shows positive correlation with ROCE as expected. SALESGR is positively correlated and 
highly significant in sector 7 (Business and Service) whereas all other sectors show 
insignificant relationship. STDTD is highly significant and shows positive as well as negative 
relationship with the ROA and ROCE for some sectors.  
 
All the variables in service sector are highly significant and all variables show the expected 
relationship with the dependent variable. Manufacturing sector shows a positive SALESGR 
but not significant. As can be seen in the estimation LIQUIDITYRATIO shows negative 
correlation in Service sector and positive correlation in Manufacturing sector. Higher the 
liquidity lowers the profitability in Service sector which implies that the most profitable 
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investment for company is normally in its fixed assets, the least profitable investment is cash. 
The positive relationship with profitability in Manufacturing sector shows that the past 
performance of the company enhance the profitability.  LOGSIZE is highly significant in both 
sectors and positively correlated with profitability. GEARINGRATIO is negatively related 
and highly significant in both sectors.  
 
The panel procedure produces stronger evidence in support of the concept that firm size is an 
important determinant of profitability. Even in the sector estimations show that size plays an 
extraordinary role in determining profitability. In all the estimations LOGSIZE show a 
positive association with the profitability.  
 
LIQUIDITYRATIO does not show a consistent relationship with profitability especially in 
the different sectors. This could be interpreted as the LIQUIDITYRATIO shows the past 
performance of the firm and it effect the profitability positively in one industry and negatively 
in other industry.  
 
 GEARINGRATION is always negative and consistent with the previous
102
 research studies. 
The firms that become highly geared may tend to endure as the proportion of gross profit 
dedicated for servicing debt increases. The coefficient of return on assets (ROA) and return on 
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Most papers conclude this, for instance, the studies of Ozkan(2001) and Hall et al(2004), for British 
enterprises and the study of De Migual and Pindado (2001) for Spanish companies.  Godadard et al(2005) 
investigate the determinants of profitability for manufacturing and service sector firms Belgian, France, Italy and 
UK and in their study they found the same relationship with profitability and gearing ratio.  
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capital employed (ROCE) confirm the inverse relationship between profitability and leverage, 
a more profitable company will have less leverage which is supported the pecking order 
hypothesis, which suggest that firms prefer to use internal equity to external funds. Arcas and 
Bachiller (2008) found that British firms have less leverage and the reason they explain for 
that is the British capital market are very developed and these firms will prefer to issue stocks 
in order to obtain financing.  
 
The variable measuring the growth of the firm, SALESGR is positively related to the 
dependent variable in almost all the models. In very few sectors it is negaitively related and 
shows significant relationship with profitability. Furthermore, the sales growth which could 
be an indicator of a firm’s business opportunities is an important factor allowing firms to 
enjoy improved profitability. As we can see in the positive sign for the variable SALESGR 
this is consistent with the improvement of sales in period of higher economic growth. 
 
The variable which measures the short term debt to total debt shows positive as well as 
negative correlation with profitability. For some industries the positive relationship with 
profitability suggest that short term debt tends to be less expensive and therefore increasing 
short term debt with a relatively low interest rate will lead to an increase in profitability. This 
implies that for some industries long term debt is costly than short term debt. On the other 
hand some industries have a negative correlation among short term debt to total assets and 
profitability. This is an indication of the fact that short term debt are more expensive and 
employing more of them lead to low profitability. Long term debts are less expensive for 
those firms. Overall SMEs in the UK find short term debt is more profitable than long term 
212 
 
debt. Summary results for the empirical analysis which is discussed above shown in Appendix 
5C.  
 
5.8 Conclusion 
This study has examined the relationship between capital structure and the profitability of 
non-financial SMEs in the UK for the period of 1998-2008. As illustrated in the previous 
section the factors influencing profitability in other countries have similar influence on the 
non-financial SMEs in the UK for the period of 1998-2008 and the results seem to support the 
predictions. 
 
The results show a significant relationship with capital structure and profitability which is 
negatively related. The size of the firm appears more important factor that determines the 
profitability in SMEs in the UK.  There is consistent evidence for positive size- profitability 
relationship.  
 
The estimation results indicate a negative correlation with the profitability and gearing ratio 
for both measures of profitability. The same relationship is shown for the other measure of 
leverage (TDA) and profitability for all estimations and the results also statistically 
significant. This is an indication that SMEs in the UK turn into more highly geared may tend 
to experience less profit proportion for owners which is not consistent with the theory that 
says higher the risk greater the return. But this is consistent with the agency theory because 
higher the leverage greater the agency cost of outside debt. However in terms of Long -term 
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debt and total assets (LDA) the results shows statistically significant negative relationship 
with profitability while short -term debt to total assets (SDA) shows a positive relationship 
with profitability. This implies that profitable firms use more short term debt to finance their 
operations. So that short term debt plays an extraordinary role in financing operations of 
SMEs in the UK. This could be the reason that use of expensive debt create agency problems 
and which could result in negative relationship with profitability. This is confirmed (Arbor 
2007) and Gleason et al (2000). 
 
Liquidity refers to a firm’s ability to meet its short-term financial obligations. The estimation 
results show negative relationship with profitability
103
 for total sample and negative as well as 
positive relationship with profitability for sector classification. The negative relationship 
between profitability and liquidity ratio which could be an implication of the past 
performance where less profitable firms granting incentives their customers or may be the 
negative sales growth declines profit and increase the stock levels. It is possible for a firm to 
go bankrupt if it has lot of cash but no profit and vice versa. As available cash will have to be 
used to finance the losses and assets of the company will have to shrink because there will be 
insufficient funds to replace them. This can be caused by declining sales leading to lower 
profits and higher the level of inventory. Further, the negative relationship could be 
consequence of firms with less risk, and hence lower profits. This implies the inefficiency of 
the management as well.   
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 This is consistent with Terual and Solano (2007). 
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For the difference sectors liquidity ratio gets negative correlation as well as positive. Statistic 
output points out that profitability is impacted to a high extent by solvency and liquidity. This 
does imply that the Education, health and social work sector all estimations are negatively 
correlated with profitability while the other industries like Agriculture forestry and mining, 
Manufacturing, Wholesale retail and trade, and Hotels and Restaurants seem to be positively 
correlated. This conclusion is quite interesting that a good liquidity indicator impacts in a 
positive way on profitability and this creates opportunities in order to bring liquidity into the 
company. This is evident in the estimation results that most of the sectors in service industry 
show a negative sales growth which would lead to a negative liquidity. The negative relation 
between liquidity and profitability is consistent with the view that less profitable firms wait 
longer to pay their bills.  
 
The analysis suggests that there is a weak link between the sales growth and return on assets 
and return on capital employed of small firms.  This is evident in both the lack of any 
significant relation between the performance equation for sales growth and ROA and ROCE. 
Sales growth is positively related with profitability in most sectors and positively correlated in 
all estimations for the total sample. But this is not an important factor as we find an 
insignificant relation for the profitability of SMEs in the UK. The implication is the short term 
increase in growth will have no profitability effect and vice versa. Roper (1999) found the 
same that number of firm characteristic had the opposite marginal effect on profitability.  
 
The results of this study have shown that the capital structure of the firm has a significant 
influence on the profitability of SMEs in the UK. Especially long term debt to total assets 
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ratio negatively related with the profitability and this is an indication that SMEs are averse to 
use more equity because of the fear of losing the control and therefore employ more debt than 
in the capital structure that would be appropriate. To avoid agency issues and the problems 
face in acquiring equity SMEs increase the usage of debt. The interesting results shown in the 
different sector classification the variable STDTD shows two different relationships with 
profitability. Manufacturing sector STDTD shows a negative relationship and service sector 
shows a positive relationship with profitability. This would be an implication that short term 
debt is profitable for service sector but not for the manufacturing sector. The reason behind 
this may be that short term debt is expensive for manufacturing sector as the lenders set 
higher credit terms.    
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
6.1 Introduction 
We have undertaken a set of studies in this thesis focusing on firm specific and 
macroeconomic variables on capital structure, cost of debt and profitability of SMEs in the 
UK. The aim of this concluding chapter is to summarise the main findings of the study, to 
suggest some possible research ideas for the future research and state the limitations of the 
study. The first job is to briefly repeat the aim and the approach of each chapter, considering 
the main results and the conclusions made in each chapter. 
 
6.2 Main Findings 
The introduction to the study is given in Chapter 1. In chapter 2 we begin with the 
introduction and definition and description of various definitions of SME in different 
countries and theoretical aspects of capital structure. It has been recognized that because of 
the very nature of the SME, SMEs they are faced by many problems which are less relevant 
for larger enterprises. The ability to obtain external finance is one of the most significant 
difficulties pertaining to SME which is indispensable for their development and expansion. In 
recognition of the importance of SME in the economy and the financing of SME Bank of 
England has taken into consideration and initiated wide range of endeavors with the aim to 
ease the seriousness of the issues SMEs experience.  The theories of capital structure include 
the Trade off theory, Pecking order theory and Agency theory. Theoretical aspects of SMEs, 
Definitions of SME, The difference between SME and Large Business Finance. 
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Following chapter 2, the remaining 3 chapters are empirical in nature. In chapter 3 a dynamic 
model is applied to data extracted from FAME database, by way of panel GMM 
methodology. The data covers 11 years from 1998-2008 and the sample includes 4000 non-
financial SMEs in the UK representing 9 sectors. This chapter investigates capital structure 
determinants and speed of adjustment of SMEs in the UK. Both firm specific and 
macroeconomic variables are used in modeling. We use dynamic panel data analysis and 
GMM estimation procedure which allows us to control the firm specific fixed effect where 
unobservable but is important in determining the capital structure.  
 
We merge two different sets of literature and try to find how firm specific factors, 
macroeconomic variables and speed of adjustment affect the determinants of capital structure 
of SMEs in the UK. We find that there is a positive relationship between lag of total debt ratio 
and debt ratio and it is highly significant and found to be a major determinant of capital 
structure. This suggests that SMEs in the UK have a target debt ratio and they move towards 
the target relatively fast. The speed of adjustment is positive and above the average suggests 
that leverage adjustment in the SMEs in UK occurs quickly. Further size, profitability and 
FGO have a significant relationship with all measures of capital structure and the results show 
that all theories of capital structure are similar to the SMEs in the UK. These are factors that 
outsiders would like to know specially for SMEs to determine whether a firm appears to be 
financially strong or weak. 
 
Firstly, size provides strong evidence that the positive impact on debt which probably show 
the control considerations. Particularly, for family owned firms, increasing size through debt 
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financing is an important factor for controlling purpose. FGO shows positive impact on debt 
ratio and which is also explains the positive impact of size on leverage. Secondly, profitability 
is negative and provides strong evidence of having negative impact on leverage which is 
consistent with the pecking order theory.  Thirdly, risk shows that agency cost is lower in 
risky firms allowing them to have higher leverage. Fourthly, macroeconomic variables show a 
significant impact on leverage of SMEs and capital structure of SMEs are time dependent. 
Finally, non-debt tax shield and net debtors are weakly related to the leverage. However, it is 
noted that this could be due to the improper selection of proxies. To sum up, this study 
supports the concept of pecking order theory, trade off theory and agency theory and firms 
have long term target debt ratio and they adjust to the target ratio relatively fast and also 
macroeconomic variables have an important role in determining capital structure of SMEs in 
the UK. The major contribution of this study to the existing literature is that adjustment speed 
of SMEs in the UK is almost similar to that of large firms (see Ozkan, 2001) in the UK and 
the model accommodates enable us to identify the determinants of optimal capital structure 
rather than the observed capital structure, the latter being taken in to consideration by the 
large number of empirical studies. 
 
The last two empirical chapters (Chapter 4 and 5) investigate the determinants of cost of debt 
and determinants of profitability of SMEs in the UK using the total population which satisfy 
the EU definition for SME. Chapter 4 studies the factors determining cost of debt capital of 
non-financial SMEs in the UK. 2SLS regression model applied to estimation of the equation 
for the data gathered from FAME data base for all active firms for the period 1998-2008. In 
the first part of this chapter we mainly focus on the theoretical aspect and we discuss theories 
relating to the cost of debt capital such as agency cost, asymmetric information and trade off 
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theory. In the empirical section we review some recent empirical studies. These studies 
suggest that cost of debt determinants of a number of countries are quite similar and although 
there might be institutional differences among countries.  
 
Further this review explains why the cost of debt for a small business is higher than for other 
firms. Confirming this idea it is found that the firm size is an important variable in 
determining the cost of debt of SMEs in the UK. This is consistent with the pecking order 
theory, trade off theory and control considerations where cost of debt tends to decrease with 
the size of the firm. In order to measure how the size of the firm affects the cost of debt 
capital, the sample has been divided in to 3 sub samples as micro, small and medium firms. It 
is suggested that micro firms cost of capital is higher than other firms and this further implied 
that asymmetric information and moral hazard which therefore leads to charging a higher 
interest rate. In addition to that size reflect the reputation of financing choices as smaller the 
firm lesser the information it produces for the public.  
 
It has appeared that SMEs use more short term finance rather than long term external finance. 
For the purpose of confirming this, we have interacted short term debt dummy with other 
variables to determine whether the short term debt plays an important role in SME financing. 
Indeed, it is cleared that SMEs prefer short term finance due to so many reasons such as no 
access to long term finance, higher cost compared to large firms, and do not want to share the 
ownership.  In general, the result of this study suggest that size, collateral assets, profit and 
gearing are important determinants of SMEs short term debt cost.  
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Chapter 5 is the final empirical chapter and it is used the same data set and same method of 
equation estimation as chapter 4.  This chapter focused the attention on the factors influencing 
the profitability of non- financial SMEs in the UK. Review of literature shows that capital 
structure is affected the profitability. In this study we use 2 measures of profitability. The total 
sample is divided into broad sectoral classification of manufacturing and service as well as all 
different sectors in order to find if there are any differences in various sectors in factors that 
determine the profitability.  
 
Descriptive statistics shows that average profitability in the manufacturing sector is higher 
than in the service sector. As in the previous chapters, in this chapter also it is discovered that 
size of the firm is strong factors that influence the profitability as well.   It is found that highly 
geared firms’ profitability is low which is inconsistent with the theory. In determining 
profitability also it is proved that short term debt is important. This again confirms the agency 
problem and resistant to change the ownership of SMEs. Negative relationship with liquidity 
and sales growth show that past performance of the firm granting incentives to the customers.  
More importantly it is found that capital structure of the firm has a significant influence on the 
profitability of SMEs in the UK. The interesting result shown in this study is that short term 
debt ratio shows negative relationship with the manufacturing sector and positive relationship 
with the service sector, implying that short term debt is more profitable for the service sector 
and short term debt is more expensive for manufacturing sector.  
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6.3 Policy Implications and Future Research 
This section consists of two sub sections. Section 6.3.1 explains the policy implications and 
section 6.3.2 explains the future research. 
 
6.3.1 Policy Implications 
This study has been mainly focused on the factors that affect the financing decisions, cost of 
debt and profitability. Our finding suggests that firm’s attach a lot importance to internal 
funds. Clearly, the pecking order theory appears to dominate the capital structure, cost of debt 
and profitability of SMEs in the UK.  
 
Therefore it is important for the policy to be directed at improving the information 
availability, especially SMEs, should encourage maintaining proper records. SMEs seem 
reluctant to be transparent and open up involvement of their business to outsiders. Further 
policy makers can promote linkages between large and small firms in order to support and 
ensure the survival of small industry which is the main contributor for the UK economy.  
 
As equity capital provides a base for further borrowing, they maintain a good rapport with the 
business cycle and provide small firms different sources of finance.  Policy makers should pay 
attention on issuing equity capital. For instance, unquoted companies can be encouraged to 
access the public equity capital by reducing the cost associated with listing and support 
financially for the flotation cost. Further it is appropriate to establish financing schemes to 
assist SMEs in specific industries, reducing collateral requirements etc.  
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6.3.2 Future Research 
Overall, our evidence suggests that there appears to be other significant factors that are 
important. One important research idea is that in addition to the firm specific quantitative 
variables it is worth and meaningful to incorporate qualitative factors such as Managerial 
ownership, Management attitudes towards the financial decision making process, etc. The role 
of qualitative factors in the statistical ratings needs to be analyzed in more depth in future 
research. This is applicable to all 3 empirical chapters. 
 
The determinants of capital structure are examined in SMEs over a longer period of time in 
order to elucidate whether capital structure of this sort of companies change along different 
economic cycles, if we are to understand better capital structure policies in these firms. 
 
Another promising research idea, which is relating to all 3 empirical chapters, is to continue 
study in more detail the demand side factors. That is the other internal variables that would 
affect the determinants of capital structure, cost of debt and profitability. In the context of 
SME there could be some other important internal variables that we haven’t considered in 
here. It will be also useful in the future to incorporate into these studies the analysis of the 
supply side factors which are related to the characteristics of the financial markets. 
 
According to the World Bank, Doing Business (2011) reports that global crisis drives massive 
institutional reforms in 2009/2010. Some countries in Europe, Asia and OECD high income 
group face debt disputes and insolvencies and they reformed their insolvency regimes. It 
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would be interesting to study the institutional reforms of different countries across Europe as 
the most of the countries aiming on improving insolvency. Most of the reforms focused on 
reorganization procedure to ensure the viability of firms and would be interesting to study the 
impact of institutional reforms in respect to the capital structure.     
 
Further research is necessary in the area of financing practices of family firms and non- 
family firms as that will contribute to the literature of the behavior different management 
styles of these firms. This would explain the effect of controlling power on the capital 
structure as more family owned firms are managed and controlled by the owners. However, 
our results confirmed that SMEs generally reluctant to share the ownership and use short term 
debt financing. We are able to explain more about the different financing practices of firms in 
these two categories as they may use different management style.  
 
To date there has not been any research study done relating to the capital structure of SMEs in 
Sri Lanka. SME banking concept was introduced in Sri Lanka as private commercial banks 
reluctant to provide finance and the cost of finance has been one of the major constraints for 
their operations and for small firms collateral requirements were very high
104
. Therefore, it 
would be interesting to study the capital structure of SMEs in the context of Sri Lanka and 
identify what are the specific character differences compared to the UK. Further Sri Lanka is 
a country which has a different macroeconomic, political and social background from 
developed economy. Hence, this would contribute to the body of knowledge, how can the 
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 Financial Sector reforms Sri Lanka 2010. 
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leverage theories which were initially developed based on Western economic orientation 
apply to an emerging market and understand the financing behavior.  
 
6.4 Limitations 
First, as this study is based on SMEs and there is no hard and fast rule
105
, some of the firms 
might have adopted different accounting practices which lead to generate different accounting 
variables.  For instance inventory costing methods such as LIFO and FIFO, different method 
of depreciation of assets etc. There is no unique method of the variables measured. Titman 
and Wessels (1988) specify that measurement problems in accounting variables would affect 
the coefficients.  
 
Second, paucity of data available and its limitations have allowed only a small period for 
study. It is hoped that in the future more complete data will be available which will cover 
larger period of time and be more detailed.  
 
Finally, in this study we have focused on single measure of leverage for the purpose of the 
study. But it would be much more interesting to study the determinants of various 
components of leverage as specially SMEs we found that highly depend on short term debt. It 
is very important to understand which source of external finance SMEs mostly use. This 
could be examined in future research in detail as it shows a more focused and clear-cut idea 
                                                             
 
105
 International Financial Reporting Standards for SMEs issued by the International Accounting Standard Board 
are not compulsory to adopt these standards.  
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about the external financing source of SME. Unavailability of classified data for different 
sources of leverage restricts us studying this in more detail. This is one of the limitation of 
this study as well as we have not distinguish between various components of leverage due to 
the date limitation.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 3A– Theoretical explanation for the methodology 
Panel data 
While it is possible to use ordinary multiple regression techniques on panel data, they may not 
be optimal. The estimates of coefficients derived from regression may be subject to omitted 
variable bias - a problem that arises when there is some unknown variable or variables that 
cannot be controlled for that affect the dependent variable. With panel data, it is possible to 
control for some types of omitted variables even without observing them, by observing 
changes in the dependent variable over time. This controls for omitted variables that differ 
between cases but are constant over time. It is also possible to use panel data to control for 
omitted variables that vary over time but are constant between cases. To illustrate it, we have 
a linear regression model for panel data. To define the model to be estimated, assume we have 
observations on i=N individuals for each of t = 1,…..,T years. The dependent variable is 
denoted by yit and the independent variables by Xit. The basic panel regression model is  
yit = Xitβ + α +εit         (A3.1) 
Where α is the overall intercept and εit is an error term. In this equation, the estimation of the 
slope coefficient β are average effects of regressors on the dependent variable. However three 
issues arise here: 
1.firm effects: individual firms may differ in their capital depreciation rates, the rate of return, 
technology, production power, and even in the construction of the accounting measures. The 
disturbance in the equation may contain a variety of errors of specification.  
2. time effect: these differences among individual firms are changing over time.  
3. measurement error: the variables in X matrix may be correlated with the error term.  
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In order to take account of the permanent differences at the firm levels, that may be correlated 
with output levels across time in 1 and the correlation of regressors with error term, we need 
to further look at the ‘fixed effect’ model.   
Fixed Effects Regression 
The solution to above three problems is to include firm-specific and time-specific effects in 
the equation. The usual linear regression model in above A3.1 then becomes: 
yit = Xit β + αi + αt +εit        (A3.2) 
where αi unobserved firm effect , a nuisance parameter which need to be removed from the 
model, and αt is a time dummy. 
The model assumes that there are common slopes, but the each firm has its own intercept: αi 
which may or may not be correlated with the X. 
In order to remove unobservable firm effects, we differentiate A3.2 above. Then we obtain 
∆yit = β( Xit -  Xit-1) + (αt - αt-1) + (εit - εit)     (A3.3) 
This indicates that the estimates of β is inconsistent with because of the correlation between X 
and ε, including the last two terms in A3.3. Then we cannot estimate this equation by ordinary 
least square. A general method of obtaining consistent estimates of the parameters in the 
models is the instrumental variable method. Broadly speaking, an instrumental variable is a 
variable that is uncorrelated with the error term but correlated with the explanatory variables 
in the equations. In order to get a consistent estimator for 3, it will be appropriate to 
instrument it by means of lagged values of the predetermined variables in order to control for 
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both contemporaneous simultaneity between X and yit and measurement error in the right 
hand side variables.  
GMM Estimator   
The GMM for dynamic panel data estimation come from the fact that the object of interest is a 
function of moment.  For the purpose of uncomplicated illustration we will consider a simple 
linear equation.  
Y= X β + ε           (A3.4) 
Suppose that there is no relationship between independent variable and disturbance and the 
equation is correctly specified. Then the moment condition will be  
E (Xʹ ε) = 0         (A3.5) 
Then the population moment we expect is  
E [Xʹ(y-X β)] = 0        (A3.6) 
Assuming that sample moments of conditions are zero, then we have 
 [Xʹ(y-Xβ  )] = 0        (A3.7) 
Rewriting the above equation, we get method of moment (MoM) estimation 
β  MoM = (Xʹ X)-1 Xʹ y = β  OL        (A3.8) 
As we can see above MoM estimator is same as the OLS estimator. Then in (A3.4) we have  
E (Xʹ ε) ≠ 0         (A3.9) 
229 
 
 Then equation (A3.8) will be biased and to avoid this problem, we have to find instrumental 
variable Z with correlation with X, the instrument should have a strong correlation with the 
regression of the model this is called the relevance requirement and uncorrelated with ε, the 
data should satisfy the orthogonality condition which is called the exogeneity requirement. 
Then the new MoM in (A3.8) becomes 
E(Z ε) =0         (A3.10) 
Which shows that the instruments are not correlated with the error terms.  
Similarly we can get (A3.7) 
  [Zʹ(y-Xβ  )] = 0        (A3.11) 
on the other hand, the number of moment restrictions may be greater than the number of 
parameters when solving β, we may encounter an over identification problem. To solve this 
problem one of possibilities is to weigh equally deviations from each condition and minimize 
the sum of squared deviations.  
minβ {  [Zʹ(y-Xβ  )] Wn [Zʹ(y-Xβ  )]       (A3.12) 
Where X is (n×L), Z is (n×k), Wn = { 2 (ZʹΩZ)-1 is an (L×L) weighting matrix, with L>k 
and Ω is the residual106.  
As number of the columns of matrix X is equal to the number of column of matrix Z, then  
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 See J. Johnston (1996) for more details. 
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β  GMM = β  2SLS. From the equation (A3.12), the GMM estimator become 
GMM


= [XʹZ WnZʹX]-1[XʹZWnZʹy]     (A3.13) 
As Johnston (1996) explain that in the presence of heteroskadasitic errors, when Z≠X, the 
GMM estimator will provide more efficient compared to two-stage least squares estimator.  
GMM estimator in the first difference equation 
Arellano and Bond (1988) introduced the following equation (A3.14) for the first difference 
for panel data estimation in the presence of firm effects. 
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   (A3.14) 
Where X* = X  and y*= y  if in the first difference equation and the residuals becomes 
*'*

 vvi  where 
*iv  are first difference residuals. 
This GMM estimator satisfies orthogonality conditions between some functions of the 
parameters and a set of instrumental variables. Due to following reasons GMM estimates are 
preferred in the dynamic panel estimations:   
1. orthogonality - in the presence of correlation of independent variables, in particular in the 
first difference model, with the error in the estimation model. GMM estimator is an 
instrumental variable method to solve this problem using the orthogonality conditions. 
2. presence of heteroskedasticity – GMM estimators allow for heteroskedastic disturbances.  
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3. unbiased estimator- when Cov(X, εt) ≠ 0 in (A3.4), GMM estimator is unbiased while OLS 
overestimate the parameter while the ML underestimate it (Cho, 1995, Arrelano and Bond, 
1994, Hall et al, 1998). 
4. robust estimator – GMM, unlike ML and OLS estimations, does not require the exact 
distribution of the disturbances. 
5. generalization - common OLS estimators (2SLS, ML) in econometrics can be considered as 
special cases of GMM.  
Over identification of instrumental variables and Sargan-test. 
Previous studies concerning dynamic equations for panel data has emphasized the case where 
the model with an arbitrary covariance matrix of the errors is identified. The fundamental 
identification condition in the GMM estimation discussed above is strict exogeneity of some 
of the explanatory variables or the availability of strictly exogenous instrumental variables, 
conditional on the unobservable individual effects. In practice, one is likely to assume serial 
uncorrelation structure of the errors, in which case different identification arrangements 
become available. This allows one to fully use past present and future values of the strictly 
exogenous variables to construct instruments for the lagged dependent variable and other non-
exogenous variable once the permanent effect have been differenced out. In these cases and 
also in the models with moving average errors, lagged values of the dependent variable itself 
become valid instruments in the differenced equations corresponding to later periods. 
Sargan tests test the validity of the instrumental variables when we have more instruments 
than parameters to estimate. For instance, if the number of moment restriction L is greater 
than the number of parameters, k, i.e., L>k, GMM


 is then over identified. In this case 
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minimand is also a test statistic for the validity of these restrictions. Under the null that these 
restrictions are valid, based on (A3.14), sargan-statistic will be 

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  (A3.15) 
This is to test null hypothesis of the validity of the extra instrumental variables, given that a 
subset of the instrumental variables is valid and exactly identifies the coefficients in the 
equation.  
Instrumental variables and MA test 
We can see from (A3.3), t-1 variables cannot be chosen as instrumental variables due to the 
possible correlation with t-1disturbance. 
In the first differenced equation it is appropriate to use t-2, t-3 or earlier instruments to ensure 
the instruments to be orthogonal to the moving average error ∆εt. If the error term in levels is 
serially uncorrelated, ∆εt. follows MA(1) process, i.e. 
 ∆εt. = εt - εt-1         (A3.16) 
Now we can choose t-2 or earlier variables as instrumental variables so that the third term in 
(A3.3) will be orthogonal to the past history of the regressors and the dependent variables. If 
the error term in levels is itself MA(1), then ∆ε, follows MA(2) process i.e., 
∆εt. = εt - εt-1  
=(vt +β1vt-1) – (vt-1 +β1vt-2) 
= (vt – (1- β)vt-1- β1vt-2) 
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Then the t-3 or earlier regressors or/and dependent variables will be used as instrumental 
variables. In practice, a statistical test for the first order serial correlation in disturbances (m1 
test) and a test for the second order correlation in disturbances (m2 test) were used to detect 
appropriate lags of instrumental variables (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
Note: The above discussion is entirely based on J. Johnston (1996) and Green (2003). 
Appendix 3B -Number of Firms stratified by Years 
Year  Number of 
firms 
1998 1710 
1999 1943 
2000 2215 
2001 2527 
2002 2774 
2003 2967 
2004 3109 
2005 3274 
2006 3642 
2007 3930 
2008 3984 
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Appendix 3C- Correlation Matrix 
Variable TDR LDA  SDA Size CA Profit OR FGO NDTS Net Debtors 
TDR 1          
LDA 0.537 1         
SDA 0.416 0.548 1        
Size -0.176 -0.264 0.381 1       
CA -0.438 -0.398 0.324 0.236 1      
Profit 0.027 0.172 0.419 0.093 0.237 1     
OR 0.093 0.381 0.438 0.084 -0.294 0.001 1    
FGO 0.073 0.094 0.226 0.280 0.128 0.265 -0.170 1   
NDTS 0.274 0.298 0.359 -0.087 -0.294 0.294 -0.391 -0.365 1  
Net Debtors -0.229 -0.328 -0.287 0.151 0.154 -0.225 0.093 0.119 -0.436 1 
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Appendix 4A- Variable Definitions 
Dependent variable 
COD   Interest cost /Total debt. 
Independent Variables 
AGE A dummy variable represent the firm age less than or equal 10 =0 and otherwise 1. 
SIZE   Natural log of sales  
(SIZE2)   Natural log of total assets 
PROFIT  Profit before interest and tax/ Total assets 
GEARING  Debt/Equity 
CA   Intangible assets/ Total assets 
LIQUIDITY  Current assets/Current liabilities 
CREDITSCORE QUI score (0, 1 Dummy variable) 
AUDIT DUMMY  A dummy variable represent 1 for firms which has unqualified audit 
report and otherwise 0. 
TAX    Taxation/ Profit Before tax 
SALES GROWTH  Percentage growth in annual sales. 
STDTD   Short term debt over total debt. 
DUMMYSTDTD A dummy variable represent 1 for STDTD=1 otherwise 0. 
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Appendix 4B- Distribution of sample firms by industry 
Two digits SIC code Number Industry description Percentage(%) 
01-14 663 Agriculture Forestry and Mining 1.30 
15-41 6534 Manufacturing 12.82 
45 3027 Construction 5.94 
50-52 7002 Wholesale and Retail Trade 13.73 
55 1493 Hotels and Restaurants 2.93 
60-64 1868 Transport and Communication 3.66 
70-75 15392 Business or Services 30.19 
80-90 7189 Education health and Social work 14.10 
91-99 5784 Other 11.34 
 50987 Total* 100 
* Unclassified 2035(3.99%) 
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Appendix 4C- Correlation Matrix 
Descriptive Stat-Pairwise Sample 
 AGE AGEDUM
MY 
CA COD GEARINGRA
TIO 
STD LOGSALES LOGSIZE PROFIT1 LIQUIDI
TYRATI
O 
QUISCOR
E 
SALESGR 
             
AGE 1 0.7195 0.0316 0.0713 -0.1192 -0.0970 0.2176 0.4767 0.0101 -0.0267 0.2719 0.0017 
AGEDUMMY 0.7195 1 0.0135 0.0873 -0.1390 -0.0490 0.2610 0.4691 0.0420 -0.0459 0.3092 0.0045 
CA 0.0316 0.0135 1 0.0234 0.0079 -0.2718 -0.0176 0.0558 -0.0260 -0.0217 0.0158 -0.0057 
COD 0.0713 0.0873 0.0234 1 -0.0809 0.0492 0.2671 0.2423 0.0398 -0.0619 0.0894 -0.0098 
GEARINGRATIO 0.1192 -0.1390 0.0079 -0.0809 1 -0.0197 -0.0698 -0.0298 -0.0923 -0.0871 -0.1921 0.0009 
STD -0.0970 -0.0490 -0.2718 0.0492 -0.0197 1 0.1919 -0.0278 0.0878 0.0765 0.0008 -0.0067 
LOGSALES 0.2176 0.2610 -0.0176 0.2671 -0.0698 0.1919 1 0.8276 0.0793 -0.1873 0.3435 0.0196 
LOGSIZE 0.4754 0.4691 0.0558 0.2423 -0.0298 -0.0278 0.8276 1 0.0577 -0.1322 0.3721 -0.0054 
PROFIT1 0.0101 0.0420 -0.0260 0.0389 -0.0923 0.0878 0.0793 0.0577 1 0.0567 0.2832 0.0008 
LIQUIDITYRATIO -0.0267 -0.0459 -0.0217 -0.0619 -0.0871 0.0765 -0.1873 -0.1322 0.0567 1 0.0823 -0.0031 
QUISCORE 0.2719 0.3092 0.0158 0.0894 -0.1921 0.0008 0.3435 0.3721 0.2832 0.0823 1 0.0018 
SALESGR 0.0017 0.0045 -0.0057 -0.0098 0.0009 -0.0067 0.0196 -0.0054 0.0008 -0.0031 0.0018 1 
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Appendix 4D -Number of Firms stratified by Years 
Year  Number of 
firms 
1998 20188 
1999 22872 
2000 24364 
2001 29342 
2002 34814 
2003 37971 
2004 39799 
2005 42732 
2006 48239 
2007 49730 
2008 50987 
239 
 
Appendix 4E - Qui Credit Assessment* 
Qui Credit Assessment Ltd have extensive experience in the credit industry. The work effects 
current economic conditions and includes post mortems on failed companies. The credit rating on 
fame comprises the Qui Score and the Qui Rating. 
 
The Qui Score 
A measure of the likelihood of company failure in the twelve months following the date of 
calculation. The Qui Score is given as a number in the range 0 to 100. For ease of interpretation, 
that range may be considered as comprising five distinct bands. 
 
81-100 The Secure Band 
Companies in this sector tend to be large and successful public companies. Failure is very 
unusual and normally occurs only as a result of exceptional changes within the company or its 
market. 
 
61-80 The Stable Band 
Here again, company failure is a rare occurrence and will only come about if there are major 
company or marketplace changes. 
 
41-60 The Normal Band 
The sector contains many companies that do not fail, but some that do. 
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21-40 The Unstable Band 
Here, as the name suggests, there is a significant risk of company failure: in fact companies in 
this band are on average four times more likely to fail that those in the Normal Band 
 
0-20 The High Risk Band 
Companies in the High Risk sector are unlikely to be able to be able to continue trading unless 
significant remedial action is undertaken, there is support from a parent company, or special 
circumstances apply. A low score does not mean that failure is inevitable. 
 
Interpreting the Qui Score 
The Qui Score is based on statistical analysis of a random selection of companies. To ensure that 
the model is not distorted, three categories are screened out from the initial selection: major 
public companies, companies that have sort insignificant amounts of unsecured trade credit and 
liquidated companies that have a surplus of assets over liabilities. The Qui Score is intended to be 
an aid to the financial part of the overall assessment, and has to be considered in conjunction with 
other information such as seasonal trends, product life cycles, competition, interest rates and 
other micro and macro-economic factors. The stability of many companies is reliant of that of 
holding companies or other associates on which separate enquiries should be made. 
 
The Qui Rating 
Acts as a yardstick which assists the calculation of credit limits for routine suppliers. 
The basic rating should be modified to reflect factors such as profit margins, stock levels, ability 
to bear losses and other factors specific to individual users. The Qui Rating can also be used by 
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purchasers of goods and services as a yardstick for establishing the monthly rate of purchase from 
suppliers from suppliers. Qui Ratings based on consolidated figures give the position for the 
group as a whole. 
*This is extracted from Qui Credit Assessment
107.
    
  
                                                             
 
107
 http://fame.bvdep.com/Fame/help/HelpFame/AQuiCrAs.htm 
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Appendix 5A- Definitions of variables 
ROA=Net profit to total assets. 
ROCE=Earnings before interest and tax to capital employed. 
LIQUIDITYRATIO=Current assets to current liabilities. 
LOGSIZE=Natural log of total assets. 
LOGSALES=Natural log of sales. 
GEARINGRATIO=Debt to equity. 
TDA=Total debt to total assets. 
LDA=Long term debt to total assets. 
STA= Short term debt to total assets. 
STDTD=Short term debt to total debt. 
SALESGR=Percentage growth in annual sales. 
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Appendix 5B -Number of Firms stratified by Years 
Year  Number of 
firms 
1998 22859 
1999 24853 
2000 29719 
2001 34921 
2002 38279 
2003 40540 
2004 42872 
2005 44387 
2006 49543 
2007 53732 
2008 54183 
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Appendix 5C: Summary results for the empirical analysis 
Panel A and B: Total Sample 
 
Variable Predicted 
sign 
Estimated coefficient for 
ROA 
Estimated coefficient for 
ROCE 
Liquidity 
LIQUIDITYRATIO 
+ - Consistently negative and 
highly significant for total 
sample 
Consistently negative and 
highly significant for total 
sample 
Size of the firm 
LOGSIZE 
 
+ 
 
Consistently positive and 
highly significant in all cases 
Consistently positive and 
highly significant in all cases 
Leverage 
GEARINGRATIO 
 
TDA 
- 
 
 
- 
Consistently negatively 
related to profitability and 
highly significant. 
Consistently negatively 
related to profitability and 
significant. 
Consistently negatively related 
to profitability and highly 
significant. 
Consistently negatively related 
to profitability and significant. 
Growth 
SALESGR 
+ Consistently positive and not 
significant. 
Consistently positive and not 
significant. 
STDTD + Positively signed and highly 
significant. 
Positively signed and highly 
significant. 
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Panel C and D: Sectors  
 
Variable Predic
ted 
sign 
Estimated coefficient for ROA Estimated coefficient for ROCE 
Liquidity 
LIQUIDITYRA
TIO 
+ - S1- Positive and not significant  
S2- Positive and not 
significant. 
S3- Negative and not 
significant. 
S4-Positive and significant. 
S5- Positively signed and not 
significant 
S6- Negative and not 
significant 
S7- Negative and not 
significant 
S8- Negative and not 
significant 
S9- Negative and not 
significant 
M- Positive and significant 
SER - Negative and  
significant. 
 
S1- Positively signed and 
significant.  
S2- Positive and  significant. 
S3- Negative and  significant. 
S4- Positive and not significant. 
S5- Positively signed and not 
significant 
S6- Negative and not significant 
S7- Negative and not significant 
S8- Negative and not significant 
S9- Negative and not significant 
M- Positively related and not 
significant  
SER-. Negative and  significant. 
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Size of the firm 
LOGSIZE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S1- Positively signed and 
highly significant 
S2- Positively signed and 
highly significant 
S3- Positively signed and  not 
significant. 
S4- Positively signed and 
highly significant  
S5- Positively signed and not  
significant. 
S6- Positively signed and 
highly significant 
S7- Positively signed and 
highly significant  
S8- Positively signed and 
highly significant 
S9- Positively signed and 
highly significant  
M-  Positively signed and 
highly significant 
SER- Positively signed and 
highly significant 
S1- Positively signed and highly 
significant 
S2- Positively signed and highly 
significant 
S3- Positively signed and  not 
significant. 
S4- Positively signed and highly 
significant 
S5- Positively signed and  not 
significant. 
S6- Positively signed and 
weakly significant  
S7- Positively signed and highly 
significant 
S8- Positively signed and highly 
significant 
S9- Positively signed and highly 
significant 
M-  Positively signed and 
highly significant 
SER- Positively signed and 
highly significant. 
 
 
 
 
Leverage 
GEARINGRAT
 
- 
S1. Negatively signed and 
highly significant 
S2- Negatively signed and 
S1- Negatively signed and 
highly significant 
S2- Negatively signed and 
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highly significant 
S3- Negatively signed and 
highly significant 
S4- Negatively signed and 
highly significant 
S5- Negatively signed and not 
significant 
S6- Negatively signed and 
highly significant 
S7- Negatively signed and 
highly significant 
S8- Negatively signed and 
highly significant 
S9- Negatively signed and 
highly significant 
M- Negatively signed and 
highly significant 
SER- Negatively signed and 
highly significant 
 
highly significant 
S3- Negatively signed and 
highly significant 
S4- Negatively signed and 
highly significant 
S5- Negatively signed and not 
significant 
S6- Negatively signed and 
highly significant 
S7- Negatively signed and 
highly significant 
S8-Negatively signed and 
highly significant 
S9-Negatively signed and 
highly significant 
M- Negatively signed and 
highly significant 
SER-Negatively signed and 
highly significant 
 
Growth 
SALESGR 
+ S1- Positively signed and not  
significant. 
S2- Positively signed and not  
significant. 
S3- Positively signed and not  
significant. 
S4- Positively signed and  
S1- Positively signed and not  
significant. 
S2- Positively signed and not  
significant. 
S3- Positively signed and not  
significant. 
S4- Positively signed and not 
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significant. 
S5- Positively signed and not  
significant. 
S6- Positively signed and not  
significant. 
S7- Positively signed and  
significant. 
 S8- Positively signed and not  
significant. 
S9- Positively signed and not  
significant. 
 M-Positively signed and not  
significant. 
 SER- Positively signed and  
significant. 
 
significant. 
S5- Positively signed and not  
significant. 
S6- Positively signed and not  
significant. 
S7- Positively signed and  
significant. 
 S8- Positively signed and not  
significant. 
S9- Positively signed and not  
significant. 
 M-Positively signed and not  
significant. 
 SER- Positively signed and  
significant. 
 
STDTD + S1- Positively signed and  
significant. 
S2- Negatively signed and 
significant 
S3- Positively signed and  
significant. 
S4- Positively signed and  
significant. 
S5- Positively signed and not  
significant. 
S6- Positively signed and  
significant. 
S7- Positively signed and  
S1- Positively signed and  
significant. 
S2- Negatively signed and 
significant 
S3- Positively signed and  
significant. 
S4- Positively signed and  
significant. 
S5- Positively signed and not  
significant 
S6- Positively signed and  
significant. 
S7- Positively signed and  
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significant. 
S8- Positively signed and  
significant. 
S9- Positively signed and  
significant. 
M- Negatively signed and not 
significant 
SER- Positively signed and not 
significant 
significant. 
S8- Positively signed and  
significant. 
S9- Positively signed and  
significant. 
M- Negatively signed and  
significant. 
SER- Positively signed and 
significant 
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